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THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  ILLINOIS 
LIBRARY 

1876 


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32 

AT/ 


OP 


Marcus  aurelius  Antoninus 


EMPEROR   OF  THE  ROMANS 


TRANSLATED  BY  GEORGE  LONG 


LEE    AND  SHEPARD 

CHARLES  T.  DILLINGHAM 

]  %1  b 


Cambridge : 
Presswork  by  John  Wilson  &>  Son. 


1.  4 


REMOTE  STORAGE 

To 

KALPH  WALDO  EMERSON, 

THIS  EDITION  OF 

TUB  THOUGHTS  OF  THE  EMPEHOR  M.  AURELIUS 
ANTONINUS, 

IS  INSCRIBED  BY  THE  PUBLISHERS. 


5  \  \  \ 


/ 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Life  of  Marcus  Aurelius     .....  7 
Philosophy  of  Marcus  Aurelius  ...  36 
Meditations  of  Marcus  Aurelius    .    .  81 
Index  of  Greek  Terms,  with  corres- 
ponding English  307 


The  portrait  of  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  is 
from  a  bust  in  the  British  Museum.  The  medallion 
die  is  from  a  coin  of  the  time  of  Aurelius. 


M.  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


ANTONINUS  was  born  at  Rome 
A» m  121?  on  the  26th  of  April. 
His  father  Annius  Verus  died  while 
he  was  praetor.  His  mother  was 
Domitia  Calvilla,  also  named  Lu- 
cilla.  The  Emperor  Antoninus  Pius  married 
Annia  Galeria  Faustina,  the  sister  of  Annius 
Verus,  and  was  consequently  Antoninus'  uncle. 
When  Hadrian  adopted  Antoninus  Pius  and  de- 
clared him  his  successor  in  the  empire,  Antoninus 
Pius  adopted  both  L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  the 
son  of  Aelius  Caesar,  and  M.  Antoninus,  whose 
original  name  was  M.  Annius  Verus.  Antoninus 
took  the  name  of  M.  Aelius  Aurelius  Verus,  to 
which  was  added  the  title  of  Caesar  in  a.  d.  139  : 
the  name  Aelius  belonged  to  Hadrian's  family, 
and  Aurelius  was  the  name  of  Antoninus  Pius. 
When  M.  Antoninus  became  Augustus,  he  dropped 
the  name  of  Verus  and  took  the  name  of  Anto- 
ninus. Accordingly  he  is  generally  named  M. 
Aurelius  Antoninus,  or  simply  M.  Antoninus. 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up.  He 
thanks  the  gods  (i.  17)  that  he  had  good  grand- 
fathers, good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good  teachers, 


8 


M.  A URELIUS 


good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and  friends,  nearly 
everything  good.  He  had  the  happ}^  fortune  to 
witness  the  example  of  his  uncle  and  adoptive 
father  Antoninus  Pius,  and  he  has  recorded  in 
his  work  (i.  16  ;  vi.  30)  the  virtues  of  this  ex- 
cellent man  and  prudent  ruler.  Like  many  young 
Romans  he  tried  his  hand  at  poetry  and  studied 
rhetoric.  Herodes  Atticus  and  M.  Cornelius 
Fronto  were  his  teachers  in  eloquence.  There 
are  extant  letters  between  Fronto  and  Marcus, 
which  show  the  great  affection  of  the  pupil  for 
the  master,  and  the  master's  great  hopes  of  his  in- 
dustrious pupil.  M.  Antoninus  mentions  Fronto 
(i.  11)  among  those  to  whom  he  was  indebted  for 
his  education. 

When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed  the 
dress  of  philosophers,  something  plain  and  coarse, 
became  a  hard  student,  and  lived  a  most  labori- 
ous abstemious  life,  even  so  far  as  to  injure  his 
health.  Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry  and  rhet- 
oric for  philosophy,  and  he  attached  himself  to 
the  sect  of  the  Stoics.  But  he  did  not  neglect 
the  study  of  law,  which  was  a  useful  preparation 
for  the  high  place  which  he  was  designed  to  fill. 
His  teacher  was  L.  Volusianus  Maecianus,  a  dis- 
tinguished jurist.  We  must  suppose  that  he 
learned  the  Roman  discipline  of  arms,  which  was 
a  necessary  part  of  the  education  of  a  man  who 
afterwards  led  his  troops  to  battle  against  a  war- 
like race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the 
names  of  his  teachers  and  the  obligations  which 


It  *y'Msg  4 

ANTONINUS.  9 

he  owed  to  each  of  them.  The  way  in  which  / 
he  speaks  of  what  he  learned  from  them  might 
seem  to  savor  of  vanity  or  self-praise,  if  we  look 
carelessly  at  the  way  in  which  he  has  expressed 
himself ;  but  if  any  one  draws  this  conclusion,  he 
will  be  mistaken.  Antoninus  means  to  com- 
memorate the  merits  of  his  several  teachers,  what 
they  taught  and  what  a  pupil  might  learn  from 
them.  Besides,  this  book  like  the  eleven  other 
books,  was  for  his  own  use,  and  if  we  may  trust 
the  note  at  the  end  of  the  first  book,  it  was  writ- 
ten during  one  of  M.  Antoninus'  campaigns  against 
the  Quadi,  at  a  time  when  the  commemoration  of 
the  virtues  of  his  illustrious  teachers  might  re- 
mind him  of  their  lessons  and  the  practical  uses 
which  he  might  derive  from  them. 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus 
of  Chaeroneia,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch.  What 
he  learned  from  this  excellent  man  is  told  by  him- 
self (i.  9).  His  favorite  teacher  was  Q.  Junius 
Rusticus  (i.  7),  a  philosopher  and  also  a  man  of 
practical  good  sense  in  public  affairs.  Rusticus 
was  the  adviser  of  Antoninus  after  he  became 
emperor.  Young  men  who  are  destined  for  high 
places  are  not  often  fortunate  in  those  who  are 
about  them,  their  companions  and  teachers  ;  and 
I  do  not  know  any  example  of  a  young  prince 
having  had  an  education  which  can  be  compared 
with  that  of  M.  Antoninus.  Such  a  body  of 
teachers  distinguished  by  their  acquirements  and 
their  character  will  hardly  be  collected  again  ;  and 
as  to  the  pupil,  we  have  not  had  one  like  him  since. 


20 


M . AURELIUS 


Hadrian  died  in  July  a.  d.  138,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Antoninus  Pius.  M.  Antoninus  mar- 
ried Faustina,  his  cousin,  the  daughter  of  Pius, 
probably  about  a.  d.  146,  for  he  had  a  daughter 
born  in  147.  M.  Antoninus  received  from  his 
adoptive  father  the  title  of  Caesar  and  was  associ- 
ated with  him  in  the  administration  of  the  state. 
The  father  and  the  adopted  son  lived  together  in 
perfect  friendship  and  confidence.  Antoninus 
was  a  dutiful  son,  and  the  emperor  Pius  loved 
and  esteemed  him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March  161.  The 
Senate,  it  is  said,  urged  M.  Antoninus  to  take 
the  solemn  administration  of  the  empire,  but  he 
associated  with  himself  the  other  adopted  son  of 
Pius,  L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  who  is  generally 
called  L.  Verus.  Thus  Rome  for  the  first  time 
had  two  emperors.  Verus  was  an  indolent  man 
of  pleasure  and  unworthy  of  his  station.  Anto- 
ninus however  bore  with  him,  and  it  is  said  that 
Verus  had  sense  enough  to  pay  to  his  colleague 
the  respect  due  to  his  character.  A  virtuous 
emperor  and  a  loose  partner  lived  together  in 
peace,  and  their  alliance  was  strengthened  by 
Antoninus  giving  to  Verus  for  wife  his  daughter 
Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by 
a  Parthian  war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to  com- 
mand, but  he  did  nothing,  and  the  success  that 
was  obtained  by  the  Romans  in  Armenia  and  on 
the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  was  due  to  his  generals. 
This  Parthian  war  ended  in  165. 


ANTONINUS. 


11 


The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the 
rude  people  beyond  the  Alps  from  the  borders 
of  Gallia  to  the  eastern  side  of  the  Hadriatic. 
These  barbarians  attempted  to  break  into  Italy, 
as  the  Germanic  nations  had  attempted  near 
three  hundred  years  before ;  and  the  rest  of  the 
life  of  Antoninus  with  some  intervals  was  em- 
ployed in  driving  back  the  invaders.  In  169 
Verus  suddenly  died,  and  Antoninus  administered 
the  state  alone. 

In  a.  d.  175  Avidius  Cassius,  a  brave  and  skil- 
ful Roman  commander  who  was  at  the  head  of 
the  troops  in  Asia,  revolted  and  declared  himself 
Augustus.  But  Cassius  was  assassinated  by  some 
of  his  officers,  and  so  the  rebellion  came  to  an 
end.  Antoninus  showed  his  humanity  by  his 
treatment  of  the  family  and  the  partisans  of 
Cassius,  and  his  letter  to  the  senate  in  which  he 
recommends  mercy  is  extant.  (Vulcatius,  Avid- 
ius Cassius,  c.  12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  east  on  hearing  of 
Cassius'  revolt.  We  know  that  in  a.  d.  174  he 
was  engaged  in  a  war  against  the  Quadi,  Marco- 
manni  and  other  Germanic  tribes,  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  he  went  direct  from  the  German  war 
without  returning  to  Rome.  His  wife  Faustina 
who  accompanied  him  into  Asia  died  suddenly  at 
the  foot  of  the  Taurus  to  the  great  grief  of  her 
husband.  Capitolinus  who  has  written  the  life 
of  Antoninus,  and  also  Dion  Cassius  accuse  the 
empress  of  scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband 
and  of  abominable  lewdness.    But  Capitolinus 


12 


M.  AURELIU S 


says  that  Antoninus  either  knew  it  not  or  pre- 
tended not  to  know  it.  Nothing  is  so  common 
as  such  malicious  reports  in  all  ages,  and  the 
history  of  imperial  Rome  is  full  of  them.  Anto- 
ninus loved  his  wife  and  he  says  that  she  was 
"obedient,  affectionate,  and  simple."  The  same 
scandal  had  been  spread  about  Faustina's  mother, 
the  wife  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  yet  he  too  was 
perfectly  satisfied  with  his  wife.  Antoninus  Pius 
says  in  a  letter  to  Fronto  that  he  would  rather 
live  in  exile  with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace  at 
Rome  without  her.  There  are  not  many  men 
who  would  give  their  wives  a  better  character 
than  these  two  emperors.  Capitolinus  wrote  in 
the  time  of  Diocletian.  He  may  have  intended 
to  tell  the  truth,  but  he  is  a  poor,  feeble  biog- 
rapher. Dion  Cassius,  the  most  malignant  of 
historians,  always  reports  and  perhaps  he  believed 
any  scandal  against  anybody. 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria  and 
Egypt,  and  on  his  return  to  Italy  through  Athens 
he  was  initiated  into  the  Eleusinian  mysteries. 
It  was  the  practice  of  the  emperor  to  conform  to 
the  established  rites  of  the  age  and  to  perform 
religious  ceremonies  with  due  solemnity.  We 
cannot  conclude  from  this  that  he  was  a  supersti- 
tious man,  though  we  might  perhaps  do  so,  if  his 
book  did  not  show  that  he  was  not.  But  this 
is  only  one  among  many  instances  that  a  ruler's 
public  acts  do  not  always  prove  his  real  opinions. 
A  prudent  governor  will  not  roughly  oppose  even 
the  superstitions  of  his  people,  and  though  he 


A  NTONINUS. 


13 


may  wish  that  they  were  wiser,  he  will  know  that 
he  cannot  make  them  so  by  offending  their  prej- 
udices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered 
Rome  in  triumph  on  the  23rd  of  December  a.  d. 
176.  In  the  following  year  Commodus  was  asso- 
ciated with  his  father  in  the  empire  and  took  the 
name  of  Augustus.  This  year  Aja,.  177  is  memor- 
able in  ecclesiastical  history.  Attalus  and  others 
were  put  to  death  at  Lyon  for  their  adherence 
to  the  Christian  religion.  The  evidence  of  this 
persecution  is  a  letter  preserved  by  Eusebius 
(E.  H.  v.  1 ;  printed  in  Routh's  Reliquiae  Sacrae, 
vol.  i.  with  notes).  The  letter  is  from  the  Chris- 
tians of  Vienna  and  Lugdunum  in  Gallia  ( Vienne 
and  Lyon)  to  their  Christian  brethren  in  Asia 
and  Phrygia ;  and  it  is  preserved  perhaps  nearly 
entire.  It  contains  a  very  particular  description 
of  the  tortures  inflicted  on  the  Christians  in 
Gallia,  and  it  states  that  while  the  persecution 
was  going  on,  Attalus  a  Christian  and  a  Roman 
citizen  was  loudly  demanded  by  the  populace  and 
brought  into  the  amphitheatre,  but  the  governor 
ordered  him  to  be  reserved  with  the  rest  who 
were  in  prison,  until  he  had  received  instructions 
from  the  emperor.  It  is  not  clear  who  the  "  rest " 
were  who  are  mentioned  in  the  letter.  Many  had 
been  tortured  before  the  governor  thought  of  ap- 
plying to  the  emperor.  The  imperial  rescript, 
says  the  letter,  was  that  the  Christians  should  be 
punished,  but  if  they  would  deny  their  faith,  they 
must  be  released.    On  this  the  work  began  again. 


14 


M.  A  URELIUS. 


The  Christians  who  were  Roman  citizens  were 
beheaded:  the  rest  were  exposed  to  the  wild 
beasts  in  the  amphitheatre.  Some  modern  writers 
on  ecclesiastical  history,  when  they  use  this  letter, 
say  nothing  of  the  wonderful  stories  of  the  mar- 
tyrs' sufferings.  Sanctus,  as  the  letter  says,  was 
burnt  with  plates  of  hot  iron  till  his  body  was  one 
sore  and  had  lost  all  human  form,  but  on  being 
put  to  the  rack  he  recovered  his  former  appear- 
ance under  the  torture,  which  was  thus  a  cure 
instead  of  a  punishment.  He  was  afterwards 
torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an  iron  chair  and 
roasted.    He  died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The 
writer,  whoever  he  was  that  wrote  in  the  name 
of  the  Gallic  Christians,  is  our  evidence  both  for 
the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary  circumstances 
of  the  story,  and  we  cannot  accept  his  evidence 
for  one  fart  and  reject  the  other.  We  often  re- 
ceive small  evidence  as  proof  of  a  thing  which 
we  believe  to  be  within  the  limits  of  probability 
or  possibility,  and  we  reject  exactly  the  same  evi- 
dence, when  the  thing  to  which  it  refers,  appears 
very  improbable  or  impossible.  But  this  is  a  false 
method  of  inquiry,  though  it  is  followed  by  some 
modern  writers,  who  select  what  they  like  from  a 
story  and  reject  the  rest  of  the  evidence ;  or  if 
they  do  not  reject  it,  they  dishonestly  suppress  it. 
A  man  can  only  act  consistently  by  accepting  all 
this  letter  or  rejecting  it  all,  and  we  cannot  blame 
him  for  either.  But  he  who  rejects  it  may  still 
admit  that  such  a  letter  may  be  founded  on  real 


A  NT  ONI  N  US. 


15 


facts ;  and  he  would  make  this  admission  as  the 
most  probable  way  of  accounting  for  the  existence 
of  the  letter :  but  if,  as  he  would  suppose,  the 
writer  has  stated  some  tilings  falsely,  he  cannot 
tell  what  part  of  his.  story  is  worthy  of  credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to 
have  been  uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of  Anto- 
ninus to  the  East,  and  on  his  return  the  emperor 
again  left  Rome  to  oppose  the  barbarians.  The 
Germanic  people  were  defeated  in  a  great  battle 
a.  d.  179.  During  this  campaign  the  emperor 
was  seized  with  some  contagious  malady,  of  which 
he  died  in  the  camp  at  Sirmium  (Mitrovitz)  on 
the  Save  in  Lower  Pannonia,  but  at  Vindebona 
(Vienna)  according  to  other  authorities,  on  the 
17th  of  March  a.  d.  180,  in  the  fifty-ninth  year 
of  his  age.  His  son  Commodus  was  with  him. 
His  body,  or  the  ashes  probably,  was  carried  to 
Rome,  and  he  received  the  honor  of  deification. 
Those  who  could  afford  it  had  his  statue  or  bust, 
and  when  Capitolinus  wrote,  many  people  still 
had  statues  of  Antoninus  among  the  Dei  Penates 
or  household  deities.  He  was  in  a  manner  made 
a  saint.  His  son  Commodus  erected  to  his  mem- 
ory the  Antonine  column  which  is  now  in  the 
Piazza  Colonna  at  Rome.  The  bassi  rilievi 
which  are  placed  in  a  spiral  line  round  the  shaft 
commemorate  his  father's  victories  over  the  Marco- 
manni  and  the  Quadi,  and  the  miraculous  shower 
of  rain  which  refreshed  the  Roman  soldiers  and 
discomfited  their  enemies.  The  statue  of  Antoni- 
nus was  placed  on  the  column,  but  it  was  removed 


M.  A  URELIUS 


at  some  time  unknown,  and  a  bronze  statue  of  St. 
Paul  was  put  in  its  place  by  Pope  Sixtus  the  fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  Anto- 
ninus is  very  defective,  and  some  of  that  which 
remains  is  not  credible.  The  most  curious  is  the 
story  about  the  miracle  which  happened  in  A.  d. 
174  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  The  Roman 
army  was  in  danger  of  perishing  by  thirst,  but  a 
sudden  storm  drenched  them  with  rain,  while  it 
discharged  fire  and  hail  on  their  enemies,  and  the 
Romans  gained  a  great  victory.  All  the  authori- 
ties which  speak  of  the  battle  speak  also  of  the 
miracle.  The  Gentile  writers  assign  it  to  their 
gods,  and  the  Christians  to  the  intercession  of  the 
Christian  legion  in  the  emperor's  army.  To  con- 
firm the  Christian  statement  it  is  added  that  the 
emperor  gave  the  title  of  Thundering  to  this  legion ; 
but  Dacier  and  others  who  maintain  the  Christian 
report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this  title  of  Thun- 
dering or  Lightning  was  not  given  to  this  legion 
because  the  Quadi  were  struck  with  lightning,  but 
because  there  was  a  figure  of  lightning  on  their 
shields,  and  that  this  title  of  the  legion  existed  in 
he  time  of  Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion  was 
called  Thundering  (KepavvofioXos,  or  Kepavvo$>6poi) 
before  the  reign  of  Antoninus.  We  learn  this 
from  Dion  Cassius  (Lib.  55,  c.  23,  and  the  note 
of  Reimarus)  who  enumerates  all  the  legions  of 
Augustus'  time.  The  name  Thundering  or  Light- 
ning also  occurs  on  an  inscription  of  the  reign  of 
Trajan,  which  was  found  at  Trieste.  Eusebius 


ANTONINUS. 


If 


(v.  5)  when  he  relates  the  miracle,  quotes  Apoli- 
narius,  bishop  of  Hierapolis,  as  authority  for  this 
name  being  given  to  the  legion  Melitene  by  the 
emperor  in  consequence  of  the  success  which  he 
obtained  through  their  prayers  ;  from  which  we 
may  estimate  the  value  of  Apolinarius'  testimony. 
Eusebius  does  not  say  in  what  book  of  Apolina- 
rius the  statement  occurs.  Dion  says  that  the 
Thundering  legion  was  stationed  in  Cappadocia 
in  the  time  of  Augustus.  Valesius  also  observes 
that  in  the  Notitia  of  the  Imperium  Romanum 
there  is  mentioned  under  the  commander  of  Ar- 
menia the  Praefectura  of  the  twelfth  legion  named 
"  Thundering  Melitene  ; "  and  this  position  in 
Armenia  will  agree  with  what  Dion  says  of  its 
position  in  Cappadocia.  Accordingly  Valesius 
concludes  that  Melitene  was  not  the  name  of  the 
legion,  but  of  the  town  in  which  it  was  stationed. 
The  legions  did  not,  he  says,  take  their  name  from 
the  place  where  they  were  on  duty,  but  from  the 
country  in  which  they  were  raised,  and  therefore, 
what  Eusebius  says  about  the  Melitene  does  not 
seem  probable  to  him.  Yet  Valesius  on  the  au- 
thority of  Apolinarius  and  Tertullian  believed  that 
the  miracle  was  worked  through  the  prayers  of 
the  Christian  soldiers  in  the  emperor's  army. 
Rufinus  does  not  give  the  name  of  Melitene  to 
this  legion,  says  Valesius,  and  probably  he  pur- 
posely omitted  it,  because  he  knew  that  Melitene 
was  the  name  of  a  town  in  Armenia  Minor,  where 
the  legion  was  stationed  in  his  time. 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a  report  of  his 
2 


18 


M.  A  URELIUS 


victory  to  the  Senate,  which  we  may  believe,  for 
such  was  the  practice ;  but  we  do  not  know  what 
he  said  in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not  extant.  Dacier 
assumes  that  the  emperor's  letter  was  purposely 
destroyed  by  the  Senate  or  the  enemies  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  so  honorable  a  testimony  to  the 
Christians  and  their  religion  might  not  be  perpet- 
uated. The  critic  has  however  not  seen  that  he 
contradicts  himself  when  he  tells  us  the  purport 
of  the  letter,  for  he  says  that  it  was  destroyed, 
and  even  Eusebius  could  not  find  it.  But  there 
does  exist  a  letter  in  Greek  addressed  by  Anto- 
ninus to  the  Roman  Senate  after  this  memorable 
victory.  It  is  sometimes  printed  after  Justin's 
second  Apology,  though  it  is  totally  unconnected 
with  the  apologies.  This  letter  is  one  of  the 
most  stupid  forgeries  of  the  many  which  exist, 
and  it  cannot  be  possibly  founded  even  on  the 
genuine  report  of  Antoninus  to  the  Senate.  If 
it  were  genuine,  it  would  free  the  emperor  from 
the  charge  of  persecuting  men  because  they  were 
Christians,  for  he  says  in  this  false  letter  that  if 
a  man  accuse  another  only  of  being  a  Christian 
and  the  accused  confess  and  there  is  nothing  else 
against  him,  he  must  be  set  free  ;  with  this  mon- 
strous addition  made  by  a  man  inconceivably  ig- 
norant, that  the  informer  must  be  burnt  alive.1 

1  Eusebius  (v.  5)  quotes  Tertullian's  Apology  to  the 
Roman  Senate  in  confirmation  of  the  story.  Tertullian, 
he  says,  writes  that  letters  of  the  emperor  were  extant, 
in  which  he  declares  that  his  army  was  saved  by  the 
prayers  of  the  Christians  ;  and  that  he  "  threatened  to 
punish  with  death  those  who  ventured  to  accuse  us." 


ANTONINUS. 


19 


During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Mar- 
cus Antoninus  there  appeared  the  first  Apology 
of  Justinus,  and  under  M.  Antoninus  the  Oration 
of  Tatian  against  the  Greeks,  which  was  a  fierce 
attack  on  the  established  religions,  the  address  of 
Athenagoras  to  M.  Antoninus  on  behalf  of  the 
Christians,  and  the  Apology  of  Melito,  bishop  of 
Sardes,  also  addressed  to  the  emperor,  and  that 
of  Apolinarius.  The  first  Apology  of  Justinus  is 
addressed  to  Antoninus  Pius  and  his  two  adopted 
sons  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus  ;  but  we  do  not 
know  whether  they  read  it.  The  second  Apology 
of  Justinus  is  addressed  to  the  Roman  Senate, 
but  there  is  nothing  in  it  which  shows  its  date. 
In  one  passage  where  he  is  speaking  of  the  perse- 
cution of  the  Christians,  Justinus  says  that  even 
men  who  followed  the  Stoic  doctrines,  when  they 
ordered  their  lives  according  to  ethical  reason, 
were  hated  and  murdered,  such  as  Heraclitus, 
JMusonius  in  his  own  times  and  others ;  for  all 
those  who  in  any  way  labored  to  live  according 
to  reason  and  avoided  wickedness  were  always 
hated ;  and  this  was  the  effect  of  the  work  of 
daemons. 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to 
death  at  Rome,  because  he  refused  to  sacrifice  to 
the  gods  ;  but  the  circumstances  of  his  death  are 
doubtful,  and  the  time  is  uncertain.    It  cannot 

It  is  possible  that  the  forged  letter  which  is  now  extant 
may  be  one  of  those  which  Tertullian  had  seen,  for  he 
uses  the  plural  number  "  letters."  A  great  deal  has 
been  written  about  this  miracle  of  the  Thundering 
Legion,  and  more  than  is  worth  reading. 


20 


M.  AURELIUS 


have  been  in  the  reign  of  Hadrian,  as  one  author- 
ity states ;  nor  in  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius, 
if  the  second  Apology  was  written  in  the  time  of 
M.  Antoninus. 

The  persecution  in  which  Polycarp  suffered  at 
Smyrna  belongs  to  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus. 
The  evidence  for  it  is  the  letter  of  the  church 
of  Smyrna  to  the  churches  of  Philomelium  and 
the  other  Christian  churches,  and  it  is  preserved 
by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  15).  But  the  critics  do 
not  agree  about  the  time  of  Poly  carp's  death, 
differing  in  the  two  extremes  to  the  amount  of 
twelve  years.  The  circumstances  of  Polycarp's 
martyrdom  were  accompanied  by  miracles,  one  of 
which  Eusebius  (iv.  15)  has  omitted,  but  it  ap- 
pears in  the  oldest  Latin  version  of  the  letter, 
which  Usher  published,  and  it  is  supposed  that 
this  version  was  made  not  long  after  the  time  of 
Eusebius.  The  notice  at  the  end  of  the  letter 
states  that  it  was  transcribed  by  Caius  from  th© 
copy  of  Irenaeus,  the  disciple  of  Polycarp,  then 
transcribed  by  Socrates  at  Corinth ;  "  after  which 
I  Pionius  again  wrote  it  out  from  the  copy  above 
mentioned,  having  searched  it  out  by  the  revela- 
tion of  Polycarp,  who  directed  me  to  it,"  &c.  The 
story  of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  is  embellished  with 
miraculous  circumstances  which  some  modern 
writers  on  ecclesiastical  history  take  the  liberty 
of  omitting.2 

2  Conyers  Middleton,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Mirac- 
ulous Powers,  &e.  p.  126.  Middleton  says  that  Eusebius 
omitted  to  mention  the  dove,  which  flew  out  of  Poly- 


ANTONINUS. 


21 


In  order  to  form  a  proper  notion  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  Christians  under  M.  Antoninus 
we  must  go  back  to  Trajan's  time.  When  the 
younger  Pliny  was  governor  of  Bithynia,  the 
Christians  were  numerous  in  those  parts,  and  the 
worshippers  of  the  old  religion  were  falling  off. 
The  temples  were  deserted,  the  festivals  neglected, 
and  there  were  no  purchasers  of  victims  for  sacri- 
fice. Those  who  were  interested  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  old  religion  thus  found  that  their 
profits  were  in  danger.  Christians  of  both  sexes 
and  of  all  ages  were  brought  before  the  governor, 
who  did  not  know  what  to  do  with  them.  He 
could  come  to  no  other  conclusion  than  this,  that 
those  who  confessed  to  be  Christians  and  per- 
severed in  their  religion  ought  to  be  punished ; 
if  for  nothing  else,  for  their  invincible  obstinacy. 
He  found  no  crimes  proved  against  the  Christians, 
and  he  could  only  characterize  their  religion  as 
a  depraved  and  extravagant  superstition,  which 
might  be  stopped,  if  the  people  were  allowed  the 
opportunity  of  recanting.  Pliny  wrote  this  in  a 
letter  to  Trajan  (Plinius,  Ep.  x.  97).  He  asked 
for  the  emperor's  directions,  because  he  did  not 
know  what  to  do :  He  remarks  that  he  had 
never  been  engaged  in  judicial  inquiries  about 

carp's  body,  and  Dodwell  and  Archbishop  Wake  have 
done  the  same.  Wake  says,  "  I  am  so  little  a  friend  to 
such  miracles  that  I  thought  it  better  with  Eusebius  to 
omit  that  circumstance  than  to  mention  it  from  Bishop 
Usher's  Manuscript,"  which  manuscript  however,  says 
Middleton,  he  afterwards  declares  to  be  so  well  attested 
that  we  need  not  any  further  assurance  of  the  truth  of 
it. 


22 


M.  A  URELIUS 


the  Christians,  and  that  accordingly  he  did  not 
know  what  or  how  far  to  inquire  and  punish. 
This  proves  that  it  was  not  a  new  thing  to  inquire 
into  a  man's  profession  of  Christianity  and  to 
punish  him  for  it.  Trajan's  Rescript  is  extant. 
He  approved  of  the  governor's  judgment  in  the 
matter ;  but  he  said  that  no  search  must  be  made 
after  the  Christians ;  if  a  man  was  charged  with 
the  new  religion  and  convicted,  he  must  not  be 
punished,  if  he  affirmed  that  he  was  not  a  Chris- 
tian and  confirmed  his  denial  by  showing  his  rev- 
erence to  the  heathen  gods.  He  added  that  no 
notice  must  be  taken  of  anonymous  informations, 
for  such  things  were  of  bad  example.  Trajan 
was  a  mild  and  sensible  man,  and  both  motives 
of  mercy  and  policy  probably  also  induced  him  to 
take  as  little  notice  of  the  Christians  as  he  could ; 
to  let  them  live  in  quiet,  if  it  were  possible. 
Trajan's  Rescript  is  the  first  legislative  act  of  the 
head  of  the  Roman  state  with  reference  to  Chris- 
tianity, which  is  known  to  us.  It  does  not  appear 
that  the  Christians  were  further  disturbed  under 
his  reign.  The  martyrdom  of  Ignatius  by  the 
order  of  Trajan  himself  is  not  universally  ad- 
mitted to  be  an  historical  fact. 

In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  possi- 
ble for  the  Roman  government  to  overlook  the 
great  increase  of  the  Christians  and  the  hostility 
of  the.  common  sort  to  them.  If  the  governors 
in  the  provinces  wished  to  let  them  alone,  they 
could  not  resist  the  fanaticism  of  the  heathen 
community,  who  looked  on  the  Christians  as  athe- 


ANTONINUS. 


23 


ists.  The  Jews  too  who  were  settled  all  over  the 
Roman  Empire  were  as  hostile  to  the  Christians 
as  the  Gentiles  were.  With  the  time  of  Hadrian 
begin  the  Christian  Apologies,  which  show  plainly 
what  the  popular  feeling  towards  the  Christians 
then  was.  A  rescript  of  Hadrian  to  the  Pro- 
consul of  Asia,  which  stands  at  the  end  of  Jus- 
tin's first  apology,  instructs  the  governor  that 
innocent  people  must  not  be  troubled  and  false 
accusers  must  not  be  allowed  to  extort  money 
from  them  ;  the  charges  against  the  Christians 
must  be  made  in  due  form  and  no  attention  must 
be  paid  to  popular  clamors ;  when  Christians 
were  regularly  prosecuted  and  convicted  of  any 
illegal  act,  they  must  be  punished  according  to 
their  deserts  ;  and  false  accusers  also  must  be  pun- 
ished. Antoninus  Pius  is  said  to  have  published 
Rescripts  to  the  same  effect.  The  terms  of  Ha- 
drian's Rescript  seem  very  favorable  to  the 
Christians,  but  if  we  understand  it  in  this  sense, 
that  they  were  only  to  be  punished  like  other 
people  for  illegal  acts,  it  would  have  had  no  mean- 
ing, for  that  could  have  been  done  without  asking 
the  emperor's  advice.  The  real  purpose  of  the 
Rescript  is  that  Christians  must  be  punished  if 
they  persisted  in  their  belief,  and  would  not  prove 
their  renunciation  of  it  by  acknowledging  the 
heathen  religion.  This  was  Trajan's  rule,  and  we 
have  no  reason  for  supposing  that  Hadrian  granted 
more  to  the  Christians  than  Trajan  did.  There 
is  printed  at  the  end  of  Justin's  Apology  a  Re- 
script of  Antoninus  Pius  to  the  Commune  of  Asia 


24 


M.  AURELIUS 


(to  koivov  tt]s  * Aatas) ,  and  it  is  also  in  Eusebius3 
(E.  H.  iy.  13).  The  Rescript  declares  that 
the  Christians,  for  they  are  meant,  though  the 
name  Christians  does  not  occur  in  the  Rescript, 
were  not  to  be  disturbed,  unless  they  were  attempt- 
ing something  against  the  Roman  rule,  and  no 
man  was  to  be  punished  simply  for  being  a  Chris- 
tian. But  this  Rescript  is  spurious.  Any  man 
moderately  acquainted  with  Roman  history  will 
see  at  once  from  the  style  and  tenor  that  it  is  a 
clumsy  forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition 
between  the  old  and  the  new  belief  was  still 
stronger,  and  the  adherents  of  the  heathen  re- 
ligion urged  those  in  authority  to  a  more  regular 
resistance  to  the  invasions  of  the  Christian  faith. 
Melito  in  his  apology  to  M.  Antoninus  represents 
the  Christians  of  Asia  as  persecuted  under  new 
imperial  orders.  Shameless  informers,  he  says, 
men  who  were  greedy  after  the  property  of  others, 
used  these  orders  as  a  means  of  robbing  those  who 

3  In  Eusebius  the  name  at  the  beginning  of  the  Re- 
script is  that  of  M.  Antoninus  ;  and  so  we  cannot  tell  to 
which  of  the  two  emperors  the  forger  assigned  the  Re- 
script.   There  are  also  a  few  verbal  differences. 

The  author  of  the  Alexandrine  Chronicum  says  that 
Marcus  being  moved  by  the  entreaties  of  Melito  and 
other  heads  of  the  church  wrote  an  Epistle  to  the  Com- 
mune of  Asia  in  which  he  forbade  the  Christians  to  be 
troubled  on  account  of  their  religion.  Valesius  sup- 
poses this  to  be  the  letter  which  is  contained  in  Eusebius 
(iv.  13),  and  to  be  the  answer  to  the  apology  of  Melito 
of  which  I  shall  soon  give  the  substance.  But  Marcus 
certainly  did  not  write  this  letter  which  is  in  Eusebius, 
and  we  know  not  what  answer  he  made  to  Melito. 


ANTONINUS. 


25 


were  doing  no  harm.  He  doubts  if  a  just  em- 
peror could  have  ordered  anything  so  unjust ;  and 
if  the  last  order  was  really  not  from  the  emperor, 
the  Christians  entreat  him  not  to  give  them  up  to 
their  enemies.4    We  conclude  from  this  that  there 

*  Eusebius,  iv.  26  ;  and  Routh's  Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol. 
I.  and  the  notes.  The  interpretation  of  this  Fragment 
is  not  easy.  Mosheim  misunderstood  one  passage  so  far 
as  to  affirm  that  Marcus  promised  rewards  to  those  who 
denounced  the  Christians  ;  an  interpretation  which  is 
entirely  false.  Melito  calls  the  Christian  religion  "  our 
philosophy,"  which  began  among  barbarians  (the  Jews), 
and  flourished  among  the  Roman  subjects  in  the  time 
of  Augustus,  to  the  great  advantage  of  the  empire,  for 
from  that  time  the  power  of  the  Romans  grew  great  and 
glorious.  He  says  that  the  emperor  has  and  will  have 
as  the  successor  to  Augustus'  power  the  good  wishes  of 
men,  if  he  will  protect  that  philosophy  which  grew  up 
with  the  empire  and  began  with  Augustus,  which  phi- 
losophy the  predecessors  of  Antoninus  honored  in  addi- 
tion to  the  other  religions.  He  further  says  that  the 
Christian  religion  had  suffered  no  harm  since  the  time 
of  Augustus,  but  on  the  contrary  had  enjoyed  all  honor 
and  respect  that  any  man  could  desire.  Nero  and  Domi- 
tian,  he  says,  were  alone-  persuaded  by  some  malicious 
men  to  calumniate  the  Christian  religion,  and  this  was 
the  origin  of  the  false  charges  against  the  Christians. 
But  this  was  corrected  by  the  emperors  who  immediately 
preceded  Antoninus,  who  often  by  their  Rescripts  re- 
proved those  who  attempted  to  trouble  the  Christians. 
Hadrian,  Antoninus'  grandfather,  wrote  to  many,  and 
among  them  to  the  governor  of  Asia.  Antoninus  Pius 
when  Marcus  was  associated  with  him  in  the  empire 
wrote  to  the  cities,  that  they  must  not  trouble  the  Chris- 
tians ;  among  others  to  the  people  of  Larissa,  Thessa- 
lonica,  the  Athenians  and  all  the  Greeks.  Melito  con- 
cluded thus  :  We  are  persuaded  that  thou  who  hast 
about  these  things  the  same  mind  that  they  had,  nay 
rather  one  much  more  humane  and  philosophical,  wilt 
do  all  that  we  ask  thee.  —  This  Apology  was  written 
after  a.  d.  169,  the  year  in  which  Verus  died,  for  it  speaks 


26 


M .  A  URELIUS 


were  at  least  imperial  Rescripts  or  Constitutions 
of  M.  Antoninus,  which  were  made  the  founda- 
tion of  these  persecutions.  The  fact  of  being  a 
Christian  was  now  a  crime  and  punished,  unless 
the  accused  denied  their  religion.  Then  come 
the  persecutions  at  Smyrna,  which  some  modern 
critics  place  in  a.  d.  167,  ten  years  before  the 
persecution  of  Lyon.  The  governors  of  the  prov- 
inces under  M.  Antoninus  might  have  found 
enough  even  in  Trajan's  Rescript  to  warrant  them 
in  punishing  Christians,  and  the  fanaticism  of  the 
people  would  drive  them  to  persecution,  even  if 
they  were  unwilling.  But  besides  the  fact  of  the 
Christians  rejecting  all  the  heathen  ceremonies, 
we  must  not  forget  that  they  plainly  maintained 
that  all  the  heathen  religions  were  false.  The 
Christians  thus  declared  war  against  the  heathen 
rites,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  obseive  that 
this  was  a  declaration  of  hostility  against  the 
Roman  government,  which  tolerated  all  the  vari- 
ous forms  of  superstition  that  existed  in  the  empire, 
and  could  not  consistently  tolerate  another  religion, 
which  declared  that  all  the  rest  were  false,  and  all 

of  Marcus  only  and  his  son  Commodus.  According  to 
Melito's  testimony,  Christians  had  only  been  punished 
for  their  religion  in  the  time  of  Nero  and  Domitian,  and 
the  persecutions  began  again  in  the  time  of  M.  Anto- 
ninus and  were  founded  on  his  orders,  which  were  abused 
as  he  seems  to  mean.  He  distinctly  affirms  '•  that  the 
race  of  the  godly  is  now  persecuted  and  harrassed  by 
fresh  imperial  orders  in  Asia,  a  thing  M'hich  had  never 
happened  before."  But  we  know  that  all  this  is  not 
true,  and  that  Christians  had  been  punished  in  Trajan's 
time. 


ANTONINUS. 


27 


the  splendid  ceremonies  of  the  empire  only  a  wor- 
ship of  devils. 

If  we  had  a  true  ecclesiastical  history,  we  should 
know  how  the  Roman  emperors  attempted  to  check 
the  new  religion,  how  they  enforced  their  princi- 
ple of  finally  punishing  Christians,  simply  as  Chris- 
tians, which  Justin  in  his  Apology  affirms  that  they 
did,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  he  tells  the  truth  ; 
how  far  popular  clamor  and  riots  went  in  this 
matter,  and  how  far  many  fanatical  and  ignorant 
Christians,  for  there  were  many  such,  contributed 
to  excite  the  fanaticism  on  the  other  side  and  to  em- 
bitter the  quarrel  between  the  Roman  government 
and  the  new  religion.  Our  extant  ecclesiastical 
histories  are  manifestly  falsified,  and  what  truth 
they  contain  is  grossly  exaggerated  ;  but  the  fact  is 
certain  that  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  hea- 
then populations  were  in  open  hostility  to  the 
Christians,  and  that  under  Antoninus'  rule  men 
were  put  to  death  because  they  were  Christians. 
Eusebius  in  the  preface  to  his  fifth  book  remarks 
that  in  the  seventeenth  year  of  Antoninus'  reign, 
in  some  parts  of  the  world  the  persecution  of  the 
Christians  became  more  violent,  and  that  it  pro- 
ceeded from  the  populace  in  the  cities ;  and  he 
adds  in  his  usual  style  of  exaggeration,  that  we 
may  infer  from  what  took  place  in  a  single 
nation  that  myriads  of  martyrs  were  made  in  the 
habitable  earth.  The  nation  which  he  alludes  to 
is  Gallia  ;  and  he  then  proceeds  to  give  the  letter 
of  the  churches  of  Viemia  and  Lugdunum.  It 
is  probable  that  he  has  assigned  the  true  cause  of 


28 


M .  AURELIUS 


the  persecutions,  the  fanaticism  of  the  populace, 
and  that  both  governors  and  emperor  had  a  great 
deal  of  trouble  with  these  disturbances.  How 
far  Marcus  was  cognizant  of  these  cruel  proceed- 
ings we  do  not  know,  for  the  historical  records  of 
his  reign  are  very  defective.  He  did  not  make 
the  rule  against  the  Christians,  for  Trajan  did 
that ;  and  if  we  admit  that  he  would  have  been 
willing  to  let  the  Christians  alone,  we  cannot 
affirm  that  it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a 
great  mistake  to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the 
unlimited  authority,  which  some  modern  sovereigns 
have  had.  His  power  was  limited  by  certain  con- 
stitutional forms,  by  the  Senate,  and  by  the  prece- 
dents of  his  predecessors.  We  cannot  admit  that 
such  a  man  was  an  active  persecutor,  for  there  is 
no  evidence  that  he  was,  though  it  is  certain  that 
he  had  no  good  opinion  of  the  Christians,  as  ap- 
pears from  his  own  words.5    But  he  knew  nothing 

5  See  xi.  3.  The  emperor  probably  speaks  of  such 
fanatics  as  Clemens  (quoted  by  Gataker  on  this  passage) 
mentions.  The  rational  Christians  admitted  no  fellow- 
ship with  them.  "  Some  of  these  heretics,"  says  Clemens, 
"  show  their  impiety  and  cowardice  by  loving  their  lives, 
saying  that  the  knowledge  of  the  really  existing  God  is 
true  testimony  (martyrdom),  but  that  a  man  is  a  self- 
murderer  who  bears  witness  by  his  death.  We  also  blame 
those  who  rush  to  death,  for  there  are  some,  not  of  us, 
but  only  bearing  the  same  name  who  give  themselves 
up.  We  say  of  them  that  they  die  without  being  martyrs, 
even  if  they  are  publicly  punished  ;  and  they  give  them- 
selves up  to  a  death  which  avails  nothing,  as  the  Indian 
Gymnosophists  give  themselves  up  foolishly  to  fire.'" 
Cave  in  his  Primitive  Christianity  (n.  c.  7)  says  of  the 
Christians :   "  They  did  flock  to  the  place  of  torment 


ANTONINUS. 


29 


of  them  except  their  hostility  to  the  Roman  relig- 
ion, and  he  probably  thought  that  they  were 
dangerous  to  the  state,  notwithstanding  the  pro- 
fessions false  or  true  of  some  of  the  Apologists. 
So  much  I  have  said,  because  it  would  be  unfair 
not  to  state  all  that  can  be  urged  against  a  man 
whom  his  contemporaries  and  subsequent  ages 
venerated  as  a  model  of  virtue  and  benevolence. 
If  I  admitted  the  genuineness  of  some  documents, 
he  would  be  altogether  clear  from  the  charge  of 
even  allowing  any  persecutions  ;  but  as  I  seek  the 
truth  and  am  sure  that  they  are  false,  I  leave  him 
to  bear  whatever  blame  is  his  due.  I  add  that  it 
is  quite  certain  that  Antoninus  did  not  derive  any 
of  his  Ethical  principles  from  a  religion  of  which 
he  knew  nothing.6 

faster  than  droves  of  beasts  that  are  driven  to  the  sham- 
bles. They  even  longed  to  be  in  the  arms  of  suffering. 
Ignatius,  though  then  in  his  journey  to  Rome  in  order 
to  his  execution,  yet  by  the  way  as  he  went  could  not 
but  vent  his  passionate  desire  of  it :  O  that  I  might 
come  to  those  wild  beasts,  that  are  prepared  for  me  ;  I 
heartily  wish  that  I  may  presently  meet  with  them  ;  I 
would  invite  and  encourage  them  speedily  to  devour  me, 
and  not  be  afraid  to  set  upon  me  as  they  have  been  to 
others  ;  nay  should  they  refuse  it,  I  would  even  force 
them  to  it and  more  to  the  same  purpose  from  Eusebius. 
Cave,  an  honest  and  good  man,  says  all  this  in  praise  of 
the  Christians ;  but  I  think  that  he  mistook  the  matter. 
We  admire  a  man  who  holds  to  his  principles  even  to 
death ;  but  these  fanatical  Christians  are  the  Gymnoso- 
phists  whom  Clemens  treats  with  disdain. 

6  Dr  F.  C.  Baur  in  his  work  entitled  Das  Christenthum 
und  die  Christliche  Kirche  der  drei  ersten  Jahrhunderte; 
&c.  has  examined  this  question  with  great  good  sense 
and  fairness,  and  I  believe  he  has  stated  the  truth  as  near 
as  our  authorities  enable  us  to-  reach  it. 


so 


M.  A URELIUS 


There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor's  Reflec- 
tions or  his  Meditations,  as  they  are  generally 
named,  is  a  genuine  work.  In  the  first  book  he 
speaks  of  himself,  his  family,  and  his  teachers  ; 
and  in  other  books  he  mentions  himself.  Suidas 
(v.  MapKo^)  notices  a  work  of  Antoninus  in  twelve 
books,  which  he  names  the  "  conduct  of  his  own 
life  ; "  and  he  cites  the  book  under  several  words 
in  his  Dictionary,  giving  the  emperor's  name,  but 
not  the  title  of  the  work.  There  are  also  passages 
cited  by  Suidas  from  Antoninus  without  mention 
of  the  emperor's  name.  The  true  title  of  the 
work  is  unknown.  Xylander  who  published  the 
first  edition  of  this  book  (Zurich,  1558,  8vo.,  with  a 
Latin  version)  used  a  manuscript,  which  contained 
the  twelve  books,  but  it  is  not  known  where  the 
manuscript  is  now.  The  only  other  complete 
manuscript  which  is  known  to  exist  is  in  the  Vati- 
can library,  but  it  has  no  title  and  no  inscriptions 
of  the  several  books  :  the  eleventh  only  has  the 
inscription  MdpKov  avroKpdropo^  marked  with  an 
asterisk.  The  other  Vatican  manuscripts  and  the 
three  Florentine  contain  only  excerpts  from  the 
emperor's  book.  All  the  titles  of  the  excerpts 
nearly  agree  with  that  which  Xylander  prefixed 
to  his  edition,  NLdpKOV  '  Avtiuvlvov  AvroKpdrop^  tcov 
ets  kavrov  /3i/3A.ta  i/?.  This  title  has  been  used  by 
all  subsequent  editors.  We  cannot  tell  whether 
Antoninus  divided  his  work  into  books  or  some- 
body else  did  it.  If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end  of 
the  first  and  second  books  are  genuine,  he  may 
have  made  the  division  himself. 


ANTONINUS. 


31 


It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his 
thoughts  or  reflections  as  the  occasions  arose  ;  and 
since  they  were  intended  for  his  own  use,  it  is  no 
improbable  conjecture  that  he  left  a  complete  copy 
behind  him  written  with  his  own  hand ;  for  it  is 
not  likely  that  so  diligent  a  man  would  use  the 
labor  of  a  transcriber  for  such  a  purpose,  and 
expose  his  most  secret  thoughts  to  any  other  eye. 
He  may  have  also  intended  the  book  for  his  son 
Commodus,  who  however  had  no  taste  for  his 
father's  philosophy.  Some  careful  hand  preserved 
the  precious  volume ;  and  a  work  by  Antoninus 
is  mentioned  by  other  late  writers  besides  Suidas. 

Many  critics  have  labored  on  the  text  of  Anto- 
ninus. The  most  complete  edition  is  that  by 
Thomas  Gataker,  1652,  4to.  The  second  edition 
of  Gataker  was  superintended  by  George  Stan- 
hope, 1697,  4to.  There  is  also  an  edition  of  1704. 
Gataker  made  and  suggested  many  good  correc- 
tions, and  he  also  made  a  new  Latin  version,  which 
is  not  a  very  good  specimen  of  Latin,  but  it 
generally  expresses  the  sense  of  the  original  and 
often  better  than  some  of  the  more  recent  trans- 
lations. He  added  in  the  margin  opposite  to  each 
paragraph  references  to  the  other  parallel  passages  ; 
and  he  wrote  a  commentary,  one  of  the  most  com- 
plete that  has  been  written  on  any  ancient  author. 
This  commentary  contains  the  editor's  exposition 
of  the  more  difficult  passages,  and  quotations  from 
all  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  for  the  illustra- 
tion of  the  text.  It  is  a  wonderful  monument  of 
learning  and  labor,  and  certainly  no  Englishman 


32 


M .  A URELIUS 


has  yet  done  anything  like  it.  At  the  end  of  his 
preface  the  editor  says  that  he  wrote  it  at  Rother- 
hithe  near  London  in  a  severe  winter,  when  he 
was  in  the  seventy-eighth  year  of  his  age,  1651, 
a  time  when  Milton,  Selden  and  other  great  men 
of  the  Commonwealth  time  were  living  ;  and  the 
great  French  scholar  Saumaise  (Salmasius),  with 
whom  Gataker  corresponded  and  received  help 
from  him  for  his  edition  of  Antoninus.  The 
Greek  text  has  also  been  edited  by  J.  M.  Sclmltz, 
Leipzig,  1802,  8vo. ;  and  by  the  learned  Greek 
Adamantius  Coral's,  Paris,  1816,  8vo.  The  text 
of  Schultz  was  republished  by  Tauclmitz,  1821. 

There  are  English,  French,  Italian  and  Spanish 
translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and  there  may  be 
others.  I  have  not  seen  all  the  English  transla- 
tions. There  is  one  by  Jeremy  Collier,  1702,  8vo. 
a  most  coarse  and  vulgar  copy  of  the  original. 
The  latest  French  translation  by  Alexis  Pierron 
in  the  collection  of  Charpentier  is  better  than 
Dacier's,  which  has  been  honored  with  an  Italian 
version  (Udine,  1772).  There  is  an  Italian  ver- 
sion (1 675)  which  I  have  not  seen.  It  is  by  a 
cardinal.  "  A  man  illustrious  in  the  church,  the 
Cardinal  Francis  Barberini  the  elder,  nephew  of 
Pope  Urban  VIII,  occupied  the  last  years  of  his 
life  in  translating  into  his  native  language  the 
thoughts  of  the  Roman  emperor,  in  order  to 
diffuse  among  the  faithful  the  fertilizing  and  vivi- 
fying seeds.  He  dedicated  this  translation  to  his 
soul,  to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his  energetic  style, 
redder  than  his  purple  at  the  sight  of  the  virtues 


ANTONINUS. 


83 


of  this  Gentile"  (Pierron,  Preface).  I  have  made 
this  translation  at  intervals  after  having  used  the 
book  for  many  years.  It  is  made  from  the  Greek, 
but  I  have  not  always  followed  one  text.  I  have 
occasionally  compared  other  versions.  I  made 
this  translation  for  my  own  use,  because  I  found 
that  it  was  worth  the  labor.  It  may  be  useful 
to  others  also  and  at  last  I  have  determined  to 
print  it,  though,  as  the  original  is  both  very  difficult 
to  understand  and  still  more  difficult  to  translate, 
it  is  not  possible  that  I  have  always  avoided  error. 
But  I  believe  that  I  have  not  often  missed  the 
meaning,  and  those  who  will  take  the  trouble  to 
compare  the  translation  with  the  original  should 
not  hastily  conclude  that  I  am  wrong,  if  they  do 
not  agree  with  me.  Some  passages  do  give  the 
meaning,  though  at  first  sight  they  may  not  appear 
to  do  so  ;  and  when  I  differ  from  the  translators, 
I  think  that  in  some  places  they  are  wrong,  and  in 
other  places  I  am  sure  that  they  are.  I  have 
placed  a  f  in  some  passages,  which  indicates  cor- 
ruption in  the  text  or  great  uncertainty  in  the 
meaning.  I  could  have  made  the  language  more 
easy  and  flowing,  but  I  have  preferred  a  somewhat 
ruder  style  as  being  better  suited  to  express  the 
character  of  the  original ;  and  sometimes  the  ob- 
scurity which  may  appear  in  the  version  is  a  fair 
copy  of  the  obscurity  of  the  Greek.  If  I  should 
ever  revise  this  version,  I  would  gladly  make  use 
of  any  corrections  which  may  be  suggested.  I 
have  added  an  index  of  some  of  the  Greek  terms 
with  the  corresponding  English.  If  I  have  not 
3 


34 


M.  A  URELIUS 


given  the  best  words  for  the  Greek,  I  have  done  the 
best  that  I  could  ;  and  in  the  text  I  have  always 
given  the  same  translation  of  the  same  word. 

The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  that 
I  have  observed  is  in  Simplicius'  Commentary  on 
the  Enchiridion  of  Epictetus.  Simplicius  was  not 
a  Christian,  and  such  a  man  was  not  likely  to  be 
converted  at  a  time  when  Christianity  was  grossly 
corrupted.  But  he  was  a  really  religious  man, 
and  he  concludes  his  commentary  with  a  prayer 
to  the  Deity  which  no  Christian  could  improve. 
From  the  time  of  Zeno  to  Simplicius,  a  period  of 
about  nine  hundred  years,  the  Stoic  philosophy 
formed  the  characters  of  some  of  the  best  and 
greatest  men.  Finally  it  became  extinct,  and  we 
hear  no  more  of  it  till  the  revival  of  letters  in 
Italy.  Angelo  Poliziano  met  with  two  very  inac- 
curate and  incomplete  manuscripts  of  Epictetus' 
Enchiridion,  which  he  translated  into  Latin  and 
dedicated  to  his  great  patron  Lorenzo  de'  Medici 
in  whose  collection  he  had  found  the  book.  Poli- 
ziano's  version  was  printed  in  the  first  Bale  edition 
of  the  Enchiridion,  A.  D.  1531  (apud  And.  Cra- 
tandrum).  Poliziano  recommends  the  Enchiridion 
to  Lorenzo  as  a  work  well  suited  to  his  temper, 
and  useful  in  the  difficulties  by  which  he  was  sur- 
rounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers  ever 
since  they  were  first  printed.  The  little  book  of 
Antoninus  has  been  the  companion  of  some  great 
men.  Machiavelli's  Art  of  War  and  Marcus 
Antoninus  were  the  two  books  winch  were  used 


ANTONINUS. 


35 


when  he  was  a  young  man  by  Captain  John 
Smith,  and  he  could  not  have  found  two  writers 
better  fitted  to  form  the  character  of  a  soldier 
and  a  man.  Smith  is  almost  unknown  and  for- 
gotten in  England  his  native  country,  but  not  in 
America  where  he  saved  the  young  colony  of  Vir- 
ginia. He  was  great  in  his  heroic  mind  and  his 
deeds  in  arms,  but  greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of 
his  character.  For  a  man's  greatness  lies  not  in 
wealth  and  station,  as  the  vulgar  believe,  nor  yet 
.in  his  intellectual  capacity,  which  is  often  asso- 
ciated with  the  meanest  moral  character,  the  most 
abject  servility  to  those  in  high  places  and  arro- 
gance to  the  poor  and  lowly ;  but  a  man's  true 
greatness  lies  in  the  consciousness  of  an  honest 
purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a  just  estimate  of  him- 
self and  everything  else,  on  frequent  self-exami- 
nation, and  a  steady  obedience  to  the  rule  which 
he  knows  to  be  right,  without  troubling  himself, 
as  the  emperor  says  he  should  not,  about  what 
others  may  think  or  say,  or  whether  they  do  or  do 
not  do  that  which  he  thinks  and  says  and  does. 


THE 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANTONINUS. 


T  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  phi- 
losophy first  showed  its  real  value 
when  it  passed  from  Greece  to  Rome. 
The  doctrines  of  Zeno  and  his  suc- 


cessors were  well  suited  to  the  gravity  and  practi- 
cal good  sense  of  the  Romans ;  and  even  in  the 
Republican  period  we  have  an  example  of  a  man, 
M.  Cato  Uticensis,  who  lived  the  life  of  a  Stoic 
and  died  consistently  with  the  opinions  which  he 
professed.  He  was  a  man,  says  Cicero,  who  em- 
braced the  Stoic  philosophy  from  conviction  ;  not 
for  the  purpose  of  vain  discussion,  as  most  did,  but 
in  order  to  make  his  life  conformable  to  its  pre- 
cepts. In  the  wretched  times  from  the  death  of . 
Augustus  to  the  murder  of  Domitian,  there  was 
nothing  but  the  Stoic  philosophy  which  could  con- 
sole and  support  the  followers  of  the  old  religion 
under  imperial  tyranny  and  amidst  universal  cor- 
ruption. There  were  even  then  noble  minds  that 
could  dare  and  endure,  sustained  by  a  good  con- 
science and  an  elevated  idea  of  the  purposes  of 
man's  existence.     Such  were  Paetus  Thrasea, 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANTONINUS*  3? 


Helvidius  Priscus,  Cornutus,  C.  Musonius  Rufus,* 
and  the  poets  Persius  and  Juvenal,  whose  ener- 
getic language  and  manly  thoughts  may  be  as  in- 
structive to  us  now  as  they  might  have  been  to 
their  contemporaries.  Persius  died  under  Nero's 
bloody  reign,  but  Juvenal  had  the  good  fortune  to 
survive  the  tyrant  Domitian  and  to  see  the  better 
times  of  Nerva,  Trajan  and  Hadrian.  His  best 
precepts  are  derived  from  the  Stoic  school,  and 
they  are  enforced  in  his  finest  verses  by  the  un- 
rivalled vigor  of  the  Latin  language. 

The  two  best  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical 
philosophy  were  a  Greek  slave  and  a  Roman  em- 
peror. Epictetus,  a  Phrygian  Greek,  was  brought 
to  Rome,  we  know  not  how,  but  he  was  there  the 
slave  and  afterwards  the  freedman  of  an  unworthy 
master,  Epaphroclitus  by  name,  himself  a  freed- 
man and  a  favorite  of  Nero.  Epictetus  may  have 
been  a  hearer  of  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  while  he 
was  still  a  slave,  but  he  can  hardly  have  been  a 
teacher  before  he  was  made  free.  He  was  one  of 
the  philosophers  whom  Domitian's  order  banished 
from  Rome.  He  retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus, 
and  lie  may  have  died  there.  Like  other  great 
teachers  he  wrote  nothing,  and  we  are  indebted  to 
his  grateful  pupil  Axrian  for  what  we  have  of 

1  I  have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero's  preceptor.  He  was 
in  a  sense  a  Stoic  and  he  has  said  many  good  things  in 
a  very  fine  way.  There  is  a  judgment  of  Gellius  (xn. 
2)  on  Seneca,  or  rather  a  statement  of  what  some  peo- 
ple thought  of  his  philosophy,  and  it  is  not  favorable. 
His  writings  and  his  life  must  be  taken  together,  and  I 
have  nothing  more  to  say  of  him  here. 


88 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


Epictetus'  discourses.  Arrian  wrote  eight  books 
of  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  of  which  only  four 
remain  and  some  fragments.  We  have  also  from 
Arrian's  hand  the  small  Enchiridion  or  Manual 
of  the  chief  precepts  of  Epictetus.  There  is  a 
valuable  commentary  on  the  Enchiridion  by  Sim- 
plicius,  who  lived  in  the  time  of  the  emperor  Jus- 
tinian.2 

Antoninus  in  his  first  book  (i.  7),  in  which  he 
gratefully  commemorates  his  obligations  to  his 
teachers,  says  that  he  was  made  acquainted  by 
Junius  Rusticus  with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus, 
whom  he  mentions  also  in  other  passages  (iv.  41 ; 
xi.  33.  36).  Indeed,  the  doctrines  of  Epictetus 
and  Antoninus  are  the  same,  and  Epictetus  is  the 
best  authority  for  the  explanation  of  the  philo- 
sophical language  of  Antoninus  and  the  exposi- 
tion of  his  opinions.  But  the  method  of  the 
two  philosophers  is  entirely  different.  T^pWgtiU^ 
addressed  himself  to  his  hearers  in  a  continuous 
discourse  and  in  a  familiar  and  simple  maimer. 
An  tori  j,nns  wrote  down  his  reflections  for  his  own 
use  only,  in  short  unconnected  paragraphs,  which 
are  often  obscure. 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philosophy, 
Physic  (c£uo-iko3  ),  Ethic  (yOtKOj ),  and  Logic  (A.oyt- 
kov).  This  division,  we  are  told  by  Diogenes,  was 
made  by  Zeno  of  Citium,  the  founder  of  the  Stoic 

2  There  is  a  complete  edition  of  Arrian's  Epictetus 
with  the  commentary  of  Simplicius  by  J.  Schweighaeu- 
ser,  6  vols.  8vo.  1799,  1800.  There  is  also  an  English 
translation  of  Epictetus  by  Mrs.  Carter. 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


39 


sect  and  by  Chrysippus  ;  but  these  philosophers 
placed  the  three  divisions  in  the  following  order, 
LoffiCjJPhysic,  Ethic,  ft  appears  however  that 
this  division  was  made  before  Zeno's  time  and 
acknowledged  by  Plato,  as  Cicero  remarks  (Acad. 
Post.  i.  5).  Logic  is  not  synonymous  with  our 
term  Logic  in  the  narrower  sense  of  that  word. 

Cleanthes,  a  Stoic,  subdivided  the  three  divis- 
ions, and  made  six  :  Dialectic  and  Rhetoric,  com- 
prised in  Logic  ;  Ethic  and  Politic  ;  Physic  and 
Theology.  This  division  was  merely  for  practi- 
cal use,  for  all  Philosophy  is  one.  Even  among 
the  earliest  Stoics  Logic  or  Dialectic  does  not  oc- 
cupy the  same  place  as  in  Plato  :  it  is  considered 
only  as  an  instrument  which  is  to  be  used  for  the 
other  divisions  of  Philosophy.  An  exposition  of 
the  earlier  Stoic  doctrines  and  of  their  modifica- 
tions would  require  a  volume.  My  object  is  to 
explain  only  the  opinions  of  Antoninus,  so  far  as 
they  can  be  collected  from  his  book. 

According  to  the  subdivision  of  Cleanthes, 
Physic  and  Theology  go  together,  or  the  study 
of  the  nature  of  Things,  and  the  study  of  the  / 
nature  of  *he  Deity,  so  far  as  man  can  under- 
stand the  Deity,  and  of  his  government  of  the 
universe.  This  division  or  subdivision  is  not 
formally  adopted  by  Antoninus,  for  as  already  ob- 
served, there  is  no  method  in  his  book  ;  but  it  is  ' 
virtually  contained  in  it. 

Cleanthes  also  connects  Ethic  and  Politic,  or 
the  study  of  the  principles  of  morals  and  the  study 
t>f  the  constitution  of  civil  society ;  and  undoubt- 


40 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


edly  he  did  well  in  subdividing  Ethic  into  two 
parts,  Ethic  in  the  narrower  sense  and  Politic,  for 
though  the  two  are  ultimately  connected,  they  are 
also  very  distinct,  and  many  questions  can  only  be 
properly  discussed  by  carefully  observing  the  dis- 
tinction. Antoninus  does  not  treat  of  Politic. 
His  subject  is  Ethic,  and  Ethic  in  its  practical 
application  to  his  own  conduct  in  life  as  a  man 
and  as  a  governor.  His  Ethic  is  founded  on  his 
doctrines  about  man's  nature,  the  Universal  Na- 
ture, and  the  relation  of  every  man  to  everything 
else.  It  is  therefore  intimately  and  inseparably 
connected  with  Physic  or  the  nature  of  Tilings 
and  with  Theology  or  the  nature  of  the  Deity. 
He  advises  us  to  examine  well  all  the  impres- 
sions on  our  minds  (^avrao-tai)  and  to  form  a 
right  judgment  of  them,  to  make  just  conclusions, 
and  to  inquire  into  the  meanings  of  words,  and 
so  far  to  apply  Dialectic,  but  he  has  no  attempt 
at  any  exposition  of  Dialectic,  and  his  philosophy 
is  in  substance  purely  moral  and  practical.  He 
says  (viii.  13),  "  Constantly  and,  if  it  be  possible, 
on  the  occasion  of  every  impression  on  the  soul,3 

3  The  original  is  em  ndo7]Q  (pavraalac.  We  have  no 
word  which  expresses  davTaaia,  for  it  is  not  only  the  sen- 
suous appearance  which  comes  from  an  external  object, 
which  object  is  called  to  davraoruv,  but  it  is  also  the 
thought  or  feeling  or  opinion  which  is  produced  even 
when  there  is  no  corresponding  external  object  before  us. 
Accordingly  everything  which  moves  the  soul  is  (pavraa- 
tov  and  produces  a  fyavTaa'ia. 

In  this  extract  Antoninus  says  dvcnoXoyelv.  ira&o2.oyeiv, 
6iaX.EKTLKeveod-aL.  I  have  translated  jradoloyelv  by  usir  g 
the  word  Moral  (Ethic),  and  that  is  the  meaning  here. 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


41 


apply  to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Moral  and 
of  Dialectic  :  "  which  is  only  another  way  of  tell- 
ing us  to  examine  the  impression  in  every  possi- 
ble way.  In  another  passage  (in.  11)  he  says, 
"  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned  let  this 
one  still  be  added  :  make  for  thyself  a  definition 
or  description  of  the  object  (to  ^avracrrov)  which 
is  presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what 
kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity, 
in  its  complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its  proper 
name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of  which  it 
lias  been  compounded,  and  into  which  it  will  be 
resolved."  Such  an  examination  implies  a  use 
of  Dialectic,  which  Antoninus  accordingly  em- 
ployed as  a  means  towards  establishing  his  Physi- 
cal, Theological  and  Ethical  principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical, 
Theological,  and  Ethical  principles,  which  are 
contained  in  the  work  of  Antoninus  ;  and  more 
expositions  than  I  have  read.  Bitter  (Geschichte 
der  Philosophic,  iv.  241)  after  explaining  the 
doctrines  of  Epictetus,  treats  very  briefly  and  in- 
sufficiently those  of  Antoninus.  But  he  refers  to 
a  short  essay,  in  which  the  work  is  done  better.4 
There  is  also  an  essay  on  the  Philosophical  Prin- 
ciples of  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  by  J.  M.  Schultz, 
placed  at  the  end  of  his  German  translation  of 
Antoninus  (Schles  wig,  1799).  With  the  assistance 
of  these  two  useful  essays  and  his  own  diligent 

4  De  Marco  Aurelio  Antonino  ...  ex  ipsius  Commen- 
tariis.  Scriptio  Philologica.  Instituit  Nicolaus  Bachius, 
Lipsiae,  1826. 


42 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


study  a  man  may  form  a  sufficient  notion  of  the 
principles  of  Antoninus ;  but  he  will  find  it  more 
difficult  to  expound  them  to  others.  Besides  the 
want  of  arrangement  in  the  original  and  of  con- 
nection among  the  numerous  paragraphs,  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  text,  the  obscurity  of  the  language 
and  the  style,  and  sometimes  perhaps  the  confu- 
sion in  the  writer's  own  ideas,  —  besides  all  this 
there  is  occasionally  an  apparent  contradiction  in 
the  emperor's  thoughts,  as  if  his  principles  .  were 
sometimes  unsettled,  as  if  doubt  sometimes 
clouded  his  mind.  A  man  who  leads  a  life  of 
tranquillity  and  reflection,  who  is  not  disturbed 
at  home  and  meddles  not  with  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  may  keep  his  mind  at  ease  and  his  thoughts 
in  one  even  course.  But  such  a  man  has  not 
been  tried.  All  his  Ethical  philosophy  and  his 
passive  virtue  might  turn  out  to  be  idle  words,  if 
he  were  once  exposed  to  the  rude  realities  of  hu- 
man existence.  Fine  thoughts  and  moral  disser- 
tations from  men  who  have  not  worked  and  suf- 
fered may  be  read,  but  they  will,  be  forgotten. 
No  religion,  no  Ethical  philosophy  is  worth  any- 
thing, if  the  teacher  has  not  lived  the  "  life  of  an 
apostle,"  and  been  ready  to  die  "  the  death  of  a 
martyr."  "  Not  in  passivity  (the  passive  affects) 
but  in  activity  lie  the  evil  and  the  good  of  the 
rational  social  animal,  just  as  his  virtue  and  his 
vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity  "  (ix.  16). 
The  emperor  Antoninus  was  a  practical  moralist. 
From  his  youth  he  followed  a  laborious  discipline, 
and  though  his  high  station  placed  him  above  all 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


43 


want  or  the  fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  frugally  and 
temperately  as  the  poorest  philosopher.  -'Epictetus 
wanted  little,  and  it  seems  that  he  always  had 
the  little  that  he  wanted  ;  and  he  was  content  with 
it,  as  he  had  been  with  his  servile  station.  But 
Antoninus  after  his  accession  to  the  empire  sat  on 
an  uneasy  seat.  He  had  the  administration  of  an 
empire  which  extended  from  the  Euphrates  to  the 
Atlantic,  from  the  cold  mountains  of  Scotland  to 
the  hot  sands  of  Africa  ;  and  we  may  imagine, 
though  we  cannot  know  it  by  experience,  what 
must  be  the  trials,  the  troubles,  the  anxiety  and 
the  sorrows  of  him  who  has  the  world's  business 
on  his  hands  with  the  wish  to  do  the  best  that  he 
can,  and  the  certain  knowledge  that  he  can  do 
very  little  of  the  good  which  he  wishes. 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy,  gen- 
eral corruption  and  with  the  weight  of  so  un- 
wieldy an  empire  upon  him,  we  may  easily  com- 
prehend that  Antoninus  often  had  need  of  all  his 
fortitude  to  support  him.  The  best  and  the  bravest 
men  have  moments  of  doubt  and  of  weakness,  but 
if  they  are  the  best  and  the  bravest,  they  rise  again 
from  their  depression  by  recurring  to  first  principles, 
as  Antoninus  does.  The  emperor  says  that  life 
is  smoke,  a  vapor,  and  St.  James  in  his  Epistle 
is  of  the  same  mind  ;  that  the  world  is  full  of  en- 
vious, jealous,  malignant  people,  and  a  man  might 
be  well  content  to  get  out  of  it.  He  has  doubts 
perhaps  sometimes  even  about  that  to  which  he 
holds  most  firmly.  There  are  only  a  few  passages 
of  this  kind,  but  they  are  evidence  of  the  struggles 


44 


THE  P  H1L0S0PHY 


which  even  the  noblest  of  the  sons  of  men  had  to 
maintain  against  the  hard  realities  of  his  daily  life. 
A  poor  remark  it  is  which  I  have  seen  somewhere, 
and  made  in  a  disparaging  way,  that  the  emperor's 
reflections  show  that  he  had  need  of  consolation 
and  comfort  in  life,  and  even  to  prepare  him  to 
meet  his  death.  True  that  he  did  need  comfort 
and  support,  and  we  see  how  he  found  it.  He 
"constantly  recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle  that 
the  universe  is  wisely  ordered,  that  every  man  is 
a  part  of  it  and  must  conform  to  that  order  which 
he  cannot  change,  that  whatever  the  Deity  has 
done  is  good,  that  all  mankind  are  a  man's  brethren, 
that  he  must  love  and  cherish  them  and  try  to 
[make  them  better,  even  those  who  would  do  him 
harm.  This  is  his  conclusion  (n.  17)  :  "  What 
then  is  that  which  is  able  to  conduct  a  man  ?  One 
thing  and  only  one,  Philosophy.  But  this  consists 
in  keeping  the  divinity  within  a  man  free  from 
violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  and 
pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a  purpose  nor 
yet  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the  need 
of  another  man's  doing  or  not  doing  anything  ; 
and  besides,  accepting  all  that  happens  and  all  that 
is  allotted,  as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it  is, 
from  whence  he  himself  came  ;  and  finally  waiting 
for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing 
else  than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements,  of  which 
every  living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there 
is  no  harm  to  the  elements  themselves  in  each 
continually  changing  into  another,  why  should  a 
man  have  any  apprehension  about  the  change  and 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


4.5 


dissolution  of  all  the  elements  [himself]?  for  it  is 
according  to  nature;  and  nothing  is  evil  that  is 
according  to  nature." 

The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge  of 
the  Nature  of  the  Universe,  of  its  government, 
and  of  the  relation  of  man's  nature  to  both.  He 
names  the  universe  (fj  rw/  oAw  ovoria,  vi.  I),5  "the 
universal  substance,"  and  he  adds  that  "  reason," 
(Aoyos)  governs  the  universe.  He  also  (vi.  9) 
uses  the  terms  "  universal  nature  "  or  "  nature  of 
the  universe."  He  (vi.  25)  calls  the  universe 
"  the  one  and  all,  winch  we  name  Cosmus  or  Order  " 
(koo-/x  js)  If  he  ever  seems  to  use  these  general 
terms  as  significant  of  the  All,  of  all  that  man  can 
in  any  way  conceive  to  exist,  he  still  on  other  oc- 
casions plainly  distinguishes  between  Matter,  Ma- 
terial things   (vky,  vXlkov),  and   Cause,  Origin, 

5  As  to  the  word  ovala,  the  reader  may  see  the  Index. 
I  add  here  a  few  examples  of  the  use  of  the  word  ;  Anto- 
ninus has  (v.  24),  7]  ovfinaoa  ovala,  "the  universal  sub- 
stance." He  says  (xn.  30),  "  there  is  one  common"  sub- 
stance (ovoia),  distributed  among  countless  bodies  ;  and 
(iv.  40).  In  Stobaeus  (torn.  i.  lib.  1,  tit.  14)  there  is  this 
definition,  ovaiav  6i  <j>aoiv  tCjV  ovtov  citcuvtmv  rrjv  TtpuTTjv 
vhjv.  (In  viii.  11),  Antoninus  speaks  of  to  ovaitidec  not 
vTukov,  "the  substantial  and  the  material ;  "  and  (vn.  10) 
he  says  that  "  everything  material"  (evvTlov)  disappears 
in  the  substance  of  the  whole  (rrj  rwv  okuv  ovaia).  The 
ovaia  is  the  generic  name  of  that  existence,  which  we  as- 
sume as  the  highest  or  ultimate,  because  we  conceive  no 
existence  which  can  be  coordinated  with  it  and  none  above 
it.  It  is  the  philosopher's  "  substance  :  "  it  is  the  ultimate 
expression  for  that  which  we  conceive  or  suppose  to  be  the 
basis,  the  being  of  a  thing.  "  From  the  Divine,  which  is 
substance  in  itself,  or  the  only  and  sole  substance,  all  and 
everything  that  is  created  exists."  (Swedenborg.) 


46 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


Reason  (atria,  aiTiwSes,  Aoyos).6  This  is  conform- 
able to  Zeno's  doctrine  that  there  are  two  original 
principles  (ap^at)  of  all  things,  that  which  acts 
(to  ttolov!  )  and  that  which  is  acted  upon  (ro 
7rdcrx')y).  That  which  is  acted  on  is  the  formless 
matter  (uA^)  :  that  which  acts  is  the  reason  (\oyos) 
in  it,  God,  for  he  is  eternal  and  operates  through 
all  matter,  and  produces .  all  things.  So  Anto- 
ninus (v.  32)  speaks  of  the  reason  (Aoyos)  which 
pervades  all  substance  (ovo-lol),  and  through  all 
time  by  fixed  periods  (revolutions)  administers 
the  universe  (to  irav).  God  is  eternal,  and  Mat- 
ter is  eternal.    It  is  God  who  gives  to  matter  its 

6  I  remark,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  misapprehension, 
that  all  these  general  terms  involve  a  contradiction.  The 
"  one  and  all,"  and  the  like,  and  "  the  whole,"  imply 
limitation.  "One"  is  limited;  "all"  is  limited;  the 
"  whole  "  is  limited.  We  cannot  help  it.  We  cannot  find 
words  to  express  that  which  we  cannot  fully  conceive. 
The  addition  of  "  absolute  "  or  any  other  such  word  does 
not  mend  the  matter.  Even  God  is  used  by  most  people, 
often  unconsciously,  in  such  a  way  that  limitation  is  im- 
plied, and  yet  at  the  same  time  words  are  added  which  are 
intended  to  deny  limitation.  A  Christian  martyr,  when 
he  was  asked  what  God  was,  is  said  to  have  answered  that 
God  has  no  name  like  a  man ;  and  Justin  says  the  same 
(Apol.  ii.  6).  We  can  conceive  the  existence  of  a  thing, 
or  rather  we  may  have  the  idea  of  an  existence,  without 
an  adequate  notion  of  it,  "  adequate  "  meaning  coexten- 
sive and  coequal  with  the  thing.  We  have  a  notion  of 
limited  space  derived  from  the  dimensions  of  what  we 
call  a  material  thing,  though  of  space  absolute,  if  I  may 
use  the  term,  we  have  no  notion  at  all ;  and  of  infinite 
space  the  notion  is  the  same,  no  notion  at  all;  and  yet 
we  conceive  it  in  a  sense,  though  I  know  not  how,  and 
we  believe  that  space  is  infinite,  and  we  cannot  conceive 
it  to  be  finite. 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


47 


form,  but  he  is  not  said  to  have  created  matter. 
According  to  this  view,  which  is  as  old  as  Anax- 
agoras,  God  and  matter  exist  independently,  but 
God  governs  matter.  This  doctrine  is  simply  the 
expression  of  the  fact  of  the  existence  both  of 
matter  and  of  God.,  The  Stoics  did  not  perplex 
themselves  with  the  insoluble  question  of  the  origin 
and  nature  of  matter.7  Antoninus  also  assumes  a 
beginning  of  things,  as  we  now  know  them  ;  but 
his  language  is  sometimes  very  obscure.  I  have 
endeavored  to  explain  the  meaning  of  one  difficult 
passage,  (vn.  75,  and  the  note.) 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  parts  ((jToiyeia) 
of  which  all  material  objects  are  made.  But 
nothing  is  permanent  in  form.  The  nature  of 
the  universe,  according  to  Antoninus'  expression 
(iv.  36),  "loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change 
the  things  which  are,  and  to  make  new  things 
like  them.  For  everything  that  exists  is  in  a 
manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be.  But  thou 
art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are  cast  into  the 

7  The  notions  of  matter  and  of  space  are  inseparable. 
We  derive  the  notion  of  space  from  matter  and  form.  But 
we  have  no  adequate  conception  either  of  matter  or  of 
space.  Matter  in  its  ultimate  resolution  is  as  unintelligible 
as  what  men  call  mind,  spirit,  or  by  whatever  other  name 
they  may  express  the  power  which  makes  itself  known  by 
its  acts.  Anaxagoras  laid  down  the  distinction  between 
intelligence  (vovg)  and  matter,  and  he  said  that  intelli- 
gence impressed  motion  on  matter  and  so  separated  the 
elements  of  matter  and  gave  them  order  ;  but  he  probably 
only  assumed  a  beginning,  as  Simplicius  says,  as  a 
foundation  of  his  philosophical  teaching. 

The  common  Greek  word  which  we  translate  "matter" 
ii  vlrj.    It  is  the  stuff  that  things  are  made  of. 


48 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


earth  or  into  a  womb :  but  this  is  a  very  vulgar 
notion."  All  things  then  are  in  a  constant  flux 
and  change  :  some  things  are  dissolved  into  the 
elements,  others  come  in  their  places  ;  and  so  the 
"  whole  universe  continues  ever  young  and  per- 
fect." (xn.  23.) 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions  about 
what  he  calls  "  apming^  prf^'ph^  "  (cnrepixaTiKol 
Xoyot) .  He  opposes  them  to  the  Epicurean  atoms 
(vi.  24),  and  consequently  his  "seminal  principles  " 
are  not  material  atoms  which  wander  about  at 
hazard,  and  combine  nobody  knows  how.  In  one 
passage  (iv.  21)  he  speaks  of  living  principles, 
souls,  (i/^xa')  after  the  dissolution  of  their  bodies 
being  received  into  the  "  seminal  principle  of  the 
universe."  Schultz  thinks  that  by  "  seminal  prin- 
ciples Antoninus  means  the  relations  of  the  various 
elemental  principles,  which  relations  areoteteK 
mined  by  the  Deity  and  by  which  alone  the  pro- 
duction of  organized  beings  is  possible."  This 
may  be  the  meaning,  but  if  it  is,  nothing  of  any 
value  can  be  derived  from  it.8  Antoninus  often 
uses  the  word  "Nature"  (^o-t;),  and  we  must 
attempt  to  fix  its  meaning.  The  simple  etymo- 
logical sense  of  <pvcn?  is  "  production,"  the  birth  of 

8  Justin  ( Apol.  ti.  8)  has  the  expression  Kara  (nrepfxariKov 
"koyov  /nepog,  where  he  is  speaking  of  the  Stoics.  The 
early  Christian  writers  were  familiar  with  the  Stoic  terms, 
and  their  writings  show  that  the  contest  was  begun  be- 
tween the  Christian  expositors  and  the  Greek  philosophy. 
Even  in  the  second  Epistle  of  St.  Peter  (n.  1,  v.  4)  we  find 
a  Stoic  expression,  Iva  6td  tovtuv  yivria&e  ticcas  koivovoi 
Qvoeug. 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


4  0 


what  we  call  Things.  The  Romans  used  Natura, 
which  also  means  "birth"  originally.  But  neither 
the  Greeks  nor  the  Romans  stuck  to  this  simple 
meaning,  nor  do  we.  Antoninus  says  (x.  6)  : 
"  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of]  atoms 
or  Nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be  estab- 
lished that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which  is 
governed  by  nature."  Here  it  might  seem  as  if 
nature  were  personified  and  viewed  as  an  active, 
efficient  power,  as  something  which,  if  not  inde- 
pendent of  the  Deity,  acts  by  a  power  which  is 
given  to  it  by  the  Deity.  Such,  if  I  understand 
the  expression  right,  is  the  way  in  which  the  word 
Nature  is  often  used  now,  though  it  is  plain  that 
many  writers  use  the  word  without  fixing  any 
exatc  meaning  to  it.  It  is  the  same  with  the 
expression  Laws  of  Nature,  which  some  writers 
may  use  in  an  intelligible  sense,  but  others  as 
clearly  use  in  no  definite  sense  at  all.  There  is 
no  meaning  in  this  word  Nature,  except  that  which 
Bishop  Butler  assigns  to  it,  when  he  says,  "  The 
only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is 
Stated,  Fixed  or  Settled ;  since  what  is  natural  as 
much  requires  and  presupposes  an  intelligent  agent 
to  render  it  so,  i.  e.  to  effect  it  continually  or  at 
stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural  or  miraculous 
does  to  effect  it  at  once."  This  is  Plato's  meaning 
(De  Leg.  iv.),  when  he  says,  that  God  holds  the 
beginning  and  end  and  middle  of  all  that  exists, 
and  proceeds  straight  on  his  course,  making  his 
circuit  according  to  nature  (that  is,  by  a  fixed 
order)  ;  and  he  is  continually  accompanied  by  jus- 

4 


50  THE  PHILOSOPHY 


tice  who  punishes  those  who  deviate  from  the 
divine  law,  that  is,  from  the  order  or  course  which 
God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets,  the 
action  of  what  we  call  gravitation,  the  elemental 
combination  of  unorganized  bodies  and  their  reso- 
lution, the  production  of  plants  and  of  living 
bodies,  their  generation,  growth,  and  their  disso- 
lution, which  we  call  their  death,  we  observe  a 
regular  sequence  of  phaenomena,  which  within  the 
limits  of  experience  present  and  past,  so  far  as  we 
know  the  past,  is  fixed  and  invariable.  But  if 
this  is  not  so,  if  the  order  and  sequence  of  phae- 
nomena, as  known  to  us,  are  subject  to  change  in 
the  course  of  an  infinite  progression,  —  and  such 
change  is  conceivable,  —  we  have  not  discovered, 
nor  shall  we  ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the  order 
and  sequence  of  phaenomena,  in  which  sequence 
there  may  be  involved  according  to  its  very  nature, 
that  is,  according  to  its  fixed  order,  some  varia- 
tion of  what  we  now  call  the  Order  or  Nature  of 
Things.  It  is  also  conceivable  that  such  changes 
have  taken  place,  changes  in  the  order  of  things, 
as  we  are  compelled  by  the  imperfection  of  lan- 
guage to  call  them,  but  which  are  no  changes  ; 
and  further  it  is  certain,  that  our  knowledge  of 
the  true  sequence  of  all  actual  phaenomena,  as  for 
instance,  the  phaenomena  of  generation,  growth, 
and  dissolution,  is  and  ever  must  be  imperfect. 

We  do  not  fare  much  better  when  we  speak  of 
Causes  and  Effects  than  when  we  speak  of  Nature. 
For  the  practical  purposes  of  life  we  may  use  the 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


51 


terms  cause  and  effect  conveniently,  and  we  may 
fix  a  distinct  meaning  to  them,  distinct  enough  at 
least  to  prevent  all  misunderstanding.  But  the 
case  is  different  when  we  speak  of  causes  and 
effects  as  of  Things.  All  that  we  know  is  phae- 
nomena,  as  the  Greeks  called  them,  or  appearances 
which  follow  one  another  in  a  regular  order,  as 
we  conceive  it,  so  that  if  some  one  phaenomenon 
should  fail  in  the  series,  we  conceive  that  there 
must  either  be  an  interruption  of  the  series,  or 
that  something  else  will  appear  after  the  phae- 
nomenon which  has  failed  to  appear,  and  will 
occupy  the  vacant  place  ;  and  so  the  series  in  its 
progression  may  be  modified  or  totally  changed. 
Cause  and  effect  then  mean  nothing  in  the  se- 
quence of  natural  phaenomena  beyond  what  I  have 
said  ;  and  the  real  cause,  or  the  transcendent  cause, 
as  some  would  call  it,  of  each  successive  phaenome- 
non is  in  that  which  is  the  cause  of  all  things 
which  are,  which  have  been,  and  which  will  be 
forever.  Thus  the  word  Creation  may  have  a 
real  sense  if  we  consider  it  as  the  first,  if  we  can 
conceive  a  first,  in  the  present  order  of  natural 
phaenomena ;  but  in  the  vulgar  sense  a  creation 
of  all  things  at  a  certain  time,  followed  by  a 
quiescence  of  the  first  cause  and  an  abandonment 
of  all  sequences  of  Phaenomena  to  the  Laws  of 
Nature,  or  to  any  other  words  that  people  may 
use,  is  absolutely  absurd.9 

9  Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought ; 
but  time  infinite  and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects  of 
thought,  except  in  a  very  imperfect  way.   Time  and  space 


52 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


j  Now,  though  there  is  great  difficulty  in  under- 
standing all  the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in  which 
he  speaks  of  Nature,  of  the  changes  of  things  and 
of  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I  am  convinced 
that  his  sense  of  Nature  and  Natural  is  the  same 
as  that  which  I  have  stated  ;  and  as  he  was  a  man 
who  knew  how  to  use  words  in  a  clear  way  and 
with  strict  consistency,  we  ought  to  assume,  even 
if  his  meaning  in  some  passages  is  doubtful,  that 
his  view  of  Nature  was  in  harmony  with  his  fixed 
belief  in  the  all -pervading,  ever-present,  and  over- 
active energy  of  God.  (iv.  40  ;  x.  1 ;  vi.  40 ;  and 
other  passages.) 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to 
understand,  and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did  not 
fully  comprehend  all  that  he  wrote  ;  which  would 
however  be  in  no  way  remarkable,  for  it  happens 
now  that  a  man  may  write  what  neither  he  nor 
anybody  can  understand.  Antoninus  tells  us 
(xn.  10)  to  look  at  things  and  see  what  they  are, 
resolving  them  into  the  material  (y^y),  the  causal 
(clltlov),  and  the  relation  (ava<^  -pa),  or  the  pur- 
pose, by  which  he  seems  to  mean  something  in  the 

must  not  in  any  way  be  thought  of,  when  we  think  of  the 
Deity.  Swedenborg  says,  "  The  natural  man  may  believe 
that  he  would  have  no  thought,  if  the  ideas  of  time,  of 
space,  and  of  things  material  were  taken  away  ;  for  upon 
those  is  founded  all  the  thought  that  man  has.  But  let 
him  know  that  the  thoughts  are  limited  and  confined  in 
proportion  as  they  partake  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  what 
is  material ;  and  that  they  are  not  limited  and  are  extend- 
ed, in  proportion  as  they  do  not  partake  of  those  things  ; 
since  the  mind  is  so  far  elevated  above  the  things  corpo- 
real and  worldly."  (Concerning  Heaven  and  Hell,  169.) 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


53 


nature  of  what  we  call  effect,  or  end.  The  word 
cause  (airta)  is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the  same 
word  in  the  Sanscrit  Qietu)  ;  and  the  subtle  phi- 
losophers of  India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less 
subtle  philosophers  of  modern  times  have  all  used 
this  word,  or  an  equivalent  word,  in  a  vague  way. 
Yet  the  confusion  sometimes  may  be  in  the  in- 
evitable ambiguity  of  language  rather  than  in  the 
mind  of  the  writer,  for  I  cannot  think  that  some 
of  the  wisest  of  men  did  not  know  what  they  in- 
tended to  say.  When  Antoninus  says  (iv.  36), 
"  that  everything  that  exists  is  in  a  mariner  the 
seed  of  that  which  will  be,"  he  might  be  supposed 
to  say  what  some  of  the  Indian  philosophers  have 
said,  and  thus  a  profound  truth  might  be  converted 
into  a  gross  absurdity.  But  he  says,  "  in  a  man- 
ner," and  in  a  manner  he  said  true  ; «. and  in 
another  manner,  if  you  mistake  his  meaning,  he 
said  false.  When  Plato  said,  "  Nothing  ever  is, 
but  is  always  becoming"  (aet  ytyverat),  he  deliv- 
ered a  text,  out  of  which  we  may  derive  some- 
thing ;  for  he  destroys  by  it  not  all  practical,  but 
all  speculative  notions  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
whole  series  of  things,  as  they  appear  to  us,  must 
be  contemplated  in  time,  that  is  in  succession,  and 
we  conceive  or  suppose  intervals  between  one  state 
of  things  and  another  state  of  things,  so  that  there 
is  priority  and  sequence,  and  interval,  and  Being, 
and  a  ceasing  to  Be,  and  beginning  and  ending. 
But  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  in  the  Nature  of 
Things.  It  is  an  everlasting  continuity,  (iv.  45  ; 
Vii.  75.)    When  Antoninus  speaks  of  generation 


54 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


(x.  26),  he  speaks  of  one  cause  (curia)  acting, 
and  then  another  cause  taking  up  the  work,  which 
the  former  left  in  a  certain  state,  and  so  on  ;  and 
we  might  perhaps  conceive  that  he  had  some  no- 
tion like  what  has  been  called  "  the  self-evolving 
power  of  nature ; "  a  fine  phrase  indeed,  the  full 
import  of  which  I  believe  that  the  writer  of  it 
did  not  see,  and  thus  he  laid  himself  open  to  the 
imputation  of  being  a  follower  of  one  of  the 
Hindu  sects,  which  makes  all  things  come  by 
evolution  out  of  nature  or  matter,  or  out  of  some- 
thing which  takes  the  place  of  deity,  but  is  not 
deity.  I  would  have  all  men  think  as  they  please 
or  as  they  can,  and  I  only  claim  the  same  free- 
dom, which  I  give.  When  a  man  writes  any- 
thing, we  may  fairly  try  to  find  out  all  that  his 
words  must  mean,  even  if  the  result  is  that  they 
mean  what  he  did  not  mean ;  and  if  we  find  this 
contradiction,  it  is  not  our  fault,  but  his  misfor- 
tune. Now  Antoninus  is  perhaps  somewhat  in 
this  condition  in  what  he  says  (x.  26),  though  he 
speaks  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph  of  the  power 
which  acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still  no  less 
clearly.  But  whether  in  this  passage  (x.  26)  he 
means  that  the  power  is  conceived  to  be  in  the 
different  successive  causes  (atrtat),  or  in  some- 
thing else,  nobody  can  tell.  From  other  passages 
however  I  do  collect  that  his  notion  of  the  phae- 
nomena  of  the  universe  is  what  I  have  stated. 
Ike  deity  works  unseen,  if  we  may  use  suck  lan- 
guage, and  perkaps  I  may,  as  Job  did,  or  ke  wko 
wrote  tke  book  of  Job.     "  In  kim  we  live  and 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


.05 


move  and  are,"  said  St.  Paul  to  the  Athenians, 
and  to  show  his  hearers  that  this  was  no  new 
doctrine,  he  quoted  the  Greek  poets.  One  of 
these  poets  was  the  Stoic  Cleanthes  whose  noble 
hymn  to  Zeus  or  God  is  an  elevated  expression 
of  devotion  and  philosophy.  It  deprives  Nature 
of  her  power  and  puts  her  under  the  immediate 
government  of  the  deity. 

"  Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  earth, 
Obeys  and  willing  follows  where  thou  leadest.  — 
Without  thee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth, 
Nor  in  the  aethereal  realms,  nor  in  the  sea, 
Save  what  the  wicked  do  through  their  own  folly." 

Antoninus'  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a 
divine  power  and  government  was  founded  on  his 
perception  of  the  order  of  the  universe.  Like 
Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.  iv.  3),  he  says  that  though 
we  camiot  see  the  fornis  of  divine  powers,  we 
know  that  they  exist  because  we  see  their  works. 

"  To  those  who  ask,  Where  EasFTEbu  seen  the 
gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  ex- 
ist and  so  worshipest  them  ?  I  answer,  in  the  first 
place,  that  they  may  be  seen  even  with  the  eyes ; 
in  the  second  place,  neither  have  I  seen  my  own 
soul  and  yet  I  honor  it.  Thus  then  with  respect 
to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  experience  of 
their  power,  from  this  I  comprehend  that  they 
exist  and  I  venerate  them."  (xn.  28.  Comp. 
Xen.  Mem.  i.  4,  9 ;  St.  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Ro- 
mans, i.  19,  20  ;  and  Montaigne's  Apology  for 
Raimond  de  Sebonde,  n.  c.  12.)  This  is  a  very 
old  argument  which  has  always  had  great  weight 


56 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


with  most  people  and  has  appeared  sufficient.  It 
does  not  acquire  the  least  additional  strength  by 
being  developed  in  a  learned  treatise.  It  is  as 
intelligible  in  its  simple  enunciation  as  it  can  be 
made.  If  it  is  rejected,  there  is  no  arguing  with 
him  who  rejects  it :  and  if  it  is  worked  out  into 
innumerable  particulars,  the  value  of  the  evi- 
dence runs  the  risk  of  being  buried  under  a  mass 
of  words. 

Man  being  conscious  that  he  is  a  spiritual  power 
or  an  intellectual  power,  or  that  he  has  such  a 
power,  in  whatever  way  he  conceives  that  he  has 
it  —  for  I  wish  simply  to  state  a  fact  —  from  this 
power  which  he  has  in  himself,  he  is  led,  as  An- 
toninus says,  to  believe  that  there  is  a  greater 
power,  which  as  the  old  Stoics  tell  us,  pervades 
the  whole  universe  as  the  intellect 10  (;/ci>s)  per- 

10  I  have  always  translated  the  word  vovg,  "  intelli- 
gence "  or  "  intellect."  It  appears  to  be  the  word  used  by 
the  oldest  Greek  philosophers  to  express  the  notion  of 
"  intelligence  "  as  opposed  to  the  notion  of  "  matter."  I 
have  always  translated  the  word  Xoyo^  by  "reason,''  and 
XoyiKog  by  the  word  "rational,"  or  perhaps  sometimes 
"  reasonable,"  as  I  have  translated  voepog  by  the  word 
"intellectual."  Every  man  who  has  thought  and  has 
read  any  philosophical  writings  knows  the  difficulty  of 
finding  words  to  express  certain  notions,  how  imperfectly 
words  express  these  notions,  and  how  carelessly  the  words 
are  often  used.  The  various  senses  of  the  word  "koyor  are 
enough  to  perplex  any  man.  Our  translators  of  the  New 
Testament  (St.  John,  c.  i.)  have  simply  translated  6  Aoyog 
by  "the  word,"  as  the  Germans  translated  it  by  "das 
Wort ;  "  but  in  their  theological  writings  they  sometimes 
retain  the  original  term  Logos.  The  Germans  have  a 
term  Vernunft,  which  seems  to  come  nearest  to  our  word 
Reason,  or  the  necessary  and  absolute  truths  which  we 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


57 


yades  man.  (Compare  Epictetus'  Discourses,  I. 
14 ;  and  Voltaire  a  Made.  Necker,  vol.  lxvii.  p. 
278.) 

God  exists  then,  but  what  do  we  know  of  his 
Nature  ?  Antoninus  says  that  the  soul  of  man  is 
an  efflux  from  the  divinity.  We  have  bodies 
like  animals,  but  we  have  reason,  intelligence  as 
the  gods.  Animals  have  life  (^xtf)'  an(^  wna^ 
we  call  instincts  or  natural  principles  of  action  : 
but  the  rational  animal  man  alone  has  a  rational, 
intelligent  soul  (^XV  ^°ytKI7>  vjepd).  Antoninus 
insists  on  this  continually  :  God  is  in  man,11  and 
so  we  must  constantly  attend  to  the  divinity 
within  us,  for  it  is  only  in  this  way  that  we  can 
have  any  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God.  The 
human  soul  is  in  a  sense  a  portion  of  the  divinity, 
and  the  soul  alone  has  any  communication  with 

cannot  conceive  as  being  other  than  what  they  are.  Such 
are  what  some  people  have  called  the  laws  of  thought, 
the  conceptions  of  space  and  of  time,  and  axioms  or  first 
principles,  which  need  no  proof  and  cannot  be  proved  or 
denied.  Accordingly  the  Germans  can  say  "  Gott  ist  die 
hochste  Vernunft,"  the  Supreme  Reason.  The  Germans 
have  also  a  word  Verstand,  which  seems  to  represent  our 
word  "  understanding,"  "  intelligence,"  "  intellect,"  not 
as  a  thing  absolute  which  exists  by  itself,  but  as  a  thing 
connected  with  an  individual  being,  as  a  man.  Accord- 
ingly it  is  the  capacity  of  receiving  impressions  ( Vorstel- 
lungen,  tyavTciGLai),  and  forming  from  them  distinct  ideas, 
(BegrifFe),  and  perceiving  differences.  I  do  not  think 
that  these  remarks  will  help  the  reader  to  the  understand- 
ing of  Antoninus,  or  his  use  of  the  words  vovg  and  Xoyog. 
The  Kmperor's  meaning  must  be  got  from  his  own  words, 
and  if  it  does  not  agree  altogether  with  modern  notions, 
it  is  not  our  business  to  force  it  into  agreement,  but  sim- 
ply to  find  out  what  his  meaning  is,  if  we  can. 
11  Comp.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,  i.  3.  17. 


58 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


the  Deity,  for  as  he  says  (xn.  2)  :  "  With  his 
intellectual  part  alone  God  touches  the  intelli- 
gence only  which  has  flowed  and  been  derived 
from  himself  into  these  bodies."  In  fact  he  says 
that  which  is  hidden  within  a  man  is  life,  that  is 
the  man  himself.  All  the  rest  is  vesture,  cover- 
ing, organs,  instrument,  which  the  living  man,  the 
real 12  man,  uses  for  the  purposes  of  his  present 
existence.  The  air  is  universally  diffused  for  him 
who  is  able  to  respire,  and  so  for  him  who  is  will- 

12  This  is  also  Swedenborg's  doctrine  of  the  soul.  "  As 
to  what  concerns  the  soul,  of  which  it  is  said  that  it  shall 
live  after  death,  it  is  nothing  else  but  the  man  himself, 
who  lives  in  the  body,  that  is,  the  interior  man,  who  by 
the  body  acts  in  the  world  and  from  whom  the  body  itself 
lives  "  (quoted  by  Clissold,  p.  456  of  "  The  Practical  Na- 
ture of  the  Theological  Writings  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg, 
in  a  letter  to  the  Archbishop  of  Dublin,"  second  edition, 
1859  ;  a  book  which  theologians  might  read  with  profit). 
This  is  an  old  doctrine  of  the  soul,  which  has  been  often 
proclaimed,  but  never  better  expressed  than  by  the 
"  Auctor  de  Mundo,"  c.  6,  quoted  by  Gataker  in  his 
"  Antoninus,"  p.  436.  "  The  soul  by  which  we  live  and 
have  cities  and  houses  is  invisible,  but  it  is  seen  by  its 
works  ;  for  the  whole  method  of 'life  has  been  devised  by 
it  and  ordered,  and  by  it  is  held  together.  In  like  manner 
we  must  think  also  about  the  Deity,  who  in  power  is 
most  mighty,  in  beauty  most  comely,  in  life  immortal, 
and  in  virtue  supreme  :  wherefore  though  he  is  invisible 
to  human  nature,  he  is  seen  by  his  very  works."  Other 
passages  to  the  same  purpose  are  quoted  by  Gataker, 
(p.  382.)  Bishop  Butler  has  the  same  as  to  the  soul: 
"  Upon  the  whole  then  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs 
are  certainly  instruments,  which  the  living  persons,  our- 
selves, make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with."  If  this 
is  not  plain  enough,  he  also  says  :  "  It  follows  that  our 
organized  bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or  part  of  our- 
selves, than  any  other  matter  around  us."  (Compare 
Anton,  x.  38.) 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


59 


ing  to  partake  of  it'  the  intelligent  power  which 
holds  within  it  all  things  is  diffused  as  wide  and 
free  as  the  air.  (vm.  54.)  It  is  by  living  a 
divine  life  that  man  approaches  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  divinity.13  It  is  by  following  the  divinity 
within,  Sat/xtoj/  or  #eos  as  Antoninus  calls  it,  that 
man  comes  nearest  to  the  Deity,  the  supreme  good, 
for  man  can  never  attain  to  perfect  agreement 
with  his  internal  guide  (to  ^yeficvmoy)-  "Live 
with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with  the  gods 
who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is 
satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and 
that  it  does  all  the  daemon  (Saifuav  )  wishes,  which 
Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guardian 
and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And  this  daemon 
is  every  man's  understanding  and  reason."  (v.  27.) 

Them  is  in  man,  llmt  is  in  the  reason,  the  in- 
telligence, a  superior  faculty  which  if  it  is  exer- 
cised rules  all  the  rest.  This  is  th^ruhng  faculty 
(to  r]y c{xovlk6v),  which  Cicero  (De  ISTatura  Deo- 
rum,  ii.  11)  renders  by  the  Latin  word  Principatus, 
"  to  which  nothing  can  or  ought  to  be  superior." 

13  The  reader  may  consult  Discourse  V.  "  Of  the  ex- 
istence and  nature  of  God,"  in  John  Smith's  "  Select 
Discourses."  He  has  prefixed  as  a  text  to  this  Discourse, 
the  striking  passage  of  Agapetus,  Paraenes.  §  3 :  "He 
who  knows  himself  will  know  God  ;  and  he  who  knows 
God  will  be  made  like  to  God ;  and  he  will  be  made  like 
to  God,  who  has  become  worthy  of  God  ;  and  he  becomes 
worthy  of  God,  who  does  nothing  unworthy  of  God,  but 
thinks  the  things  that  are  his,  and  speaks  what  he  thinks, 
and  does  what  he  speaks."  I  suppose  that  the  old  say- 
ing, "  Know  thyself,"  which  is  attributed  to  Socrates  and 
others,  had  a  larger  meaning  than  the  narrow  sense  which 
is  generally  given  to  it. 


80 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


Antoninus  often  uses  this  term,  and  others  which 
are  equivalent.  He  names  it  (vn.  64)  "  the 
governing  intelligence."  The  governing  faculty 
is  the  master  of  the  soul.  (v.  26.)  A  man  must 
reverence  only  his  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity 
within  him.  As  we  must  reverence  that  which 
is  supreme  in  the  universe,  so  we  must  reverence 
that  which  is  supreme  in  ourselves,  and  this  is 
that  which  is  of  like  kind  with  that  which  is 
supreme  in  the  universe,  (v.  21.)  So,  as  Plotinus 
says,  the  soul  of  man  can  only  know  the  divine, 
so  far  as  it  knows  itself.  In  one  passage  (xi.  19) 
Antoninus  speaks  of  a  man's  condemnation  of 
himself,  when  the  diviner  part  within  him  has 
been  overpowered  and  yields  to  the  less  honorable 
and  to  the  perishable  part,  the  body,  and  its  gross 
pleasures.  In  a  word,  the  views  of  Antoninus  on 
this  matter,  however  his  expressions  may  vary, 
are  exactly  what'  Bishop  Butler  expresses,  when 
he  speaks  of  "  the  natural  supremacy  of  reflection 
or  conscience,"  of  the  faculty  "  which  surveys,  ap- 
proves or  disapproves  the  several  affections  of  our 
mind  and  actions  of  our  lives." 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Anto- 
ninus on  the  notion  of  the  Universe  being  one 
animated  Being.  But  all  that  he  says  amounts ' 
to  no  more,  as  Schultz  remarks,  than  this  :  the 
soul  of  man  is  most  intimately  united  to  his  body 
and  together  they  make  one  animal,  which  we 
call  man ;  so  the  Deity  is  most  intimately  united 
to  the  world  or  the  material  universe,  and  together 
they  form  one  whole.    But  Antoninus  did  not 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


61 


view  God  and  the  material  universe  as  the  same, 
any  more  than  he  viewed  the  body  and  soul  of 
man  as  one.  Antoninus  has  no  speculations  on 
the  absolute  nature  of  the  Deity.  It  was  not  his 
fashion  to  waste  his  time  on  what  man  cannot 
understand.  He  was  satisfied  that  God  exists, 
that  he  governs  all  things,  that  man  can  only  have 
an  imperfect  knowledge  of  his  nature,  and  he  must 
attain  this  imperfect  knowledge  by  reverencing 
the  divinity  which  is  within  him,  and  keeping  it 
pure. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  it  follows  that  the 
universe  is  administered  by  the  Providence  of  God 
(-n-povoLa),  and  that  all  things  are  wisely  ordered. 
There  are  passages  in  which  Antoninus  expresses 
doubts,  or  states  different  possible  theories  of  the 
constitution  and  government  of  the  Universe,  but 
he  always  recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle,  that 
if  we  admit  the  existence  of  a  Deity,  we  must 
also  admit  that  he  orders  all  things  wisely  and 
well.  (iv.  27  ;  vi.  1  ;  ix.  28  ;  xn.  5,  and  many 
other  passages.)  Epictetus  says  (i.  6)  that  we 
can  discern  the  providence  which  rules  the  world, 
if  we  possess  two  things,  the  power  of  seeing  all 
that  happens  with  respect  to  each  thing,  and  a 
grateful  disposition. 

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is  the 
world  so  full  of  what  we  call  evil,  physical  and 
moral  ?  If  instead  of  saying  that  there  is  evil  in 
the  world,  we  use  the  expression  which  I  have 
used,  "  what  we  call  evil,"  we  have  partly  antici- 
pated the  Emperor's  answer.    We  see  and  feel 


C2 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


and  know  imperfectly  very  few  things  in  the  few 
years  that  we  live,  and  all  the  knowledge  and  all 
the  experience  of  all  the  human  race  is  positive 
ignorance  of  the  whole,  which  is  infinite.  Now 
as  our  reason  teaches  us  that  everything  is  in  some 
way  related  to  and  connected  with  every  other 
thing,  all  notion  of  evil  as  being  in  the  universe 
of  things  is  a  contradiction,  for  if  the  whole  comes 
from  and  is  governed  by  an  intelligent  being,  it 
is  impossible  to  conceive  anything  in  it  which  tends 
to  the  evil  or  destruction  of  the  whole,  (vin.  55  ; 
X.  6.)  Everything  is  in  constant  mutation,  and 
yet  the  whole  subsists.  We  might  imagine  the 
solar  system  resolved  into  its  elemental  parts,  and 
yet  the  whole  would  still  subsist  "  ever  young  and 
perfect." 

All  things,  all  forms,  are  dissolved  and  new 
forms_..appear.  All  living  tilings  undergo  the 
change  which  we  call  death.  If  we  call  death  an 
evil,  then  all  change  is  an  evil.  Living  beings 
also  suffer  pain,  and  man  suffers  most  of  all,  for 
he  suffers  both  in  and  by  his  body  and  by  his 
intelligent  part.  Men  suffer  also  from  one  another, 
and  perhaps  the  largest  part  of  human  suffering 
comes  to  man  from  those  whom  he  calls  his  broth- 
ers. Antoninus  says  (vin.  55),  "  Generally, 
wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the  universe  ; 
and  particularly,  the  wickedness  [of  one  man]  does 
no  harm  to  another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him 
who  has  it  in  his  power  to  be  released  from  it,  as 
soon  as  he  shall  choose."  The  first  part  of  this 
is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  doctrine  that  the 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


63 


whole  can  sustain  no  evil  or  harm.  The  second 
part  must  be  explained  by  the  Stpi^  principle  that 
there  is  no  evil  in  anything  which  is  not  in  our 
power.  What  wrong  we  suffer  from  another  is 
his  evil,  not  ours.  BuTTXiTs  is  an  admission  that 
there  is  evil  in  a  sort,  for  he  who  does  wrong  does 
evil,  and  if  others  can  endure  the  wrong,  still  there 
is  evil  in  the  wrongdoer.  Antoninus  (xi.  18) 
gives  many  excellent  precepts  with  respect  to 
wrongs  and  injuries,  and  his  precepts-are  practical. 
He  teaches  us  to. bear  what  we  cannot  avoids  and 
his  lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to  him  who 
denies  the  being  and  the  government  of  God  as 
to  him  who  believes  in  both.  There  is  no  direct 
answer  in  Antoninus  to  the  objections  which  may 
be  made  to  the  existence  and  providence  of  God 
because  of  the  moral -disorder  and ,  siuTering  which 
are  in  the  world,  except  this  answer  which  he 
makes  in  reply  to  the  supposition  that  even  the 
best  men  may  be  extinguished  by  death.  He 
says  if  it  is  so,  we  may  be  sure  that  if  it  ought 
to  have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have 
ordered  it  otherwise,  (xn.  5.)  His  conviction  of 
the  wisdom  which  we  may  observe  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  world  is  too  strong  to  be  disturbed  by 
any  apparent  irregularities  in  the  order  of  things. 
That  these  disorders  exist  is  a  fact,  and  those  who 
would  conclude  from  them  against  the  being  and 
government  of  God  conclude  too  hastily.  We  all 
admit  that  there  is  an  order  in  the  material  world, 
a  Nature,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word  has 
been  explained,  a  constitution  (Karao-KtvYj,)  what 


64  THE  PHILOSOPHY 


we  call  a  system,  a  relation  of  parts  to  one  another 
and  a  fitness  of  the  whole  for  something.  So  in 
the  constitution  of  plants  and  of  animals  there  is 
an  order,  a  fitness  for  some  end.  Sometimes  the 
order,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  interrupted  and  the 
end,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  not  attained.  The  seed, 
the  plant  or  the  animal  sometimes  perishes  before 
it  has  passed  through  all  its-  changes  and  done  all 
its  uses.  It  is  according  to  Nature,  that  is  a  fixed 
order,  for  some  to  perish  early  and  for  others  to 
do  all  their  uses  and  leave  successors  to  take  their 
place.  So  man  has  a  corporeal  and  intellectual 
and  moral  constitution  fit  for  certain  uses^and 
on  the  whole  man  performs  these  uses,  dies  and 
leaves  other  men  in  his  place.  So  society  exists, 
and  a  social  state  is  manifestly  the  Natural  State 
of  man,  the  state  for  which  his  Nature  fits  him ; 
and  society  amidst  innumerable  irregularities  and 
disorders  still  subsists  ;  and  perhaps  we  may  say 
that  the  history  of  the  past  and  our  present  knowl- 
edge give  us  a  reasonable  hope  that  its  disorders 
will  diminish,  and  that  order,  its  governing  prin- 
ciple, may  be  more  firmly  established.  As  order 
then,  a  fixed  order,  we  may  say,  subject  to  devia- 
tions real  or  apparent,  must  be  admitted  to  exist 
in  the  whole  Nature  of  things,  that  which  we  call 
disorder  or  evil  as  it  seems  to  us,  does  not  in  any 
way  alter  the  fact  of  the  general  constitution  of 
things  having  a  Nature  or  fixed  order.  Nobody 
will  conclude  from  the  existence  of  disorder  that 
order "Is^not  the  rule,  for  the  existence  oi_or.der 
both  physical  and  moral  is  proved  by  daily  ex- 


OF  ANTONINUS, 


65 


r  perience  and  all  past  experience.  We  cannot 
conceive  how  the  order  of  the  universe  is  main- 
tained: we  cannot  even  conceive  how  our  own 
life  from  day  to  day  is  continued,  nor  how  we 
,  perform  the  simplest  movements  of  the  body,  nor 
i  how  we  grow  and  think  and  act,  though  we  know 
many  of  the  conditions  which  are  necessary  for 
all  these  functions.  Knowing  nothing  then  of 
the  unseen  jDower^  except 
bywEatTis  done,  we  know  nothing  of  the  power 
which  acts  through  what  we  call  all  time  and  all 
space  ;  but  seeing  that  "there Is'a^TSTature  or  fixed 
order  in  all  things  known  to  us,  it  is  conformable 
to  the  nature  of  our  minds  to  believe  that  this 
universal  Nature  has  a  cause  which  operates  con- 
tinually, and  that  we  are  totally  unable  to  specu- 
late on  the  reason  of  any  of  those  disorders  or 
evils  which  we  perceive.  This  I  believe  is  the 
answer  which  may  be  collected  from  all  that  An- 
toninus has  said.14 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  question.  Achilles 
tells  Priam  (Iliad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has  two  casks, 
one  filled  with  good  things,  and  the  other  with 
bad,  and  that  he  gives  to  men  out  of  each  accord- 
ing to  his  pleasure  ;  and  so  we  must  be  content, 
for  we  cannot  alter  the  will  of  Zeus.  One  of  the 
Greek  commentators  asks  how  must  we  reconcile 
this  doctrine  with  what  we  hud  in  the  first  book 
of  the  Odyssey,  where  the  king  of  the  gods  says, 

14  Cleanthes  says  in  his  Hymn  : 
"  For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest, 
So  that  One  everlasting  reason  governs  all/' 
5 


66  THE  PHILOSOPHY 


Men  say  that  evil  comes  to  them  from  us,  but  they 
bring  it  on  themselves  through  their  own  folly. 
The  answer  is  plain  enough  even  to  the  Greek 
commentator.  The  poets  make  both  Achilles  and 
Zeus  speak  appropriately  to  their  several  charac- 
ters. Indeed  Zeus  says  plainly  that  men  do  attrib- 
ute their  sufferings  to  the  gods,  but  they  do  it 
falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their  own  sorrows. 

Epictetus  in  his  Enchiridion  (c.  27)  makes  short 
work  of  the  question  of  evil.  Pie  says,  "As  a 
markjs  not  set  up  for  the.  purpose  of  missing  it, 
so  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the 
Universe."  This  will  appear  obscure  enough  to 
those  who  are  not  acquainted  with  Epictetus,  but 
he  always  knows  what  he  is  talking  about.  We 
do  not  set  up  a  mark  in  order  to  miss  it,  though 
we  may  miss  it.  God,  whose  existence  Epictetus 
assumes,  has  not  ordered  all  things  so  that  his  pur- 
pose shall  fail.  Whatever  there  may  be  of  what 
we  call  evil,  the  Nature  of  evil,  as  he  expresses  it, 
does  not  exist ;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a  part  of  the 
constitution  or  nature  of  Things.  If  there  were 
a  principle  of  evil  (apx>?)  m  the  constitution  of 


things7  evil"  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as  Simplicius 
argues,  but  evil  would  be  good.  Simplicius  (c.  34, 
[27])  has  a  long  and  curious  discourse  on  this  text 
of  Epictetus,  and  it  is  amusing  and  instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter.  It 
contains  all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (n.  11)  : 
"  To  go  from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not 
a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not  in- 
volve thee  in  evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not 


OF  A  NTONINUS.  67 

/ 
/ 

exist,  or  if  tliey  have  no  concern  about  human 
affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe  devoid 
of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ?  But  in  truth 
they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human  tilings, 
and  they  have  put  all  the  means  in  man's  power 
to  enable  him  not  to  fall  into  real  evils.  And  as 
to  the  rest,  if  there  was  anything  evil,  they  would 
have  provided  for  this  also,  that  it  should  be  al- 
together in  a  man's  power  not  to  fall  into  it.  But 
that  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse,  how  can 
it  make  a  man's  life  worse  ?  But  neither  through 
ignorance,  nor  having  the  knowledge,  but  not  the 
power  to  guard  against  or  correct  these  things,  is 
it  possible  that  the  nature  of  the  Universe  has 
overlooked  them  ;  nqr— is— it  possible  that  it  has 
made  so  great_a  mistake,  either" throu^^^ranl^fV 
power  or  want  of  skill,  that  goodand  evil  should 
hap|?en-4nd iscrim i ua.tp.ly  tQc-.tLe>-good-an<l  the  bad. 
But  death  certainly ' ahcTIife,  honor  and  dishonor, 
pain  and  pleasure,  all  these  things  equally  happen 
to  good  and  bad  men,  being  things  which  make 
us  neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore  they  are 
neither^good  jior-eviL" 

The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus'  Philosophy  fol- 
lows from  his  general  principles.  The_  end  of  all 
his  philosophy  is  to  live  conformably  to  Nature, 
both  a  man's  own  nature  and  the  nature  of  the 
Universe.  Bishop  Butler  has  explained  what  the 
Greek  philosophers  meant  when  they  spoke  of 
livincr  fl^eprclmo;  la  Nfltnr^  and  he  says  that  when 
it  is  explained,  as  he  has  explained  it  and  as  they 
understood  it,  it  is  "a  manner  of  speaking  not  loose 


63 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


and  undeterminate,  but  clear  and  distinct,  strictly 
just  and  true."  To  live  according  to  Nature  is  to 
live  according  to  a  man^s  whole  nature,  not  accord- 
ing to  a  part  of  it,  and  to  reverence  the  divinity 
within  him  as  the  governor  of  all  his  actions.  "  To 
the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  according  to 
nature  and  according  to  reason."  15  (vn.  11.)  That 
which  is  done  contra^y~^to_reason  is  also  an  act 
contrary  to  nature,  to  the  whole  nature,  though  it 
is  certainly  conformable  to  some  part  of  man's 
nature,  or  it  could  not  be  done.  Man  is  made  for 
action,  not  for  idleness  or  pleasure.    As  plants 


anoltnimals  do  the  uses  of  their  nature,  so  man 
must  do  his.  (v.  1.) 

Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  universal 
nature,  conformably  to  the  nature  of  all  things  of 
which  he  is  one ;  and  as  a  citizen  of  a  political 
community  he  must  direct  his  life  and  actions  with 
reference  to  those  among  whom,  and  for  whom, 
among  other  purposes,  he  lives.  A  man  must  not 
retire  into  solitude  and  cut  himself  off  from  his 
fellow  men.  He  must  be  ever  active  to  do  his 
part  in  the  great  whole.  All  men  are  his  kin,  not 
only  in  blood,  but  still  more  by  participating  in 
the  same  intelligence  and  by  being  a  portion  of 
the  same  divinity.  A  man  cannot  really  be  in- 
jured by  his  brethren,  for  no  act  of  theirs  can 
make  him  bad,  and  he  must  not  be  angry  with 
them  nor  hate  them  :  "  For  we  are  made  for  co- 

15  This  is  what  Juvenal  means  when  he  says  (xiv. 
321)  — 

Nunquam  aliud  Natura  aliud  Sapentia  elicit 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


6!) 


.  operation,  like  feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like 
the  rows  of  the  upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act 
against  one  another  then  is  contrary  to  nature  ; 

"  and  it  is  acting  against  one  another  to  be  vexed 

/and  to  turn  away."  (n.  1.) 

Further  he  says  :  "  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing 
and  rest  in  it,  in  passing  from  one  social  act  to 
another  social  act,  thinking  of  God."  (vi.  7.) 
Again  :  "  Love  mankind.  Follow  God."  (vn.  31.) 
It  is  the  characteristic  of  the  rational  soul  for  a 
man  to  love  his  neighbor,  (xi.  1.)  Antoninus 
teaches  in  various  passages  the  forgiveness  of  in- 
juries, and  we  know  that  he  also  practised  what 
he  taught.  Bishop  Butler  remarks  that  "  this 
divine  precept  to  forgive  injuries  and  to  love  our 
enemies,  though  to  be  met  with  in  Gentile  moral- 
ists, yet  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  precept  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  our  Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it 
than  on  any  other  single  virtue."  The  practice  of 
this  precept  is  the  most  difficult  of  all  virtues. 
Antoninus  often  enforces  it  and  gives  us  aid 
towards  following  it.  When  we  are  injured,  we 
feel  anger  and  resentment,  and  the  feeling  is 
natural,  just  and  useful  for  the  conservation  of 
society.  It  is  useful  that  wrong  doers  should  feel 
the  natural  consequences  of  their  actions,  among 
which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society  and  the  re- 
sentment of  him  who  is  wronged.  But  revenge 
in  the  proper  sense  of  that  word,  mustnot  be  prac- 
tised. "  The  best  way  of  avenging  tlrysSi^.  says 
the  emperor,  "is  not  to  become  like  the  wrong 
doer/'    It  is  plain  by  this  that  he  does  not  mean 


70 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


that  we  should  in  any  case  practise  revenge  ;  but 
he  says  to  those  who  talk  of  revenging  wrongs, 
Be  not  like  him  who  has  done  the  wrong.  Soc- 
rates in  the  Crito  (c.  10)  says  the  same  in  other 
words,  and  St.  Paul  (Ep.  to  the  Romans,  xn.  17.) 
"  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  imme- 
diately consider  with  what  opinion  about  good  or 
evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For  when  thou  hast 
seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity^lnm_jmd  wilt  neither 
wonder  nor  be  angry."  (vn.  26.)  Antoninus 
would  not  deny  thatT  wrong  naturally  produces  the 
feeling  of  anger  and  resentment,  for  this  is  implied 
in  the  recommendation  to  reflect  on  the  nature  of 
the  man's  mind  who  has  done  the  wrong,  and  then 
you  wilPhave  pity  iii£tead  of  resentment :  and  so 
it  comes  to  the  same  as  St.  Paul's  advice  to  be 
angry  and  sin  not ;  which,  as  Butler  well  explains 
it,  is  not  a  recommendation  to  be  angry,  which 
nobody  needs,  for  anger  is  a  natural  passion,  but 
it  is  a  warning  against  allowing  anger~~to'lead  us 
into  sin.  In  short  the  emperor's"~doctrine  about 
wrongful  acts  is  this  :  wrong  doers  do  not  know 
what  good  and  bad  are  :  they  offend  out  of  igno- 
rance, and  in  the  sense  of  the  Stoics  this  is  true. 
Though  this  kind  of  ignorance  will  never  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  legal  excuse,  and  ought  not  to  be 
admitted  as  a  full  excuse  in  any  way  by  society, 
there  may  be  grievous  injuries,  such  as  it  is  in  a 
man's  power  to  forgive  without  harm  to  society  ; 
and  if  he  forgives  because  he  sees  that  his  enemies 
know  not  what  they  do,  he  is  acting  in  the  spirit 
of  the  sublime  prayer,  "  Father,  forgive  them,  for 
they  know  not  what  they  do." 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


71 


The  emperor's  moral  philosophy  was  not  a  feeble, 
narrow  system,  which  teaches  a  man  to  look  di- 
rectly to  his  own  happiness,  though  a  man's  hap- 
piness or  tranquillity  is  indirectly  promoted  by 
living  as  he  ought  to  do.  A  man  must  live  con- 
formably to  the  universal  nature,  which  means,  as 
the  emperor  explains  it  in  many  passages,  that  a 
man's  actions  must  be  conformable  to  his  true  re- 
lations to  all  other  human  beings,  both  as  a  citizen 
of  a  political  community  and  as  a  member  of  the 
whole  human  family.  This  implies,  and  he  often 
expresses  it  in  the  most  forcible  language,  that  a 
man's  words  and  actions,  so  far  as  they  affect 
others,  must  be  measured  by  a  fixed  rule,  which 
is  their  consistency  with  the  conservation  and  the 
interests  of  the  particular  society  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  and  of  the  whole  human  race.  To  live 
conformably  to  such  a  rule,  a  man  must  use  his 
rational  faculties  in  order  to  discern  clearly  the 
consequences  and  full  effect  of  all  his  actions  and 
of  the  actions  of  others  :  he  must  not  live  a  life  of 
contemplation  and  reflection  only,  though  he  must 
often  retire  within  himself  to  calm  and  purify  his 
soul  by  thought,  but  he  must  mingle  in  the  Avork  of 
man  and  be  a  fellow  laborer  for  the  general  good. 

A  man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in  life, 
that  he  may  direct  all  his  energies  to  it ;  of  course 
a  good  object,  (n.  7.)  He  who  has  not  one  object 
or  purpose  of  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all 
through  his  life.  (xi.  21.)  Bacon  has  a  remark  to 
the  same  effect,  on  the  best  means  of  "  reducing 
of  the  mind  unto  virtue  and  good  estate  ;  which 


72 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


is,  the  electing  and  propounding  unto  a  man's  self 
good  and  virtuous  ends  of  his  life,  such  as  may  be 
in  a  reasonable  sort  within  his  compass  to  attain." 
He  is  a  happy  man  who  has  been  wise  enough 
to  do  this  when  he  was  young  and  has  had  the 
opportunities ;  but  the  emperor  seeing  well  that  a 
man  cannot  always  be  so  wise  in  his  youth,  en- 
courages himself  to  do  it  when  he  can,  and  not  to 
let  life  slip  away  before  he  has  begun.  He  who 
can  propose  to  himself  good  and  virtuous  ends  of 
life,  and  be  true  to  them,  cannot  fail  to  live  con- 
formably to  his  own  interest  and  the  universal  in- 
terest, for  in  the  nature  of  things  they  are  one. 
If  a  thing  is  not  good  for  the  hive,  it  is  not  good 
for  the  bee.  (vi.  54) 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  "  If  the  gods 
have  determined  about  me  and  about  the  things 
which  must  happen  to  me,  they  have  determined 
well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to  imagine  a  deity 
without  forethought ;  and  as  to  doing  me  harm, 
why  should  they  have  any  desire  towards  that  ? 
For  what  advantage  would  result  to  them  from 
this  or  to  the  whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of 
their  providence  ?  But  if  they  have  not  deter- 
mined about  me  individually,  they  have  certainly 
determined  about  the  whole  at  least ;  and  the 
things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in  this 
general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept  with  pleas- 
ure and  to  be  content  with  them.  But  if  they 
determine  about  nothing  —  which  it  is  wicked  to 
believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us  neither  sacri- 
fice nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them  nor  do  anything 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


73 


else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were  present  and 
lived  with  us  —  but  if  however  the  gods  determine 
about  none  of  the  things  which  concern  us,  I  am 
able  to  determine  about  myself,  and  I  can  inquire 
about  that  which  is  useful ;  and  that  is  useful  to 
every  man  which  is  conformable  to  his  own  con- 
stitution (Karao-Kevrj)  and  nature.  But  my  nature 
is  rational  and  social ;  and  my  city  and  country, 
so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome  ;  but  so  far  as 
I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.  The  things  then 
which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful 
to  me."  (vi.  44.) 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to 
state  the  emperor's  opinions  on  all  the  ways  in 
which  a  man  may  profitably  use  his,  undemanding 
towards  perfecting  himself  in  practical  virtue. 
The  passages  to  this  purpose  are  in  all  parts  of 
his  book,  but  as  they  are  in  no  order  or  connec- 
tion, a  man  must  use  the  book  a. long  time  before 
he  will  find  out  all  that  is  in  it.  A  few  words 
may  be  added  here.  If  we  analyse  all  other 
things,  we  find  how  insufficient  they  are  for  human 
life,  and  how  truly  worthless  many  of  them  are. 
Virtue  alone  is  indivisible,  one,  and  perfectly  satis- 
fying. The  notion  of  Un-fue  cannot  be  considered 
vague  or  unsettled,  because  a  man  may  find  it 
difficult  to  explain  the  notion  fully  to  himself  or 
to  expound  it  to  others  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent 
cavilling.  Virtue  is  a  whole,  and  no  more  consists 
of  parts  than  man's  intelligence  does,  and  yet  we 
speak  of  various  intellectual  faculties  as  a  conven- 
ient way  of  expressing  the  various  powers  which 


74 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


man's  intellect  shows  by  its  works.  In  the  same 
way  we  may  speak  of  various  virtues  or  parts  of 
virtue,  in  a  practical  sense^^r  the  purpose  of 
showing  what  particular  virtues  we  ought  to  prac- 
tise in  order  to  the  exercise  of  the  whole  of  virtue, 
that  is,  as  much  as  man's  nature  is  capable  of. 

The  primB^nrinciple  in  man's  constitution  is 
social.  The  next  in  order  is  not  to  yield  to  the  per- 
suasions of  the  body,  when  they  are  not  conformable 
to  the  rational  principle,  which  must  govern.  The 
third  is  freedom  from  error  and  from  deception. 
"  Let  then  the  ruling  principle  holding  fast  to 
these  things  go  straight  on  and  it  has  what  is  its 
own."  (vn.  55.)  The  emperor  selects  justice  as 
the  virtue  which  is  the  basis,  of  all  the  resT^xTll), 
and  this  hacTbeen  said  long  before  his  time. 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of 
what  is  meant  by  justice  as  a  disposition  of  the 
mind,  and  some  notion  about  acting  in  conformity 
to  this  disposition ;  but  experience  shows  that 
men's  notions  about  justice  are  as  confused  as  their 
actions  are  inconsistent  with  the  true  notion  of 
justice.  The  emperor's  notion  of  justice  is  clear 
enough,  but  not  practical  enough  for  all  mankind. 
"  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations  with 
respect  to  the  things  which  come  from  the  exter- 
nal cause  ;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the  things 
done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that  is,  let 
there  be  movement  and  action  terminating  in  this, 
in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature." 
(ix.  31.)  In  another  place  (ix.  1)  he  says  that 
"  he  who  acta  unjustly  acts  impiously,"  which  fol- 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


75 


lows  of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in  various 
places.  lie  insists  on  the  practice  of  truth  as  a 
virtue  and  as  a  means  to  virtue,  which  no  doubt 
it  is  :  for  lying  even  in  indifferent  things  weakens 
the  understanding  ;  and  lying  maliciously  is  as 
great  a  moral  offence  as  a  man  can  be  guilty  of, 
viewed  both  as  showing  an  habitual  disposition, 
and  viewed  with  respect  to  its  consequences.  He 
couples  the  notion  of  justice_,with  action.  A  man 
must  not  pride  himself  on  having  some  fine  notion 
of  justice  in  his  head,  but  he  must  exhibit  his 
justice  in  act,  like  St.  James's  notion  of  faith. 
But  this  is  enough. 

The  Stoics  and  Antoninus  among  them  call  some 
things  beautiful  («a\a)  and  some  ugly  (atcrxpa), 
and  as  they  are  beautiful  so  they  are  good,  and  as 
they  are  ugly  so  they  are  evil  or  bad.  (n.  1.)  All 
these  things  good  and  evil  are  in  our  power, 
absolutely  some  of  the  stricter  Stoics  would  say ; 
in  a  maimer  only,  as  those  who  would  not  depart 
alfogether  from  common  sense  would  say  ;  practi- 
cally they  are  to  a  great  degree  in  the  power  of 
some  persons  and  in  some  circumstances,  but  in  a 
small  degree  only  in  other  persons  and  in  other 
circumstances.  The  Stoics  maintain  man's  free 
will  as  to  the  things  which  are  in  his  power ;  for 
as  to  the  things  which  are  out  of  his  power,  free 
will  terminating  in  action  is  of  course  excluded 
by  the  very  terms  of  the  expression.  I  hardly 
know  if  we  can  discover  exactly  Antoninus'  notion 
of  the  free  will  of  man,  nor  is  the  question  worth 
the  inquiry.    What  he  does  mean  and  does  say  is 


76 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


intelligible.  All  the  things  which  are  not  in 
our  power  (aTrpoatpera)  are  indifferent :  they  are 
neither  good  nor  bad,  morally.  Such  are  life, 
health,  wealth,  power,  disease,  poverty  and  death. 
Life  and  death  are  all  men's  portion.  Health, 
wealth,  power,  disease  and  poverty  happen  to  men 
indifferently  to  the  good  and  to  the  bad  ;  to  those 
who  live  according  to  nature  and  to  those  who  do 
not.  "  Life,"  says  the  emperor,  "  is  a  warfare  and 
a  stranger's  sojourn,  and  after  fame  is  oblivion." 
(n.  17.)  After  speaking  of  those  men  who  have 
disturbed  the  world  and  then  died,  and  of  the 
death  of  philosophers  such  as  Heraclitus  and  De- 
mocritus  who  was  destroyed  by  lice,  and  of  Soc- 
rates whom  other  lice  (his  enemies)  destroyed,  he 
says :  "  What  means  all  this  ?  Thou  hast  embarked, 
thou  hast  made  the  voyage,  thou  art  come  to  shore  ; 
get  out.  If  indeed  to  another  life,  there  is  no 
want  of  gods,  not  even  there.  But  if  to  a  state 
without  sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by 
pains  and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel 
which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which  serves  it 
is  superior  :  for  the  one  is  intelligence  and  deity ; 
the  other  is  earth  and  corruption."  (in.  3.)  It  is 
not  death  that  a  man  should  fear,  but  he  should 
fear  never  beginning  to  live  according  to  nature. 
(xii.  1.)  Every  man  should  live  in  such  a  way 
as  to  discharge  his  duty,  and  to  trouble  himself 
about  nothing  else.  He  should  live  such  a  life 
that  he  shall  always  be  ready  for  death,  and  shall 
depart  content  when  the  summons  comes.  For 
what  is  death  ?    "A  cessation  of  the  impressions 


OF  A  NTONINUS. 


77 


through  the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings 
which  move  the  appetites  and  of  the  discursive 
movements  of  the  thoughts,  and  of  the  service  to 
the  flesh."  (vi.  28.)  Death  is  such  as  generation 
is,  a  mystery  of  nature,  (iv.  5.)  In  another 
passage,  the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  perhaps 
doubtful  (ix.  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child  which 
leaves  the  womb,  and  so  he  says  the  soul  at  death 
leaves  its  envelope.  As  the  child  is  born  or  comes 
into  life  by  leaving  the  womb,  so  the  soul  may  on 
leaving  the  body  pass  into  another  existence  which 
is  perfect.  I  am  not  sure  if  this  is  the  emperor's 
meaning.  Butler  compares  it  with  a  passage  in 
Strabo  about  the  Brahmins'  notion  of  death  being 
the  birth  into  real  life  and  a  happy  life  to  those 
who  have  philosophized  ;  and.  he  thinks  that  An- 
toninus may  allude  to  this  opinion.16 

Antoninus'  opinion  of  a  future  life  is  nowhere 
clearly  expressed.  His  doctrine  of  the  nature  of 
the  soul  of  necessity  implies  that  it  does  not  perish 
absolutely,  for  a  portion  of  the  divinity  cannot 
perish.  The  opinion  is  at  least  as  old  as  the  time 
of  Epicharmus  and  Euripides  ;  what  comes  from 
earth  goes  back  to  earth,  and  what  comes  from 
heaven,  the  divinity,  returns  to  him  who  gave  it. 
But  I  find  nothing  clear  in  Antoninus  as  to  the 

16  Seneca  (Ep.  102)  has  the  same,  whether  an  expres- 
sion of  his  own  opinion,  or  merely  a  fine  saying  of  others 
employed  to  embellish  liis  writings,  I  know  not.  After 
speaking  of  the  child  being  prepared  in  the  womb  to  live 
this  life,  he  adds,  "  Sic  per  hoc  spatium,  quod  ab  infantia 
patet  in  senectutem,  in  alium  naturae  sumimur  partum. 
Alia  origo  nos  expectat,  alius  rerum  status." 


78 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


notion  of  the  man  existing  after  death  so  as  to  be 
conscious  of  his  sameness  with  that  soul  which 
occupied  his  vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be 
perplexed  on  this  matter,  and  finally  to  have  rested 
in  this,  that  God  or  the  gods  will  do  whatever  is 
best  and  consistent  with  the  university  of  things. 

Nor  I  think  does  he  speak  conclusively  on 
another  Stoic  doctrine,  which  some  Stoics  prac- 
tised, the  anticipating  the  regular  course  of  nature 
by  a  man's  own  act.  The  reader  will  find  some 
passages  in  which  this  is  touched  on,  and  he  may 
make  of  them  Avhat  he  can.  But  there  are  pas- 
sages in  which  the  emperor  encourages  himself  to 
wait  for  the  end  patiently  and  with  tranquillity  ; 
and  certainly  it  is  consistent  with  all  his  best 
teaching  that  a  man  should  bear  all  that  falls  to 
his  lot  and  do  useful  acts  as  long  as  he  lives.  He 
should  not  therefore  abridge  the  time  of  his  use-r 
fulness  by  his  own  act.  Whether  he  contemplates 
any  possible  cases  in  which  a  man  should  die  by 
his  own  hand,  I  cannot  tell,  and  the  matter  is  not 
worth  a  ^curious  inquiry,  for  I  believe  it  would  not 
lead  tetany  certain  result  as  to  his  opinion  on  this 
point,  i  I  do  not  think  that  Antoninus,  who  never 
mentions  Seneca,  though  he  must  have  known  all 
about  him,  would  have  agreed  with  Seneca  when 
he  gives  as  a  reason  for  suicide,  that  the  eternal 
law,  whatever~Tie  means,  has  made  nothing  better 
for  us  than  this,  that  it  has  given  us  only  one  way 
of  entering  into  life  and  many  ways  of  gomg  out 
of  it.  The  ways  of  gomg  out  indeed  are  many, 
and  that  is  a  good  reason  for  a  man  taking  care 
of  himself. 


OF  ANTONINUS. 


7S 


Hnppinnpa  yraa  vnl..±hp,  direct  jal^cLoiLa--Si.nii^s 
life.  There  is  no  rule  of  life  contained  in  the 
precept  that  a  man  shouIcTpursue  his  own  hap- 
piness. Many  men  tlTrnlT  that  they  are  seeking 
happiness  when  they  are  only  seeking  the  gratifi- 
cation of  some  particular  passion,  the  strongest 
that  they  have.  The  end  of  a  man  is,  as  already 
explained,  to  live  conformably  to  nature,  and  he 
will  thus  obtain  happiness,  tranquillity  of  mind  and 
contentment,  (in.  12  ;  viii.  1,  and  other  places.) 
As  a  means  of  living  conformably  to  nature  he 
must  study  the  four  chief  virtue^— each  of  which 
has  its  proper  sphere  :  wisdom  or  the  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil ;  justice,  or  the  giving  to  every 
man  his  clue  ;  fortitude,  or  the  enduring  of  labor 
and  pain  ;  and  temperance,  which  is  moderation 
in  all  things.  By  thus  living  conformably  to 
nature,  the  Stoic  obtained  all  that  he  wished  or 
expected.  His  reward  was  in  his  virtuous  life, 
and  he  was  satisfied  with  that.  Some  Greek  poet 
long  ago  wrote  :  — 

For  virtue  only  of  all  human  things  \ 
Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 
Virtue  herself  rewards  the  toils  of  virtue. 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  themselves 
m  very  arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about  the  wise 
man's  self  sufficiency;  they  elevated  him  to  the 
rank  of  a  deity. 11    But  these  were  only  talkers 

17  J.  Smith  in  his  Select  Discourses  on  "  the  Excellency 
and  Nobleness  of  true  religion  "  (c.  vi.)  has  remarked  on 
this  Stoical  arrogance.  He  finds  it  in  Seneca  and  others. 
In  Seneca  certainly,  and  perhaps  something  of  it  in 
Epictetus ;  but  it  is  not  in  Antoninus. 


80 


ANTONINUS. 


and  lecturers,  such  as  those  in  all  ages  who  utter 
fine  words,  know  little  of  human  affairs,  and  care 
only  for  notoriety.  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  both 
by  precept  and  example  labored  to  improve  them- 
selves and  others ;  and  if  we  discover  imperfec- 
tions in  their  teaching,  we  must  still  honor  these 
great  men  who  attempted  to  show  that  there  is  in 
man's  nature  and  in  the  constitution  of  things 
sufficient  reason  for  living  a  virtuous  life.  It  is 
difficult  enough  to  live  as  we  ought  to  live,  diffi- 
cult even  for  any  man  to  live  in  such  a  way  as  to 
satisfy  himself,  if  he  exercises  only  in  a  moderate 
degree  the  power  of  reflecting  upon  and  reviewing 
his  own  conduct ;  and  if  all  men  cannot  be  brought 
to  the  same  opinions  in  morals  and  religion,  it  is 
at  least  worth  while  to  give  them  good  reasons  for 
as  much  as  they  can  be  persuaded  to  accept. 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


T. 

ROM  my  grandfather  Verus1  [I 
learned]  good  morals  and  the  gov- 
ernment of  my  temper. 

2.  From  the  reputation  and  re- 
membrance of  my  father,2  modesty  and  a  manly 
character. 

1  Annius  Verus  was  his  grandfather's  name.  There  is 
no  verb  in  this  section  connected  with  the  word  "  from," 
nor  in  the  following  sections  of  this  book ;  and  it  is  not 
quite  certain  what  verb  should  be  supplied.  What  I 
have  added  may  express  the  meaning  here,  though 
there  are  sections  which  it  will  not  fit.  If  he  does  not 
mean  to  say  that  he  learned  all  these  good  things  from 
the  several  persons  whom  he  mentions,  he  means  that 
he  observed  certain  good  qualities  in  them,  or  received 
certain  benefits  from  them,  and  it  is  implied  that  he  was 
the  better  for  it,  or  at  least  might  have  been ;  for  it 
would  be  a  mistake  to  understand  Marcus  as  saying  that 
he  possessed  all  the  virtues  which  he  observed  in  his 
kinsmen  and  teachers. 

2  His  father's  name  was  Annius  Verus. 

6 


82 


M.  ANTONINUS.  J. 


3.  From  my  mother,3  piety  and  beneficence,  and 
abstinence,  not  only  from  evil  deeds,  but  even 
from  evil  thoughts  ;  and  further,  simplicity  in  my 
way  of  living,  far  removed  from  the  habits  of  the 
rich. 

4.  From  my  great-grandfather,4  not  to  have 
frequented  public  schools,  and  to  have  had  good 
teachers  at  home,  and  to  know  that  on  such  things 
a  man  should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the 
green  nor  of  the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the 
Circus,  nor  a  partisan  either  of  the  Parmularius 
or  the  Scutarius  at  the  gladiators'  fights;  from 
him  too  I  learned  endurance  of  labor,  and  to 
want  little,  and  to  work  with  my  own  hands,  and 
not  to  meddle  with  other  people's  affairs,  and  not 
to  be  ready  to  listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognetus,  not  to  busy  myself  about 
trifling  things,  and  not  to  give  credit  to  what  was 
said  by  miracle-workers  and  jugglers  about  incan- 
tations and  the  driving  away  of  daemons  and  such 
things  ;  and  not  to  breed  quails  [for  fighting],  nor 
to  give  myself  up  passionately  to  such  things  ;  and 
to  endure  freedom  of  speech ;  and  to  have  become 

8  His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  named  also  Lucilla. 
*  Perhaps  his  mother's  grandfather,  Catilius  Severus. 


M .  ANTONINUS.  I. 


33 


intimate  with  philosophy;  and  to  have  been  a 
hearer,  first  of  Bacchius,  then  of  Tandasis  and 
Marcianus ;  and  to  have  written  dialogues  in  my 
youth  ;  and  to  have  desired  a  plank  bed  and  skin, 
and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  belongs  to  the  Gre- 
cian discipline. 

7.  From  Rusticus5  I  received  the  impression 
that  my  character  required  improvement  and  dis- 
cipline ;  and  from  him  I  learned  not  to  be  led 
astray  to  sophistic  emulation,  nor  to  writing  on 
speculative  matters,  nor  to  delivering  little  horta- 
tory orations,  nor  to  showing  myself  off  as  a  man 
who  practises  much  discipline,  or  does  benevolent 
acts  in  order  to  make  a  display ;  and  to  abstain 
from  rhetoric,  and  poetry,  and  fine  writing ;  and 
not  to  walk  about  in  the  house  in  my  outdoor 
dress,  nor  to  do  other  things  of  the  kind ;  and  to 
write  my  letters  with  simplicity,  like  the  letter 

5  Q.  Junius  Rusticus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  whom 
Antoninus  valued  highly,  and  often  took  his  advice. 
(Capitol.  M.  Antonin.  'in.) 

Antoninus  says,  toIq  'EmtcTTjTetoic  VTcofivT/fiaaiv,  which 
must  not  be  translated,  "  the  writings  of  Epictetus,"  for 
Epictetus  wrote  nothing.  His  pupil  Arrian,  who  has 
preserved  for  us  all  that  we  know  of  Epictetus,  says, 
rnvra  E7reipad-7]v  {mofivrfixara  hfiavrC)  dcafvhaijai  rfiq  kxeivov 
diavoiag.    (Ep.  ad  Gell.) 


84  M.   ANTONINUS.  I. 


which  Rusticus  wrote  from  Sinuessa  to  my  moth 
er ;  and  with  respect  to  those  who  have  offended 
me  by  words,  or  done  me  wrong,  to  be  easily  dis- 
posed to  be  pacified  and  reconciled,  as  soon  as  they 
have  shown  a  readiness  to  be  reconciled ;  and  to 
read  carefully,  and  not  to  be  satisfied  with  a  su- 
perficial understanding  of  a  book;  nor  hastily  to 
give  my  assent  to  those  who  talk  over-much ;  and 
I  am  indebted  to  him  for  being  acquainted  with 
the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  which  he  communi- 
cated to  me  out  of  his  own  collection. 

8.  From  Apollonius  6  I  learned  freedom  of  will 
and  undeviating  steadiness  of  purpose;  and  to 
look  to  nothing  else,  not  even  for  a  moment,  ex- 
cept to  reason;  and  to  be  always  the  same,  in 
sharp  pains,  on  the  occasion  of  the  loss  of  a  child, 
and  in  long  illness  ;  and  to  see  clearly  in  a  living 
example  that  the  same  man  can  be  both  most  res- 
olute and  yielding,  and  not  peevish  in  giving  his 
instruction ;  and  to  have  had  before  my  eyes  a 
man  who  clearly  considered  his  experience  and  his 
skill  in  expounding  philosophical  principles  as  the 
smallest  of  his  merits  ;  and  from  him  I  learned 
how  to  receive  from  friends  what  are  esteemed 

6  Apollonius  of  Cbalcis  came  to  Rome  in  the  time  of 
Pius  to  be  Marcus*  preceptor.    He  was  a  rigid  Stoic. 


M.   ANTONINUS.    I.  85 


favors,  without  being  either  humbled  by  them  or 
letting  them  pass  unnoticed. 

9.  From  Sextus,7  a  benevolent  disposition,  and 
the  example  of  a  family  governed  in  a  fatherly  man- 
ner, and  the  idea  of  living  conformably  to  nature ; 
and  gravity  without  affectation,  and  to  look  care- 
fully after  the  interests  of  friends,  and  to  tolerate 
ignorant  persons,  and  those  who  form  opinions 
without  consideration  f  :  he  had  the  power  of  read- 
ily accommodating  himself  to  all,  so  that  inter- 
course wifh  him  was  more  agreeable  than  any 
flattery ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  was  most  highly 
venerated  by  those  who  associated  with  him :  and 
he  had  the  faculty  both  of  discovering  and  order- 
ing, in  an  intelligent  and  methodical  way,  the  prin- 
ciples necessary  for  life  ;  and  he  never  showed  an- 
ger or  any  other  passion,  but  was  entirely  free  from 
passion,  and  also  most  affectionate  ;  and  he  could 
express  approbation  without  noisy  display,  and  he 
possessed  much  knowledge  without  ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander 8  the  grammarian,  to  re- 
frain from  fault-finding,  and  not  in  a  reproachful 

7  Sextus  of  Chseronea,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch,  or 
nephew,  as  some  say  ;  but  more  probably  a  grandson. 

8  Alexander  was  a  Grammaticus,  a  native  of  Phrygia. 
He  wrote  a  commentary  on  Homer  ;  and  the  rhetorician 


86  M.  ANTONINUS.  I. 


way  to  chide  those  who  uttered  any  barbarous  or 
solecistic  or  strange-sounding  expression ;  but  dex- 
terously to  introduce  the  very  expression  which 
ought  to  have  beep  used,  and  in  the  way  of  answer 
or  giving  confirmation.,  or  joining  in  an  inquiry 
about  the  thing  itself,  not  about  the  word,  or  by 
some  other  fit  suggestion. 

11.  From  Fronto9  I  learned  to  observe  what 
envy,  and  duplicity,  and  hypocrisy  are  in  a  tyrant, 
and  that  generally  those  among  us  who  are  called 
Patricians  are  rather  deficient  in  paternal  affection. 

12.  From  Alexander  the  Platonic,  not  frequent- 
ly nor  without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one,  or  to 
'write  in  a  letter,  that  I  have  no  leisure  ;  nor  con- 
tinually to  excuse  the  neglect  of  duties  required 
by  our  relation  to  those  with  whom  we  live,  by 
alleging  urgent  occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,10  not  to  be  indifferent  when 
a  friend  finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find  fault 
without  reason,  but  to  try  to  restore  him  to  his 
usual  disposition ;  and  to  be  ready  to  speak  well 

Aristides  wrote  a  panegyric  on  Alexander  in  a  funeral 
oration. 

9  Cornelius  Fronto  was  a  rhetorician,  and  in  great 
favor  with  Marcus.  There  are  extant  various  letters 
between  Marcus  and  Fronto. 

10  Cinna  Catulus,  a  Stoic  philosopher. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    /.  8? 


of  teachers,  as  it  is  reported  of  Domitius  and 
Athenodotus ;  and  to  love  my  children  truly. 

14.  From  my  brother11  Severus,  to  love  my 
kin,  and  to  love  truth,  and  to  love  justice ;  and 
through  him  I  learned  to  know  Thrasea,  Helvid- 
ius,  Cato,  Dion,  Brutus  ; 12  and  from  him  I  receiv- 
ed the  idea  of  a  polity  in  which  there  is  the  same 
law  for  all,  a  polity  administered  with  regard  to 
equal  rights  and  equal  freedom  of  speech,  and  the 
idea  of  a  kingly  government  which  respects  most 
of  all  the  freedom  of  the  governed ;  I  learned  from 
him  also  f  consistency  and  undeviating  steadiness 
in  my  regard  for  philosophy ;  and  a  disposition  to 
do  good,  and  to  give  to  others  readily,  and  to  cher- 
ish good  hopes,  and  to  believe  that  I  am  loved  by 
my  friends ;  and  in  him  I  observed  no  conceal- 
ment of  his  opinions  with  respect  to  those  whom 

11  The  word  brother  may  not  be  genuine.  Antoninus 
had  no  brother.  It  has  been  supposed  that  he  may 
mean  some  cousin.  Schultz  omits  "  brother,"  and  says 
that  this  Severus  is  probably  Claudius  Severus,  a  peri- 
patetic. 

12  We  know,  from  Tacitus  (Annal.  xiii.,  xvi.  21 ;  and 
other  passages),  who  Thrasea  and  Helvidius  were.  Plu- 
tarch has  written  the  lives  of  the  two  Catos,  and  of 
Dion  and  Brutus.  Antoninus  probably  alludes  to  Cato 
of  Utica,  who  was  a  Stoic. 


88  M .  ANTONINUS.  I. 


he  condemned,  and  that  his  friends  had  no  need 
to  conjecture  what  he  wished  or  did  not  wish, 
but  it  was  quite  plain. 

1 5.  From  Maximus la  I  learned  self-government, 
and  not  to  be  led  aside  by  anything ;  and  cheer- 
fulness in  all  circumstances,  as  well  as  in  illness  ; 
and  a  just  admixture  in  the  moral  character  of 
sweetness  and  dignity,  and  to  do  what  was  set 
before  me  without  complaining.  I  observed  that 
everybody  believed  that  he  thought  as  he  spoke, 
and  that  in  all  that  he  did  he  never  had  any  bad 
intention ;  and  he  never  showed  amazement  and 
surprise,  and  was  never  in  a  hurry,  and  never  put 
off  doing  a  thing,  nor  was  perplexed  nor  dejected, 
nor  did  he  ever  laugh  to  disguise  his  vexation,  nor, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  he  ever  passionate  or  sus- 
picious. He  was  accustomed  to  do  acts  of  benefi- 
cence, and  was  ready  to  forgive,  and  was  free  from 
all  falsehood;  and  he  presented  the  appearance 
of  a  man.  who  could  not  be  diverted  from  right 
rather  than  of  a  man  who  had  been  improved.  I 
observed,  too,  that  no  man  could  ever  think  that 

18  Claudius  Maximus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who 
Tras  highly  esteemed  also  by  Antoninus  Pius,  Marcus' 
predecessor.  The  character  of  Maximus  is  that  of  a 
perfect  man.    (See  viii.  25.) 


M.  ANTONINUS.    I.  89 


he  was  despised  by  Maximus,  or  ever  venture  to 
think  himself  a  better  man.  He  had  also  the  art 
of  being  humorous  in  an  agreeable  way.f 

16.  In  my  father14  I  observed  mildness  of 
temper,  and  unchangeable  resolution  in  the  things 
which  he  had  determined  after  due  deliberation ; 
and  no  vainglory  in  those  things  which  men  call 
honors ;  and  a  love  of  labor  and  perseverance ; 
and  a  readiness  to  listen  to  those  who  had  any- 
thing to  propose  for  the  common  weal;  and  un- 
deviating  firmness  in  giving  to  every  man  accord- 
ing to  his  deserts  ;  and  a  knowledge  derived  from 
experience  of  the  occasions  for  vigorous  action  and 
for  remission.  And  I  observed  that  he  had  overcome 
all  passion  for  boys ;  and  he  considered  himself  no 
more  than  any  other  citizen  ;  and  he  released  his 
friends  from  all  obligation  to  sup  with  him  or  to 
attend  him  of  necessity  when  he  went  abroad,  and 
those  who  had  failed  to  accompany  him,  by  reason 
of  any  urgent  circumstances,  always  found  him  the 
same.  I  observed  too  his  habit  of  careful  inquiry 
in  all  matters  of  deliberation,  and  his  persistency, 
and  that  he  never  stopped  his  investigation  through 
being  satisfied  with  appearances  which  first  present 

14  He  means  his  adoptive  father,  his  predecessor,  the 
Emperor  Antoninus  Pius. 


90  M.  ANTONINUS.  I. 


themselves ;  and  that  his  disposition  was  to  keep 
his  friends,  and  not  to  be  soon  tired  of  them,  nor 
yet  to  be  extravagant  in  his  affection ;  and  to  be 
satisfied  on  all  occasions,  and  cheerful ;  and  to 
foresee  things  a  long  way  off,  and  to  provide  for  the 
smallest  without  display ;  and  to  check  immediately 
popular  applause  and  all  flattery ;  and  to  be  ever 
watchful  over  the  things  which  were  necessary  for 
the  administration  of  the  empire,  and  to  be  a  good 
manager  of  the  expenditure,  and  patiently  to  en- 
dure the  blame  which  he  got  for  such  conduct; 
and  he  was  neither  superstitious  with  respect  to 
the  gods,  nor  did  he  court  men  by  gifts  or  by  try- 
ing to  please  them,  or  by  flattering  the  populace  ; 
but  he  showed  sobriety  in  all  things  and  firmness, 
and  never  any  mean  thoughts  or  action,  nor  love 
of  novelty.  And  the  things  which  conduce  in  any 
way  to  the  commodity  of  life,  and  of  which  fortune 
gives  an  abundant  supply,  he  used  without  arro- 
gance and  without  excusing  himself ;  so  that  when 
he  had  them,  he  enjoyed  them  without  affectation, 
and  when  he  had  them  not,  he  did  not  want  them. 
No  one  could  ever  say  of  him  that  he  was  either  a 
sophist  or  a  [home-bred]  flippant  slave  or  a  pedant ; 
but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to  be  a  man  ripe, 
perfect,  above  flattery,  able  to  manage  his  own  and 
other  men's  affairs.     Besides  this,  he  honored 


M.  ANT  ONINU  S.    7.  91 


those  who  were  true  philosophers,  and  he  did  not 
reproach  those  who  pretended  to  be  philosophers, 
nor  yet  was  he  easily  led  by  them.  He  was  also 
easy  in  conversation,  and  he  made  himself  agree- 
able without  any  offensive  affectation.  He  took  a 
reasonable  care  of  his  body's  health,  not  as  one  who 
was  greatly  attached  to  life,  nor  out  of  regard  to 
personal  appearance,  nor  yet  in  a  careless  way,  but 
so  that,  through  his  own  attention,  he  very  seldom 
stood  in  need  of  the  physician's  art  or  of  medi- 
cine or  external  applications.  He  was  most  ready 
to  give  way  without  envy  to  those  who  possessed 
any  particular  faculty,  such  as  that  of  eloquence  or 
knowledge  of  the  law  or  of  morals,  or  of  anything 
else ;  and -he  gave  them  his  help,  that  each  might 
enjoy  reputation  according  to  his  deserts  ;  and  he 
always  acted  conformably  to  the  institutions  of  his 
country,  without  showing  any  affectation  of  doing 
so.  Further,  he  was  not  fond  of  change  nor  un- 
steady, but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same  places,  and 
to  employ  himself  about  the  same  things ;  and 
after  his  paroxysms  of  headache  he  came  imme- 
diately fresh  and  vigorous  to  his  usual  occupa- 
tions. His  secrets  were  not  many,  but  very  few 
and  very  rare,  and  these  only  about  public  mat- 
ters ;  and  he  showed  prudence  and  economy  in  the 
exhibition  of  the  public  spectacles  and  the  con- 


92  M.  ANTONINUS.  I. 


struction  of  public  buildings,  his  donations  to  the 
people,  and  in  such  things,  for  he  was  a  man  who 
looked  to  what  ought  to  be  done,  not  to  the  repu- 
tation which  is  got  by  a  man's  acts.  He  did  not 
take  the  bath  at  unseasonable  hours  ;  he  was  not 
fond  of  building  houses,  nor  curious  about  what  he 
ate,  nor  about  the  texture  and  color  of  his  clothes, 
nor  about  the  beauty  of  his  slaves.15  His  dress 
came  from  Lorium,  his  villa  on  the  coast,  and  from 
Lanuvium  generally.16  We  know  how  he  behaved 
to  the  toll-collector  in  Tusculum  who  asked  his 
pardon;  and  such  was  all  his  behavior.  There 
was  in  him  nothing  harsh,  nor  implacable,  nor 
violent,  nor,  as  one  may  say,  anything  carried  to 
the  sweating  point;  but  he  examined  all  things 
severally,  as  if  he  had  abundance  of  time,  and  with- 
out confusion,  in  an  orderly  way,  vigorously  and 
consistently.  And  that  might  be  applied  to  him 
which  is  recorded  of  Socrates,17  that  he  was  able 
both  to  abstain  from,  and  to  enjoy,  those  things 

which  many  are  too  weak  to  abstain  from,  and 

t 

15  This  passage  is  corrupt,  and  the  exact  meaning  is 
uncertain. 

16  Lorium  was  a  villa  on  the  coast  north  of  Rome,  and 
there  Antoninus  was  brought  up.  and  he  died  there.  Thia 
also  is  corrupt. 

Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  3.  15. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    I.  93 


cannot  enjoy  without  excess.    But  to  be  strong 
enough  both  to  bear  the  one  and  to  be  sober  in  the 
other  is  the  mark  of  a  man  who  has  a  perfect  and 
invincible  soul,  such  as  he  showed  in  the  illness/ 
of  Maximus. 

17.  To  the  gods  I  am  indebted  for  having  good 
grandfathers,  good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good 
teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and 
friends,  nearly  everything  good.  Further,  I  owe 
it  to  the  gods  that  I  was  not  hurried  into  any 
offence  against  any  of  them,  though  I  had  a  dis- 
position which,  if  opportunity  had  offered,  might 
have  led  me  to  do  something  of  this  kind ;  but, 
through  their  favor,  there  never  was  such  a  con- 
currence of  circumstances  as  put  me  to  the  trial. 
Further,  I  am  thankful  to  the  gods  that  I  was 
not  longer  brought  up  with  my  grandfather's  con- 
cubine, and  that  I  preserved  the  flower  of  my 
youth,  and  that  I  did  not  make  proof  of  my 
virility  before  the,  proper  season,  but  even  de- 
ferred the  time ;  that  I  was  subjected  to  a  ruler 
and  a  father  who  was  able  to  take  away  all  pride 
from  me,  and  to  bring  me  to  the  knowledge  that 
it  is  possiblefor jiman  Jo  live  Jn_a  palace  without 
wanting  either  guards  or  embroidered  dresses,  or 
torches  and  statues,  and  such-like  show;  but  that 
it  is  in  such  a  man's  power  to  bring  himself  very 


94  M.  ANTONINUS.  I. 


near  to  the  fashion  of  a  private  person,  without 
being  for  this  reason  either  meaner  in  thought,  or 
more  remiss  in  action,  with  respect  to  the  things 
which  must  be  done  for  the  public  interest  in  a 
manner  that  befits  a  ruler.  I  thank  the  gods  for 
giving  me  such  a  brother,18  who  was  able  by  his 
moral  character  to  rouse  me  to  vigilance  over 


myself,  and  who,  at  the  same  time,  pleased  meT5y 
his  respect  and  affection ;  that  my  children  have 
not  been  stupid  nor  deformed  in  body  ;  that  I  did 
not  make  more  proficiency  in  rhetoric,  poetry,  and 
the  other  studies,  in  which  I  should  perhaps  have 
been  completely  engaged,  if  I  had  seen  that  I  was 
making  progress  in  them ;  that  I  made  haste  to 
place  those  who  brought  me  up  in  the  station  of 
honor,  which  they  seemed  to  desire,  without  put- 
ting them  oif  with  hope  of  my  doing  it  some  time 
after,  because  they  were  then  still  young ;  that  I 
knew  Apollonius,  Rusticus,  Maximus ;  that  I  re- 
ceived clear  and  frequent  impressions  about  living 
according  to  nature,  and  what  kind  of  a  life  that 
is,  so  that,  so  far  as  depended  on  the  gods,  and 
their  gifts,  and  help,  and  inspirations,  nothing  hin- 
dered me  from  forthwith  living  according  to  na- 
ture, though  I  still  fall  short  of  it  through  my  own 

18  The  emperor  had  no  brother,  except  L.  Verus,  his 
brother  by  adoption. 


M.   ANTONINUS.  I. 


fault,  and  through  not  observing  the  admonition 
of  the  gods,  and,  I  may  almost  say,  their  direcf 
instructions  ;  that  my  body  has  held  out  so  long 
in  such  a  kind  of  life  ;  that  I  never  touched  either 
Benedicta  or  Theodotus,  and  that,  after  having 
fallen  into  amatory  passions,  I  was  cured  ;  and, 
though  I  was  often  out  of  humor  with  Rusticus,  I 
never  did  anything  of  which  I  had  occasion  to  re- 
pent ;  that,  though  it  was  my  mother's  fate  to  die 
young,  she  spent  the  last  years  of  her  life  with 
me  ;^that,  whenever  I  wished  to  help  any  man  in 
his  need,  or  on  any  other  occasion,  I  was  nevei 
told  that  I  had  not  the  means  of  doing  it ;  and 
that  to  myself  the  same  necessity  never  happened, 
to  receive  anything  from  another ;  that  I  have 
such  a  wife,19  so  obedient,  and  so  affectionate,  and 
so  simple  ;  that  I  had  abundance  of  good  masters 
for  my  children  ;  and  that  remedies  have  been 
shown  to  me  by  dreams,  both  others,  and  against 

bloodspitting  and  giddiness 20  ;  and  that, 

when  I  had  an  inclination  to  philosophy,  I  did  not 
fall  into  the  hands  of  any  sophist,  and  that  I  did 
not  waste  my  time  on  writers  [of  histories],  or  in 
the  resolution  of  syllogisms,  or  occupy  jmyself 
about  the  investigation  of  appearances  in  the 

19  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus. 

20  This  is  corrupt. 


-3 


96  M.  ANTONINUS.  I. 


heavens  ;  for  all  these  things  require  the  help 
of  the  gods  and  fortune. 

Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua.*21 

21  The  Quadi  lived  in  the  southern  part  of  Bohemia 
and  Moravia ;  and  Antoninus  made  a  campaign  against 
them.  (See  the  Life.)  Granua  is  probably  the  river 
Graan,  which  flows  into  the  Danube. 

If  these  words  are  genuine,  Antoninus  may  have  writ- 
ten this  first  book  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  In 
the  first  edition  of  Antoninus,  and  in  the  older  editions, 
the  first  three  sections  of  the  second  book  make  the  con- 
clusion of  the  first  book.  Gataker  placed  them  at  the 
beginning  of  the  second  book. 


n. 


|EGIN  the  morning  by  saying  to  thy- 
self, I  shall  meet  with  the  busybody, 
the  ungrateful,  arrogant,  deceitful, 
t^z^Wd  envious,  unsocial.  All  these  things 
happen  to  them  by  reason  of  their  ignorance  of 
what  is  good  and  evil.  But  I  who  have  seen  the 
nature  of  the  good  that  it  is  beautiful,  and  of 
the  bad  that  it  is  ugly,  and  the  nature  of  him 
who  does  wrong,  that  it  is  akin  to  me,  not  [only] 
of  the  same  blood  or  seed,  but  that  it  participates 
in  [the  same]  intelligence  and  [the  same]  portion 
of  the  divinity,  I  can  neither  be  injured  by  any  of 
them,  for  no  one  can  fix  on  me  what  is  ugly,  nor 
can  I  be  angry  with  my  kinsman,  nor  hate  him. 
For  we  are  made  for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like 
hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the  upper  and 
lower  teeth.  To  act  against  one  another  then  is 
contrary  to  nature  ;  and  it  is  acting  against  one 
another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away. 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I  am,  it  is  a  little  flesh 

7 


98  M.  ANTONINUS.   II.  , 

and  breath,  and  the  ruling  part.  Throw  away  thy 
books ;  no  longer  distract  thyself :  it  is  not  allowed ; 
but  as  if  thou  wast  now  dying,  desrjisethe^ flesh : 
it  is  blood  and  bones  and  a  network,  a  contexture 
of  nerves,  veins,  and  arteries.  See  the  breath  also, 
what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is,  air,  and  not  always  the 
same,  but  every  moment  sent  out  and  again  sucked 
in.  The  third  tl^eiLi£J&e^iling  part :  consider 
thus :  Thou  art  an  old  man ;  no  longer  let  this  be 
a  slave,  no  longer  be  pulled  by  the  strings  like  a 
puppet  to  unsocial  movements,  no  longer  be  either 
dissatisfied  with  thy  present  lot,  or  shrink  from 
the  future. 

3.  All  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  providence. 
.That  which  is  from  fortune  is  not  separated  from 
nature  or  without  an  interweaving  and  involution 
with  the  things  which  are  ordered  by  providence. 
From  thence  all  things  flow  ;  and  there  is  besides 
necessity,  and  that  which  is  for  the  advantage  of 
the  whole  universe,  of  which  thou  art  a  part. 
^vBut  that  is  good  for  every  part  of  nature  which 
'  the  nature  of  the  whole  brings,  and  what  serves  to 
maintain  this  nature.  Now  the  universe  is  pre- 
served, as  by  the  changes  of  the  elements  so  by  the 
changes  of  things  compounded.  Let  these  prin- 
ciples be  enough  for  thee,  let  them  always  be 
fixed  opinions.    But  cast  away  the  thirst  after 


M.  ANTONINUS.   II.  99 


books,  that  thou  mayest  not  die  murmuring,  but 
cheerfully,  truly,  and  from  thy  heart  thankful  to 
the  gods. 

4.  Remember  how  long  thou  hast  been  putting 
off  these  things,  and  how  often  thoujast  received 
an  opportunity  from  the  gods,  and  yet  dost  not  use 
it.  Thou  must  now  at  last  perceive  of  what  uni- 
verse thou  art  a  part,  and  of  what  administrator 
of  the  universe,  thy  existence  is  an  efflux,  and  that 
a  limit  of  time  is  fixed  for  thee,  which  if  thou  dost 
taot  use  for  clearing  away  the  clouds  from  thy 
inind,  it  will  go  and  thou  wilt  go,  and  it  will  never 
return. 

5.  Every  moment  think  gteadily  as  a  Roman 
,and  a  man,  to_do  what  thou  hast^Ju  hand  with 
perfect  and  simple  dignity,  and  feeling  of  affection, 
and  freedom,  and  justicej__and  to  give  thyself 
relief  from  all  other  thoughts.  And  thou  wilt 
give  thyself  relief,  if  thou  doest  every  act  of  thy 
life  as  if  it  were  the  last,  laying  aside  all  careless- 
ness and  passionate  aversion  from  the  commands 
of  reason,  and  all  hypocrisy,  and  self-love,  and  dis- 
content with  the  portion  which  has  been  given  to 
thee.  Thou  seest  how  few  the  things  are,  the 
which  if  a  man  lays  hold  of,  he  is  able  to  live  a 
life  which  flows  in  quiet,  and  is  like  the  exist- 
ence of  the  gods ;  for  the  gods  on  their  part 


100         M.  A  NTONINUS.  II: 

will  require  _n£t^jxig„iaore„from  him  who  observes 
these  things. 

6.  Do  wrong  to  thyself,  do  wrong  to  thyself,  my 
soul ;  but  thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the  opportunity 
of  honoring  thyself.  Every  man's  life  is  sufficient.! 
But  thine  is  nearly  finished,  though  thy  soul  rev- 
erences not  itself,  but  places  thy  felicity  in  the 
souls  of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon  thee 
distract  thee  ?  Give  thyself  time  to  learn  some- 
thing new  and  good,  and  cease  to  be  whirled 
around.  But  then  thou  must  also  avoid  being 
carried  about  the  other  way.  For  those  too  are 
triflers  who  have  wearied  themselves  in  life  by 
their  activity,  and  yet  have  no  object  to  which  to 
direct  every  movement,  and,  in  a  word,  all  their 
thoughts. 

\  8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  the  mind 
of  another  a  man  has  seldom  been  seen  to  be  un- 
happy; but  those  who  do~ii©t~observ£.  the  move- 
ments of  their  own  minds  must  of  necessity  be 
unhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind,  what 
is  the  nature  of  the  whole,  and  what  is  my  nature, 
and  how  this  is  related  to  that,  and  what  kind  of 
a  part  it  is  of  what  kind  of  a  whole;  and  that 
there  is  no  one  who  hinders  thee  from  always 


M.   ANTONINUS.  II. 


101 


doing  and  saying  the  things  which  are  according 
to  the  nature  of  which  thou  art  a  part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad  acts 
—  such  a  comparison  as  one  would  make  in  accord- 
ance with  the  common  notions  of  mankind  —  says, 
like  a  true  philosopher,  that  the  offences  which  are 
committed  through  desire  are  more  blamable  than 
those  which  are  committed  through  anger.  For  he 
who  is  excited  by  anger  seems  to  turn  away  from 
reason  with  a  certain  pain  and  unconscious  con- 
traction ;  but  he  who  offends  through  desire,  being 
overpowered  by  pleasure,  seems  to  be  in  a  man- 
ner more  intemperate  and  more  womanish  in  his 
offences.  Rightly  then,  and  in  a  way  worthy  of 
philosophy,  he  said  that  the  offence  which  is  com- 
mitted with  pleasure  is  more  blamable  than  that 
which  is  committed  with  pain ;  and  on  the  whole 
the  one  is  more  like  a  person  who  has  been  first 
wronged  and  through  pain  is  compelled  to  be 
angry  ;  but  the  other  is  moved  by  his  own  impulse 
to  do  wrong,  being  carried  towards  doing  some- 
thing by  desire. 

11.  Since  it  is  possible  that  thou  mayest  depart 
from  life  this  very  moment,  regulate  every  act  and 
thought  accordingly.  But  to  go  away  from  among 
men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a  thing  to  be  afraid 
of,  for  the  gods  will  not  involve  thee  in  evil ;  but 


102         M.  ANTONINUS.  II. 


if  indeed  they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have  no 
concern  about  human  affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to 
live  in  a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of 
x  providence  ?  But  in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they 
do  care  for  human  things,  and  they  have  put  all 
the  means  in  man's  power  to  enable  him  not  to 
fall  into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there 
was  anything  evil,  they  would  have  provided  for 
this  also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a  man's 
power  not  to  fall  into  it.  Now  that  which  does 
not  make  a  man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a  man's 
life  worse  ?  But  neither  through  ignorance,  nor 
having  the  knowledge,  but  not  the  power  to  guard 
against  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible  that 
the  nature  of  the  universe  has  overlooked  them ; 
nor  is  it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mis- 
take, either  through  want  of  power  or  want  of 
skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  happen  indiscrim- 
inately to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But  death  cer- 
tainly, and  life,  honor  and  dishonor,  pain  and  pleas- 
ure, all  these  things  equally  happen  to  good  men 
and  bad,  being  things  which  make  us  neither  bet- 
ter nor  worse.  Therefore  they  are  neither  good 
nor  evil. 

12.  How  quickly  all  things  disappear,  in  the 
universe  ?  the  bodies  themselves,  but  in  time  the 
remembrance  of  them ;  what, is  the  nature  of  all 


M.    ANTONINUS.  II. 


10? 


sensible  things,  and   particularly  those  which 

attract  with  the  bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify  by 
pain,  or  are  noised  abroad  by  vapory  fame ;  how 
worthless,  and  contemptible,  and  sordid,  and  per- 
ishable, and  dead  they  are  —  all  this  it  is  the 
part  of  the  intellectual  faculty  to  observe.  To 
observe  too  who  these  are  whose  opinions  and 
voices  give  reputation;  what  death  is,  and  the 
fact  that,  if  a  man  looks  at  it  in  itself,  and  by 
the  abstractive  power  of  reflection  resolves  into 
their  parts  all  the  things  which  present  them- 
selves to  the  imagination  in  it,  he  will  then  con- 
sider it  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  operation  of 
nature  ;  and  if  any  one  is  afraid  of  an  opera- 
tion of  nature,  he  is  a  child.  This,  however,  is 
not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but  it  is  also  a 
thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  nature. 
To  observe  too  how  man  comes  near  to  the  deity, 
and  by  what  part  of  him,  and  when  this  part  of 
man  is  so  disposed.f 
^  13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a  man  who 
traverses  everything  in  a  round,  and  pries  into  the 
things  beneath  the  earth,  as  the  poet  says,  and 
seeks  by  conjecture  what  is  in  the  minds  of  his 
neighbors,  without  perceiving  that  it  is  sufficient 
to  attend  to  the  daemon  within  him,  and  to 
reverence  it  sincerely.     And  reverence  of  the 


104 


M.  ANTONINUS.  II. 


daemon  consists  in  keeping  it  pure  from  passion 
and  thoughtlessness,  and  dissatisfaction  with  what 
comes  from  gods  and  men.  For  the  things  from 
the  gods  merit  veneration  for  their  excellence  ; 
and  the  things  from  men  should  be  dear  to  us  by 
reason  of  kinship ;  and  sometimes  even,  in  a  man- 
ner, they  move  our  pity  by  reason  of  men's  igno- 
rance of  good  and  bad ;  this  defect  being  not  less 
than  that  which  deprives  us  of  the  power  of  dis- 
tinguishing things  that  are  white  and  black. 

14.  Though  thou  shouldest  be  going  to  live 
three  thousand  years,  and  as  many  times  ten 
thousand  years,  still  rpmfvmhp.r  that  no  man  loses 
any  other  life  than  this  which  he  now  lives,  nor 
lives  any  other  than  this  which  he  now  loses. 
The  longest  and  shortest  are  thus  brought  to 
the  same.  For  the  present  is  the  same  to  all, 
though  that  wrhich  is  past  is  not  the  same  ;  and 
so  that  which  is  lost  appears  to  be  a  mere  mo- 
ment. For  a  man  cannot  lose  either  the  past 
orjhe .  future :  for  what  a  man  has  not,  how  can 
any  one  take  this  from  him  ?  TliQsejtwo  things 
then  thou  must  bear  in  mind ;  the_jnne,  that  all 
things  from  eternity  are  of  like  forms  and  come 
round  in  a  circle,  and  that  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  a  man  shall  see  the  same  things  during 
a  hundred  yeaji_ox_two  hundred,  or  an  infinite 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


II. 


105 


time  ;  andj^he^siixioud,  that  the  longest  liver  and 
he  who  will  die  soonest  lose  just  the  same.  For 
the  VYQSQrtJ^Jks^^ 

can  be  deprived,  if  it  is  tnie^JhatJthis  is  the_only 
thing  which  he  has,  and  that  a  man  cannot  lose 
a  thing  if  he  has  it  not. 

15.  Remember  that  all  is  opinion.  For  what 
was  said  by  the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest :  and 
manifest  too  is  the  use  of  what  was  said,  if  a 
man  receives  what  may  be  got  out  of  it  as  far 
as  it  is  true. 

1 6.  The  soul  of  man  does  violence  to  itself,  first 
of  all,  when  it  becomes  an  abscess  and.  as  it  were, 
a  tumor  on  the  universe,  so  far  as  it  can.  For  to 
be  vexed  at  anything  which  happens  is  a  separa- 
tion of  ourselves  from  nature,  in  some  part  of 
which  the  natures  of  all  other  things  are  con- 
tained. In  the  next  place,  the  soul  does  vio- 
lence to  itself  when  it  turns  away  from  any  man, 
or  even  moves  towards  him  with  the  intention 
of  injuring,  such  as  are  the  souls  of  those  who 
are  angry.  In  the  thir-d-~plaee,  the  soul  does 
violence  to  itself  when  it  is  overpowered  by 
pleasure  or  by  pain.  Eourthlv.  when  it  plays 
a  part,  and  does  or  says  anything  insincerely 
and  untruly.  Fifthly,  when  it  allows  any  act 
of  its  own  and  any  movement  to  be  without  an 


106  M.  ANTONINUS.  II. 


aim,  and  does  anything  thoughtlessly  and  with- 
out considering  what  it  is,  it  being  right  that 
even  the  smallest  things  be  done  with  reference 
to  an  end  ;  and  the  end  of  rational  animals  is  to 
follow  the  reason  and  the  law  of  the  most  an- 
cient city  and  polity. 
.     17.  Of  human  life  the  time  is  appoint,  and  the 
/  substance  is  in  a  nux,  and  the  perception  dull, 
v  and  the  composition  of  the  whole  body  subject 

\  to  putrefaction,  and  the  soul  a  whirl,  and 
/  tune  Eardjx)  divine,  and  fame  a  thing  devoid  of 
^ — 'judgment.    And,  to  say  all  in  a  word,  everythin 
which  belongs  to  the  body  is  a, .stream,, and  wha 
belongs  to  the  soul  isji  jlream  and  vapoiy^nd  life, 
is  a  warfare  and__a^]xaiig^^--^ojourn,  and  after=_ 
fame  is  oblivion.    What  then  is  that  which  is 
able-  to  conduct  a  man  ?    One  thing  and  onl 
one,  philosophy.    But  this  consists  in  keeping 
the  daemon  within  a  man  free  from  violence 
and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  and  pleasures, 
doing  nothing  "without  a  purpose,  nor  yet  falsely 
and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the  need  of  an- 
other man's  doing  or  not  doing  anything ;  and 
besides,  accepting  all  that  happens,  and  all  that 
is  allotted,  as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it 
is,  from  whence  he  himself  came  ;  and,  finally, 
waiting  for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind,  as  be- 


M.ANTONINUS.    II.  107 


ing  nothing  else  than  a  dissolution  of  the  ele- 
ments of  which  every  living  being  is  compounded. 
But  if  there  is  no  harm  to  the  elements  them- 
selves in  each  continually  changing  into  another, 
why  should  a  man  have  any  apprehension  about 
the  change  and  dissolution  of  all  the  elements  ? 
For  it  is  according  to  nature,  and  nothing  is  evil 
which  is  according  to  nature.) 


1  Carnuntum  was  a  town  of  Pannonia,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Danube,  about  thirty  miles  east  of  Vindo- 
bona  (Vienna).  Orosius  (vii.  15.)  and  Eutropius  (viii. 
13.)  say  that  Antoninus  remained  three  years  at  Car- 
nuntum during  his  war  with  the  Marcomanni. 


Tins  in  CarnuntumA 


in. 


<E  ought  to  consider  not  only  that 
our  life  is  daily  wasting  away  and 
a  smaller  part  of  it  is  left,  but  an- 
other thing  also  must  be  taken  into 
the  account,  that  if  a  man  should  live  longer, 
it  is  quite  uncertain  whether  the  understanding 
will  still  continue  sufficient  for  the  comprehension 
of  things,  and  retain  the  power  of  contemplation 
which  strives  to  acquire  the  knowledge  of  the 
divine  and  the  human.  For  if  he  shall  begin  to 
fall  into  dotage,  perspiration,  and  nutrition,  and 
imagination,  and  appetite,  and  whatever  else 
there  is  of  the  kind,  will  not  fail  ;  but  the 
power  of  making  use  of  ourselves,  and  filling 
up  the  measure  of  our  duty,  and  clearly  sepa- 
rating all  appearances,  and  considering  whether 
a  man  should  now  depart  from  life,  and  what- 
ever else  of  the  kind  absolutely  requires  a  dis- 
ciplined reason,  all  this  is  already  extinguished. 


M.    ANTONINUS.    III.  109 

We  must  make  haste  then,  not  only  because  we  •? 
are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but  also  because  the  # 
conception  of  things  and  the  understanding  of 
them  cease  first. 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the 
things  which  follow  after  the  things  which  are 
produced  according  to  nature  contain  something  //^ 
pleasing  and  attractive.  For  instance,  when 
bread  is  baked  some  parts  are  split  at  the  sur- 
face, and  these  parts  which  thus  open,  and  have 
a  certain  fashion  contrary  to  the  purpose  of  the 
baker's  art,  are  beautiful  in  a  manner,  and  in  a 
peculiar  way  excite  a  desire  for  eating.  And  . 
again,  figs,  when  they  are  quite  ripe,  gape  open ; 
and  in  the  ripe  olives  the  very  circumstance  of 
their  being  near  to  rottenness  adds  a  peculiar 
beauty  to  the  fruit.  And  the  ears  of  corn  bend- 
ing down,  and  the  lion's  eyebrows,  and  the 
foam  which  flows  from  the  mouth  of  wild  boars, 
and  many  other  things  —  though  they  are  far 
from  being  beautiful,  if  a  man  should  examine 
them  severally,  —  still,  because  they  are  con- 
sequent upon  the  things  which  are  formed  by 
nature,  help  to  adorn  them,  and  they  pleasejthe 
mind  ;  so  that  if  a  man  should  have  a  feeling 
and  deeper  insight  with  respect  to  the  things 
which  are  produced  in  the  universe,  there  is 


110        M.   ANTONINUS.  III. 


hardly  one  of  those  which  follow  by  way  of  con- 
sequence which  will  not  seem  to  him  to  be  in  a 
manner  disposed  sojts  to,  give  pleasure.  And  so 
he  will  see  even  the  real  gaping  jaws  of  wild 
beasts  with  no  less  pleasure  than  those  which 
painters  and  sculptors  show  by  imitation  ;  and 
in  an  old  woman  and  an  old  man  he  will  be 
able  to  see  a  certain  maturity  and  comeliness  ; 
and  the  attractive  loveliness  of  young  persons, 
he  will  be  able  to  look  on  with  chaste  eyes  ; 
and  many  such  things  will  present  themselves, 
not  pleasing  to  every  man,  but  to  him  only  who 
has  become  truly  familiar  with  nature  and  her 
works. 


3.  Hippocrates  after  curing  many  diseases  him- 
self fell  sick  and  died.  The  Chaldaei  foretold 
the  deaths  of  many,  and  then  fate  caught  them 
too.  Alexander,  and  Pompeius,  and  Caius  Cae- 
sar, after  so  often  completely,  destroying  whole 
cities,  and  in  battle  cutting  to  pieces  many  ten 
thousands  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  themselves 
too  at  last  departed  from  life.  Heraclitus^  after 
so  many  speculations  on  the  conflagration  of  the 
universe,.,  was  filled  with  water  internally  and 
died  smeared  all  over  with  mud.  And  lice  de- 
stroyed Democritus  ;  and  other  lice_Jkilled _  Soc- 
rates.   What  means  all  this  ?    Thou  hast  em- 


M .  ANT  ONINUS.  111. 


Ill 


barked,  thou  hast  made  the  voyage,  thou  art  come 
to  shore ;  get  out.  If  indeed  to  another  life,  there 
is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even  there.  But  if  to  a 
state  without  sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be 
held  by  pains  and  pleasures,  "and  to  be  a  slave 
to  the_vessel,  which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that 
which  serves  it  is  superior  :f  for  the  one  is  in- 
telligence and  deity ;  the  other  is  earth  and  cor- 
ruption. 

v  4.  Do  not  waste  the  remainder  of  thy  life  in 
thoughts  about  others,  when  thou  dost  not  refer 
thy  thoughts  to  some  object  of  common  utility. 
For  thou  losest  the  •  opportunity  of  doing  some- 
thing else  when  thou  hast  such  thoughts  as  these. 
What  is  such  a  person  doing,  and  why,  and  what 
is  he  saying,  and  what  is  he  thinking  of,  and  what 
is  he  contriving,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind 
makes  us  wander  away  from  the  observation  of 
our  own  ruling  power.  (We  ought  then  to  check 
in  the  series  of  our  thoughts  everything  that  is 
without  a  purpose  and  useless,  but  most  of  all 
the  overcurious  feeling  and  the  malignant ;  and 
a  man  should  use  himself  to  think  of  those 
things  only  about  which  if  one  should  suddenly 
ask,  What  hast  thou  now  in  thy  thoughts  ?  with 
perfect  openness  thou  mightest  immediately  an- 
swer, This  or  That ;  so  that  from  thy  words  it 


112 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


III. 


should  be  plain  that  everything  in  thee  is  sim- 
ple and  benevolent,  and  such  as  befits  a  social 
animal,  and  one  that  cares  not  for  thoughts  about 
pleasure  or  sensual  enjoyments  at  all,  or  any  ri- 
valry or  envy  and  suspicion,  or  anything  else  for 
which:  thou  wouldst  blush  if  thou  shouldst  say 
that  thou  hadst  it  in  thy  mind.  For  the  man 
who  is  such  as  no  longer  to  delay  being  among 
the  number  of  the  best,  is  like  a  priest  and  min- 
ister of  the  gods,  using  too  the  [deity]  which  is 
planted  within  him,  which  makes  the  man  un- 
contaminated  by  pleasure,  unharmed  by  any  pain, 
untouched  by  any  insult,  feeling  no  wrong,  a 
fighter  in  the  noblest  fight,  one  who  cannot  be 
overpoweredjDy^my  passion,  dyed  deep  with  jus- 
tice, accepting  with  all  his  soul  everything  which 
happens  and  is  assigned  to  him  as  his  portion; 
and  not  often,  nor  yet  without  great  necessity 
and  for  the  general  interest,  imagining  what  an- 
other says,  or  does,  or  thinks.  For  it  is  only 
what  belongs  to  himself  that  he  makes  the  mat- 
ter for  his  activity  ;  and  he  constantly  thinks  of 
that  which  is  allotted  to  himself  out  of  the  sum 
total  of  things,  and  he  makes  his  own  acts  fair, 
and  he  is  persuaded  that  his  own  portion  is  good. 
For  the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  each  man  is  car- 
ried along  with  him  and  carries  him  along  with 


M.  ANT  ONINU  S.    III.  113 


it.|  And  he  remembers  also  that  every  rational, 
animal  is  his  kinsman,  and  that  to  care  for  all 
men  is  according  to  man's  nature;  and  a  man 
should  hold  on  to  the  opinion  not  of  all,  but  of 
those  only  who  confessedly  live  according  to  na- 
ture. But  as  to  those  who  live  not  so,  he  always 
bears  in  mind  what  kind- of  men  they  are  both 
at  home  and  from  home,  both  by  night  and  by 
day,  and  what  they  are>  and  with  what  men  they 
live  an  impure  life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not 
value  at  all  the  praise  which  comes  from  such 
men,  since  they  are  not  even  satisfied  with  them- 
selves. 

5.  Labor  not  unwillingly,  nor  without  regard 
to  the  common  interest,  nor  without  due  consider- 
ation, nor  with  distraction ;  nor  let  studied  orna- 
ment set  off  thy- thoughts,  and  be  not  either  a 
man  of  many  words,  or  busy  about  too  many 
things.  And  further,  let  the  deity  which  is  in 
thee  be  the  guardian  of  a  living  being,  manly 
and  of  ripe  age,  and  engaged  in  matter  political, 
and  a  Roman,  and  a  ruler,  who  has  taken  his 
post  like  a  man  waiting  for  the  signal  which 
summons  him  from  life,  and  ready  to  go,  hav- 
ing need  neither  of  oath  nor  of  any  man's  tes- 
timony. Be  cheerful  also,  and  seek  not  exter- 
nal help  nor  the  tranquillity  which  others  give. 
8 


114        M.ANTONINUS.  III. 


A  man  then  must  stand  erect,  not  be  kept  erect 
by  others. 

6.  If  thou  Jndest  in  human  life  anything  bet- 
terjthan  justice,  truth,  temperance,  fortitude,  and, 
in  ajsvord,  anything  better  than  thy  own  mind's 
self-satisfaction  in  the  things  which  it  enables 
thee  to  do  according  to  right  reason,  and  in  the 
condition  that  is  assigned  to  thee  without  thy 
own  choice ;  if,  I_say,  thou  seest  anything  bet- 
ter than  this,  turn  to  it  with  all  thy  soul,  and 
enjoy  that  which  thou  hast  found  to  be  the  best. 
But  if  nothing  appears  to  be  better  than  the  deity 
which  is  planted  in  thee,  which  has  subjected  to 
itself  all  thy  appetites,  and  carefully  examines 
all  the  impressions,  and,  as  Socrates  said,  has 
detached  itself  from  the  persuasions  of  sense,  and 
has  submitted  itself  to  the  gods,  and  cares  for 
mankind ;  if  thou  findest  everything  else  smaller 
and  of  less  value  than  this,  give  place  to  noth- 
ing else,  for  if  thou  dost  once  diverge  and  in- 
cline to  it,  thou  wilt  no  longer  without  distrac- 
tion be  able  to  give  the  preference  to  that  good 
thing  which  is  thy  proper  possession  and  thy 
own ;  for  it  js_jiot  right  that  anything  of  any 
other  kind,  such  as  praise  from  the  many,  or 
power,  or  enjoyment  of  pleasure,  should  come 
into  competition  with  that  which  is  rationally 


M.ANTONINUS.    III.  115 


and  politically  good.  All  these  things,  even 
though  they  may  seem  to  adapt  themselves  [to 
the  better  things]  in  a  small  degree,  obtain  the 
superiority  all  at  once,  and  carry  us  away.  But 
do  thou,  I  say,  simply  and  freely  choose  the  bet- 
ter, and  hold  to  it  —  But  that  which  is  useful  N 
is  the  better."  —  Well  then,  if  it  is  useful  to  thee 
as  a  rational  being,  keep  to  it ;  but  if  it  is  only 
useful  to  thee  as  an  animal,  say  so,  and  main- 
tain thy  judgment  without  arrogance  :  only  tak& 
care  that  thou  makest  the  inquiry  by  a  sure 
method. 

7.  Never  value  ^^yj^in^jis^prontable  to  thy- 
self which  shall  compel  thee  to  breal^thy  prom-  \ 
iseTTttJo^j^^  to  hate  any:  man,  to 

suspect,  to  curse,  to  act  the  Iry^wrJle^to^desire 
anything  which  needs  walls  and  curtains :  for 
he  who  has  preferred  to  everything  else  his 
own  intelligence,  and  the  daemon  [within  him] 
and  the  worship  of  its  excellence,  acts  no  tragic 
part,  does  not  groan,  will  not  need  either  solitude 
or  much  company ;  and,  what  is  chief  of  all,  he 
will  live  without  either  pursuing  or  flying  from 
[life] ;  but  whether  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter 
time  he  shall  have  the  soul  inclosed  in  the  body, 
he  cares  not  at  all:  for  even  if  he  must  depart 
immediately,  he  will  go  as  readily  as  if  he  were 


116        M.ANTONINUS.  III. 


going  to  do  anything  else  which  can  be  done  with 
decency  and  order  ;  taking  care  of  this  only  all  ■ 
through  life,  that  his  thoughts  turn  not  away 
from  anything  which  belongs  to  an  intelligent 
animal  and  a  member  of  a  civil  community. 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is  chastened  and 
purified  thou  wilt  find  no  corrupt  matter,  nor  im- 
purity, nor  any  sore  skinned  over.  Nor  is  his 
life  incomplete  when  fate  overtakes  him,  as  one 
may  say  of  an  actor  who  leaves  the  stage  be- 
fore ending  and  finishing  the  play.  Besides, 
there  is  in  him  nothing  servile,  nor  affected,  nor 
too  closely  bound  [to  other  things],  nor  yet  de- 
tached [from  other  things],  nothing  worthy  of 
blame,  nothing  which  seeks  a  hiding-place. 

9.  Reverence  the  faculty  which  produces  opin- 
ion. On  this  faculty  it  entirjd^~j&epends  whether 
there  shall  exist  in  thy  ruling^rjaji--anyr  opinion 
inconsistent  with  nature  and  the  constitution  of 
the  rational  animal.  And  this  faculty  promises 
freedom  from  hasty  judgment,  and  friendship 
towards  men,  and  obedience  to  the  gods. 

^ I    10.  Throwing  away  then  all  things,  hold- -to- 


these  only  .which  are  few ;  and  besides  bear  in 
mind  that  every  man  lives  only  this  present 
time,  which  is  an  indivisible  point,  and  that  all 
the  rest  of  his  life  is  either  past  or  it  is  uncer- 


M.  ANTONINUS.    III.  117 


tain.  Short  then  is  the  time  which  every  man 
lives,  and  small  the  nook  of  the  earth  where 
he  lives ;  and  short  too  the  longest  posthumous 
fame,  and  even  this  only  continued  by  a  suc- 
cession of  poor  human  beings,  who  will  very 
soon  die,  and  who  know  not  even  themselves, 
much  less  him  who  died  long  ago. 

11.  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned 
let  this  one  still  be  added  :  —  Make^or_thySfilL 
a  definition  or  description  of  the  thing  which 
is  presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what 
kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity, 
in  incomplete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its  proper 
name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of  which  it 
has  been  compounded,  and  into  which  it  will  be 
resolved.  For  nothing  is  so  productive  of  eleva- 
tion of  mind  as  to  be  able  to  examine  methodi- 
cally and  truly  every  object  which  is  presented 
to  thee  in  life,  and  always  to  look  at  things  so 
as  to  see  at  the  same  time  what  kind  of  universe 
this  is,  and  what  kind  of  use  everything  performs 
in  it,  and  what  value  everything  has  with  ref- 
erence to  the  whole,  and  what  with  reference  to 
man,  who  is  a  citizen  of  the  highest  city,  of 
which  all  other  cities  are  like  families ;  what 
each  thing  is,  and  of  what  it  is  composed,  and 
how  long  it  is  the  nature  of  this  thing  to  endure 


118 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


III. 


which  now  makes  an  impression  on  me,  and  whal 
virtue  I  have  need  of  with  respect  to  it,  such  a? 
gentleness,  manliness,  truth,  fidelity,  simplicity 
contentment,  and  the  rest.  Wherefore,  on  ever) 
occasion  a  man  should  say  :  this  comes  from  god  , 
and  this  is  according  to  the  apportionment  f  and 
spinning  of  the  thread  of  destiny,  and  such-like 
coincidence  and  chance  ;  and  this  is  from  one 
of  the  same  stock,  and  a  kinsman  and  partner, 
one  who  knows  not  however  what  is  according 
to  his  nature.  But  I  know ;  for  this  reason  I 
behave  towards  him  according  to  the  natural  law 
of  fellowship  with  benevolence  and  justice.  At 
the  same  time  however  in  things  indifferent  I 
attempt  to  ascertain  the  value  of  each. 

1 2.  If  thou  workest  at  that  which  is  before 
thee,  following  right  reason  seriously,  vigorously, 
calmly,  without  allowing  anything  else  to  distract 
thee,  but  keeping  thy  divine  part  pure,  as  if  thou 
shouldest  be  bound  to  give  it  back  immediately  ; 
if  thou  holdest  to  this,  expecting  nothing,  fearing 
nothing,  but  satisfied  with  thy  present  activity  ac- 
cording to  nature,  and  with  heroic  truth  in  every 
word  and  sound  which  thou  utterest,  thou  wilt 
live  happy.  And  there  is  no  man  who  is  able 
to  prevent  this. 

13.  As  physicians  have  always  their  instru- 


M.  ANTONINUS.    III.  119 


ments  and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  suddenly 
require  their  skill,  so  do  thou  have  principles 
ready  for  the  understanding  of _thin^MdUvija^jjiiL  1 
human,  and  for  doing  everything,  even  the  small- 
est, with  a  recollection  of  the  bond  which  unites 
the  diving  and  human  to  one  another.  For 
neither  wiliPthou  do  anything  well  which  per- 
tains to  man  without  at  the  same  time  having 
a  reference  to  things  divine  ;  nor  tli£  contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard;  for  neither 
wilt  thou  read  thy  own  memoirs,  nor  the  acts 
of  the  ancient  Romans  and  Hellenes,  and  the 
selections  from  books  which  thou  wast  reserv- 
ing for  thy  old  age. Hasten  then  to  the  end 
which  thou  hast  before  thee,  and,  throwing 
away  idle  hopes,  come  to  thy  own  aid,  if  thou  I 
carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while  it  is  in  thy  power.  J 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are  sig- 
nified  by  the  words  stealing,  sowing,  buying^ 
keeping  quiet,  seeing  what  ought  to  be  done ; 
for  this  is  not  doneHBylne  eyes,  but  by  another 
kind  of  vision. 

1 6.  Body,  soul,  intelligence :  to  the  body  _be- 
long  sensations,  to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the 
intelligence  principles.  To  receive  the  impres- 
sions of  forms  by  means  of  appearances  belongs 
even  to  animals ;  to  be  pulled  by  the  strings  of 


120        M.  ANTONINUS.  III. 


desire  belongs  both  to  wild  beasts  and  to  men 
who  have  made  themselves  into  women,  and  to  a 
Phalaris  and  a  Nero :  and  to  have  the  intelli- 
gence that  guides  to  the  things  which  appear 
suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who  do  not  be- 
lieve in  the  gods,  and  who  betray  their  country, 
and  do  their  impure  deeds  when  they  have  shut 
the  doors.  If  then  everything  else  is  common 
to  all  that  I  have  mentioned,  there  remains  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  the  good  man,  to  be  pleased 
and  content  with  what  happens,  and  with  the 
thread  which  is  spun  for  him ;  and  not  to  de- 
file the  divinity  which  is  planted  in  his  breast, 
/  nor  disturb  it  by  a  crowd  of  images,  but  to  pre- 
serve it  tranquil,  following  it  obediently  as  a  god, 
neither  saying  anything  contrary  to  the  truth,  nor 
doing  anything  contrary  to  justice.  And  if  all 
men  refuse  to  believe  that  he  lives  a  simple, 
modest,  and  contented  life,  he  is  neither  angry 
with  any  of  them,  nor  does  he  deviate  from  the 
way  which  leads  to  the  end  of  life,  to  which  a 
man  ought  to  come  pure,  tranquil,  ready  to  de- 
part, and  without  any  compulsion  perfectly  rec- 
onciled to  his  lot. 


IV. 


I  HAT  which  rules  within,  when  it  is 
according  to  nature,  is  so  affected 
with  respect  to  the  events  which 
happen,  that  it  always  easily  adapts 
itself  to  that  which  is  possible  and  is  presented 
to  it.  For  it  requires  no  definite  material,  but 
it  moves  towards  its  purpose,  under  certain  con- 
ditions however ;  and  it  makes  a  material  for 
itself  out  of  that  which  opposes  it,  as  fire  lays 
hold  of  what  falls  into  it,  by  which  a  small  light 
would  have  been  extinguished  :  but  when  the 
fire  is  strong,  it  soon  appropriates  to  itself  the 
matter  which  is  heaped  on  it,  and  consumes  it, 
and  rises  higher  by  means  of  this  very  ma- 
terial. 

2.  Let  no  act  be  done  without  a  pirrDOse,  nor 
otherwise  than  according  to  the  perfect  principles 
of  art. 

3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses  in 


122  M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


the  country,  sea-shores,  and  mountains  ;  and  thou 
too  art  wont  to  desire  such  things  very  much. 
But  this  is  altogether  a  mark  of  the  most  com- 
mon sort  of  men,  for  it  is  in  thy  power  when- 
ever thou  shalt  choose  to  retire  into  thyself. 
For  nowhere  either  with  more  quiet  or  more 
freedom  from  trouble  does  a  man  retire  than 
into  his  own  soul,  particularly  when  he  has 
within  him  such  thoughts  that  by  looking  into 
them  he  is  immediately  in  perfect  tranquillity : 
and  I  affirm  that  tranquillity  is  nothing  else  than 
the  good  ordering  of  the  mind.  Constantly  then 
give  to  thyself  this  retreat,  and  renew  thyself; 
and  let  thy  principles  be  brief  and  fundamental, 
which,  as  soon  as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them,  will 
be  sufficient  to  cleanse  the  soul  completely,  and 
to  send  thee  back  free  from  all  discontent  with 
the  things  to  which  thou  returnest.  For  with 
what  art  thou  discontented?  With  the  badness 
of  men  ?  Recall  to  thy  mind  this  conclusion, 
that ^ration_al  anjmaals_..£xkt.ib^^ 
that  to  endure  is  a  part  of  justice,. and  that  men 
do  wrong  involuntarily  ;  and  consider  how  many 
already,  after  mutual  enmity,  suspicion;  hatred, 
and  fighting,  have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced 
to  ashes ;  and  be  quiet  at  last.  —  But  perhaps 
thou  art  dissatisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned 


M.  ANTONINUS.     IV.  123 


to  thee  out  of  the  universe.  —  Recall  to  thy  recol- 
lection this  alternative  ;  either  there  is  providence 
or  atoms  [fortuitous  concurrence  of  things]  ;  or 
remember  the  arguments  by  which  it  has  been 
proved  that  the  world  is  a  kind  of  political  com- 
munity [and  be  quiet  at  last].  —  But  perhaps 
corporeal  things  will  still  fasten  upon  thee. — Con- 
sider then  fur tli er  that  the  mind  mingles  not  with 
the  breath,  whether  moving  gently  or  violently, 
when  it  has  once  drawn  itself  apart  and  discov- 
ered its  own  power,  and  think  also  of  all  that 
thou  hast  heard  and  assented  to  about  pain  and 
pleasure  [and  be  quiet  at  last].  —  But  perhaps 
the  desire  of  the  thing  called  fame  will  torment 
thee  —  See  how  soon^yerything  is  forgotten, 
and  look  at  the  chaos  of  infinite  time  on  each 
side  of  [the  present],  and  the  emptiness  of  ap- 
plause, and  the  changeableness  and  want  of  judg- 
ment in  those  who  pretend  to  give^  praise,  and 
the  narrowness  of  the  space^jwithin^  which  it  is 
circumscribed  [and  be  quiet  at  last].  For  the 
whole  earth  is  a  point,  and  how  small  a  nook 
in  it  is  this  thy  dwelling,  and  how  few  are  there 
in  it,  and  what  kind  of  people  are  they  who  will 
praise  thee. 

This^  then  remains  :  Remember  to  retire  into 
I  his  little  territory  of  thy  own,  and  above  all  do 


124  M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


not  distract  or  strain  thyself,  but  be  free,  and  look 
at  things  as  a  man,  as  a  human  being,  as  a  citizen, 
as  a  mortal.  But  among  the  jthings  readiest  to 
thy  hand  to  which  thou  shalt  turn,  let  there  be 
these,  which  are  two.  One  is  that  things  do  not 
touch  the  soul,  for  they  are  external  and  remain 
immovable ;  but  our  perturbations  come  only  from 
the  opinion  which  is  within.  The  other  is  that 
all  these  things  which  thou  seest  change  immedi- 
ately and  will  no  longer  be ;  and  constantly  bear 
in  mind  how  many  of  these  changes  thou  hast 
already  witnessed.  The  universe  is  transforma- 
tion :  life,  is  opinion. 

I  4.  If  ouT^rteH-Getual  part  is  common,  the  rea- 
son also,  in  respect  of  which  we  are  rational  be- 
ings, is  common  :  if  this  is  so,  common  also  is  the 
eason  which  commands  us  what  to  do,  and  what 
ot  to  do ;  if  this  is  so,  there  is  a  common  law 
lso  ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  fellow-citizens  ;  if  this 
is  so,  we  are  members  of  some  political' commu- 
nity;  if  this  is  so,  the  world  is  in  a  maimer  a  state. 
For  of  what  other  common  political  community 
will  any  one  say  that  the  whole  human  race  are 
members  ?    And  from  thence,  from  this  common 
political  community  comes  also  our  very  intellec- 
tual faculty  and  reasoning  faculty  and  our  capacity 
for  law  ;  or  whence  do  they  come  ?    For  as  my 


M.   ANTONINUS.    IV.  125 

earthly  part  is  a  portion  given  to  me  from  certain 
earth,  and  that  which  is  watery  from  another  ele- 
ment, and  that  which  is  hot  and  fiery  from  some 
peculiar  source  (for  nothing  comes  out  of  that 
which  is  nothing,  as  nothing  also  returns  to  non- 
existence), so  also  the  intellectual  part  comes  from 
some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mystery  of 
nature..;  a  composition  out  of  the  same  elements, 
and  a  decomposition  into  the  same  ;  and  altogether 
not  a  tiling  of  which  any  man  should  be  ashamed, 
for  it  is  conformable  to  [the  nature  of]  a  reason- 
able_animal,  and  not  contrary  to  the  reason  of  our 
constitution. 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be 
done  by  such  persons,  it  is  a  matter  of  neces- 
sity; and  if  a  man  will  not  have  it  so,  he  will 
not  allow  the  fig-tree  to  have  juice.  But  by  all 
means  bear  this  in  mind,  that  within  a  very 
short  time  both  thou  and  he  will  be  dead;  and 
soon  not  even  your  names  will  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  away  thy  opinion,  and  then  there 
is  taken  away  the  complaint,  "  I  have  been 
harmed."  Take  away  the  complaint,  "I  have 
been  harmed,"  and  the  harm  is  taken  away. 

8.  That  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse 
than  he  was,  also  does  not  make  his  life  worse, 


126  M.    ANTONINUS.  IV. 


nor  does  it  harm  him  either  from  without  or 
from  within. 

9.  The  nature  of  that  which  is  [universally] 
useful  has  been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider  that  everything  which  happens, 
happens  justly,  and  if  thou  obs^rve^l^arefully, 
thou  wilt  find  it  to  be  so.  I  do  not  say  only 
with  respect  to  the  continuity- of  the  series  of 
things,  but  with  respect  to  what  is  just,  and  as  if 
it  were  done  by  one  who  assigns  to  each  thing 
its  value.  Observe  then  as  thou  hast  begun ; 
and  whatever  thou  doest,  do  it  in  conjunction 
with  this,  the  being  good,  and  in  the  sense  in 
which  a  man  is  properly  understood  to  be  good. 
Keep  to  this  in  every  action. 

11.  Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things 
as  he  has  who  does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he 
wishes  thee  to  have,  but  look  at  them  as  they 
are  in  truth. 

12.  A  man  should  always  have  these  two 
rules  in  readiness;  the  one,  to  do  only  what- 
ever the  reason  of  the  ruling  and  legislating 
facu^niay  suggest  for  the  use  of  men ;  the 
other,,  to  change  thy  opinion,  if  there  is  any 
one  jU^Jiand_wh.a„s^ets^  thee  right  and  moves 
thee  Jrom  any__opinion.  But  this  change  of 
opinion  must  proceed  only  from  a  certain  per- 


M.    ANTONINUS.  IV. 


suasion,  as  of  what  is  just  or  of  common  advan- 
tage, and  the  like,  not  because  it  appears  pleas-^ 


ant  or  brings  reputation. 

13.  Hast  thou  reason  ?  I  have.  —  Why  then 
dost  not  thou  use  it?  For  if  this  does  its  own 
work,  what  else  dost  thou  wish? 

14.  Thou  existest  as  a  part.  Thou  shalt  dis- 
appear in  that  which  produced  thee ;  but  rather 
thou  shalt  be  received  back  into  its  seminal 
principle  by  transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same 
altar :  one  falls  before,  another  falls  after ;  but 
it  makes  no  difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a  god  to 
those  to  whom  thou  art  now  a  beast  and  an  ape, 
if  thou  wilt  return^to  thy.  principles  and  the  wor- 
ship of  reason. 

17.  Do  not  act  as  if  thou  wert L  going  to  live 
ten  thousand  years.  Death  hangs  over  thee. 
While  thou  livest,  while  it  is  in  thy  power,  be 
good. 

18.  How  much  trouble  he  avoids  who  does  not 
look  to  see  what .  his  neighbor  says  or  does  or 
thmks,  but  only  to  what  lie  does  himself,  that 
it  may  be  just  and  pure  ;  or  as  Agathon  f  says, 
^ook  not  round  at  the  depraved  morals  of  others, 
but  run  straight  along  the  line  without  deviating 
from  it. 


1 28  M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


1 9.  He  who  has  a  vehement  desire  for  posthu- 
mous fame  does  not  consider  that  every  one  of 
those  who  remember  him  will  himself  also  die 
very  soon  ;  then  again  also  they  who  have  suc- 
ceeded them,  until  the  whole  remembrance  shall 
have  been  extinguished  as  it  is  transmitted 
through  men  who  foolishly  admire  and  perish. 
But  suppose  that  those  who  will  remember  are 
even  immortal,  and  that  the  remembrance  will 
be  immortal^,  what  then  is  this  to  %hee  ?  And  I 
say  not  what  is  it  to  the  dead,  but  what  is  it  to 
the  living.  What  is  praise,  except  f  indeed  so 
far  as  it  has  f  a  certain  utility  ?  For  thou  now 
rejectest  unseasonably  the  gift  of  nature,  cling- 
ing to  something  else  T~ .  "".  f.  ~" 

20.  Everything  which  is  in  any  way  beautiful 
is  beautiful  in  itself,  and  terminates  in  itself,  not 
having  praise  as  part  of  itself.  Neither  worse 
then  nor  better  is  a  thing  made  by  being  praised. 
I  affirm  this  also  of  the  things  which  are  called 
beautiful  by  the  vulgar,  for  example,  material 
things  and  works  of  art.  That  which,  ia_r£allY  -  - 
beautiful  has  no  need  of  anything ;  not  more 
than  law,  not  more  than  truth,  not  more  than 
benevolence  or  modesty.    Which  of  these  things 

is  beautiful  because  it  is  praised,  or  spoiled  by 
being  blamed  ?    Is  such  a  thing  as  an  emerald 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


IV. 


129 


made  worse  than  it  was,  if  it  is  not  praised  ?  ov 
gold,  ivory,  purple,  a  lyre,  a  little  knife,  a  flower, 
a  shrub  ? 

21.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the  air 
contain  them  from  eternity  ?  —  But  how  does  the 
earth  contain  the  bodies  of  those  who  have  been 
buried  from  time  so  remote  ?  For  as  here  the 
mutation  of  these  bodies  after  a  certain  continu- 
ance, whatever  it  may  be,  and  their  dissolution 
make  room  for  other  dead  bodies; (so  the  souls 
which  are  removed  into  the  air  after  subsisting 
for  some  time  are  transmuted,  and  diffused,  and 
assume  a  fiery  nature  by  being  received  into  the 
seminal  intelligence  of  the  universe,  and  in  this 
way  make  room  for  the  fresh  souls  which  come 
to  dwell  there)  And  this  is  the  answer  which  a 
man  might  give  on  the  hypothesis  of  souls  continu- 
ing to  exist.  But  we  must  not  only  think  of  the 
number  of  '"bodies  which  are  thus  buried,  but  also 
of  the  number  of  animals  which  are  daily  eaten 
by  us  and  the  other  animals.  For  what  a  number 
is  consumed,  and  thus  in  a  manner  buried  in  the 
bodies  of  those  who  feed  on  them  ?  And  never- 
theless this  earth  receives  them  by  reason  of  the 
changes  [of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the 
transformations  into  the  aerial  or  the  fiery  element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in  this 


t30 


M.  ANTONI N  U  S 


IV. 


matter?  The  division  into  that  which  is  material. 
and  that  which  is  the  cause  of  form  [the  formal], 
(vn.  29.) 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every 
movement  have  respect  to  justice,  and  on  the  oc- 
casion of  every  impression  maintain  the  faculty 
of  comprehension  [or  understanding], 

23.  Everything  harmonizes  with  me,  which  is 
harmonious  to  thee,  O  Universe.  Nothing  for 
me  is  too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due  time 
for  thee.  Everything  is  fruit  to  me  which  thy 
seasons  bring,  O  Nature  :  from  thee  are  all  things, 
in  thee  are  all  things,  to  thee  all  things  return. 
The  poet  says,  Dear  city  of  Cecrops ;  and  wilt  not 
thou  say,  Dear  city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thyself  with  few  things,  says  the 
(philosopher,  if  thou  wouldst  be  tranquil.  —  But 
/consider  if  it  would  not  be  better  to  say,  Do  what 
is  necessary,  and  whatever  the  reason  of  the 
animal  which  is  naturally  social  requires,  and  as 
it  requires.  For  this  brings  not  only  the  tran- 
quillity which  comes  from  doing  well,  but  also  that 
which  comes  from  doing  few  things.  For  the 
greatest  part  of  what  we  say  and  do  being  un- 
necessary, if  a  man  takes  this  away,  he  will  have 
more  leisure  and  less  uneasiness.  Accordingly 
on  every  occasion  a  man  should  ask  himself.  Is 


M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


131 


this  one  of  the  unnecessary  things  ?  Now  a  man 
should  take  away  not  ojuly-u-nneeessary  acts,  but 
alsqjurmecessary  thoughts,  for  thus  superfluous  acts 
will  not  follow  after. 

25.  Try  how  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits 
thee,  the  life  of  him  who  is  satisfied  with  his  por- 
tion out  of  the  whole,  and  satisfied  with  his  own 
just  acts  and  benevolent  disposition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things?  Look  also 
at  these.  Do  not  disturb  thyself.  Make  thyself 
all  simplicity.  Does  any  one  do  wrong  ?  It  is  to 
himself  that  he  does  the  wrong.  Has  anything 
happened  to  thee  ?  Well ;  out  of  the  universe 
from  the  beginning  everything  which  happens  has 
been  apportioned  and  spun  out  to  thee.  In  a 
word,  thy  life  is  short.  Thou  must  turn  to  profit 
the  present  by  the  aid  of  reason  and  justice.  Be 
sober  in  thy  relaxation. 

27.  Either  it  is  a  well  arranged  universe 1  or  a 
chaos  huddled  together,  but  still  a  universe.  But 
can  a  certain  order  subsist  in  thee,  and  disorder 
in  the  All  ?  And  this  too  when  all  things  are  so 
separated  and  diffused  and  sympathetic. 

28.  A  black  character,  a  womanish  character, 

1  Antoninus  here  uses  the  word  Koafiog  both  in  the 
sense  of  the  Universe  and  of  Order ;  and  it  is  difficult 
to  express  his  meaning. 


132         M.  ANTONIJSUS.  IV. 


a  stubborn  character,  bestial,  childish,  animal, 
stupid,  counterfeit,  scurrilous,  fraudulent,  tyran- 
nical. 

29.  If  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  universe  who 
does  not  know  what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a 
stranger  who  does  not  know  what  is  going  on 
in  it.  He  is  a  runaway,  who  flies  from  social 
reason ;  he  is  blind,  who  shuts  the  eyes  of  the 
understanding ;  he  is  poor,  who  has  need  of  an- 
other, and  has  not  from  himself  all  things  which 
are  useful  for  life.  He  is  an  abs cession  the 
universe  who  withdraws  and  separates  himself 
from  the  reason  of  our  common  nature  through 
being_disj^ased  with  the  things  which.,  happen, 
for  the  same  nature  produces  this,  and  has  pro- 
duced thee  too :  he  is  a  piece  rent  asunder  from 
the  state,  who  tears  his  own  soul  from  that  of 
reasonable  animals,  which  is  one. 

30.  The  one  is  a  philosopher  without  a  tunic, 
and  the  other  without  a  book :  here  is  another 
half  naked:  Bread  I  have  not,  he  says,  and  I 
abide  by  reason  —  And  I  do  not  get  the  means 
of  living  out  of  my  learning,f  and  I  abide  [by 
my  reason]. 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  which 
thou  hast  learned,  and  be  content  with  it.;  and 
pass  through  the  rest  of  life  like  one  who  has  in- 


M.ANTONINUS.    IV.  133 


trusted  to  the  gods  with  his  whole  soul  all  that  he 
has,  making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant  nor  the 
slave  of  any  man. 

-82.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Ves- 
pasian. Thou  wilt  see  all  these  things,  people 
marrying,  bringing  up  children,  sick,  dying,  war- 
ring, feasting,  trafficking,  cultivating  the  ground, 
nattering,  obstinately  arrogant,  suspecting,  plot- 
ting, wishing  for  some  to  die,  grumbling  about  the 
present,  loving,  heaping  up  treasure,  desiring  con- 
sulship, kingly  power.  Well  then,  that  life  of 
these  people  no  longer  exists  at  all.  Again,  re- 
move to  the  times  of  Trajan.  Again,  all  is  the 
same.  Their  life  too  is  gone.  In  like  manner 
view  also  the  other  epochs  of  time  and  of  whole 
nations,  and  see  how  many  after  great  efforts  soon 
fell  and  were  resolved  into  the  elements.  But 
chiefly  thou  shouldst  think  of  those  whom  thou 
hast  thyself  known  distracting  themselves  about 
idle  things,  neglecting  to  do  what  was  in  accord- 
ance with  their  proper  constitution,  and  to  hold 
firmly  to  this  and  to  be  content  with  it.  And 
herein  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  the  atten- 
tion given  to  everything  has  its  proper  value  and 
proportion.  For  thus  thou  wilt  not  be  dissatisfied, 
if  thou  appliest  thyself  to  smaller  matters  no 
further  than  is  fit. 


134         M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


33.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar 
are  now  antiquated :  so  also  the  names  of  those 
who  were  famed  of  old,  are  now  in  a  manner 
antiquated,  Camillus,  Caeso,  Volesus,  Leonnatus, 
and  a  little  after  also  Scipio  and  Cato,  then 
Augustus,  then  also  Hadrianus  and  Antoninus. 
For  all  things  soon  pass  away  and  become  a  mere 
tale,  and  complete  oblivion  soon  buries  them. 
And  I  say  this  of  those  who  have  shone  in  a  won- 
drous way.  For  the  rest,  as  soon  as  they  have 
breathed  out  their  breath,  they  are  gone,  and  no 
man  speaks  of  them.  And,  to  conclude  the  mat- 
ter, what  is  even  an  eternal  remembrance  ?  A„ 
mere^jiotidag.  What  then  is  that  about  which 
we  ought  to  employ  our  serious  pains  ?  This 
one  tiling,  thoughts  just,  and  acts  social,  and  words 
which  never  lie,  and  a  disposition  which  gladly 
accepts  all  that  happens,  as  necessary,  as  usual,  as 
flowing  from  a  principle  and  source  of  the  same 
kind.  < iw 

34.  Willingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one 
of  the  fates],  allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread  f 
into  whatever  things  she  pleases. 

f  35.  Everything  is  only  for  a  day,  both  that 
Vwhich  remembers  and  that  which  is  remembered. 
36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take 
place  by  change,  and  accustom  thyself  to  consider 


M.    ANTONINUS  IV. 


135 


that  the  nature  of  the  Universe  loves  nothing  so 
much  as  to  change  the  things  which  are  and  to 
make  new  things  like  them.  For  everything  that 
exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will 
be.  But  thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which 
are  cast  into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb :  but  this 
is  a  very  vulgar  notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet 
simple,  nor  free  from  perturbations,  nor  without 
suspicion  of  being  hurt  by  external  things,  nor 
kindly  disposed  towards  all ;  nor-_do^l-4l^u~-^t^ 
plac£-_wis4otti_£nJy^^ 

38.  Examine  men's  ruling  principles,  even 
those  of  the  wise,  what  kind  of  things  they  avoid, 
and  what  kind  they  pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  Jhee,  does  not  subsist  in 
thej-ujynj^H^  ;  nor  yet  in  any 
turning  and  mutation  of  thy  corporeal  covering. 
Where  is  it  thg_n?    It  Js  in  that  part  of  thee  in  t 

which__£uhsi aia  thje-_power__of  forming  opinions 

ahmiLevils.  Let  this  power  then  not  form  [such] 
opinions,  and  all  is  well.  And  if  that  which  is 
nearest  to  it,  the  poor  body,  is  cut,  burnt,  filled 
with  matter  and  rottenness,  nevertheless  let  the 
part  which  forms  opinions  about  these  things  be 
quiet,  that  is,  let  it  judge  that  nothing  is  either 
bad  or  good  which  can  happen  equally  to  the  bad 


136         M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


man  and  the  good.  For  that  which  happens 
equally  to  him  who  lives  contrary  to  nature  and 
to  him  who  lives  according  to  nature,  is  neither 
according  to  nature  nor  contrary  to  nature. 

40.  Constantly  regard  the  universe  as  one  liv- 
ing being,  having  one  substance  and  one  soul; 
and  observe  how  all  things  Jjiave  reference  to  one 
perception,  the  perception  of  this  one  living  being ; 
and  how  all  things  act  with  one  movement  ;  and 
how  all  things  are  the  co-operating  causes  of  all 
things  which  exist ;  observe  too  the  continuous 
spinning  of  the  thread  and  the  contexture  of  the 
web. 

41.  Thou  art  a  little  soul  bearing  about  a 
corpse,  as  Epictetus  used  to  say. 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change, 
and  no  good  for  things  to  subsist  in  consequence 
of  change. 

<-,  43.  Time  is  like  a  river  made  up  of  the  events 
which  happen,  and  a  violent  stream  ;  for  as  soon 
as  a  thing  has  been  seen,  it  is  carried  away,  and 
another  comes  in  its  place,  and  this  will  be  car- 
ried away  too. 

44.  Everything  which  happens  is  as  familiar 
and  well  known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the 
fruit  in  summer ;  for  such  is  disease,  and  death, 
and  calumny,  and  treachery,  and  whatever  else 
delights  fools  or  vexes  them. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    IV.  137 


45.  I^Liiifi^ries^jybiii^s  those  which  follow 
are  always  aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have  gone 
before  j.  for  this  series  is  not  like  a  mere  enumera- 
tion of  disjointed  things,  which  has  only  a  neces- 
sary sequence,  but  it  is  a  rational  connection:  and 
as  all  existing  things  are  arranged  together  har- 
moniously, so  the  things  which  come  into  existence 
exhibit  no  mere  succession,  but  a  certain  wonder- 
ful relationship,    (vi.  38.  vu.  9.) 

46.  Always  remember  the  saying  of  Heraclitus, 
that  the  death  of  earth  is  to  become  water,  and 
the  death  of  water  is  to  become  air,  and  the  death 
of  air  is  to  become  fire,  and  reversely.  And  think 
too  of  him  who  forgets  whither  the  way  leads,  and 
that  men  quarrel  with  that  with  which  they  are 
most  constantly  in  communion,  the  reason  which 
governs  the  universe  ;  and  the  things  which  they 
daily  meet  with  seem  to  them  strange :  and  con- 
sider /that  we  ought  not  to  act  and  speak  as  if  we 
were  asleep,  for  even  in  sleep  we  seem  to  act  and 
speak  ;  and  that  f  we  ought  not,  like  children  who 
learn  from  their  parents,  simply  to  act  and  speak 
as  we  have  been  taught.f 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  shalt  die 
to-morrow  or  certainly  on  the  day  after  to-morrow, 
thou.  wouldstaiQt  care  much  whether  it  was  on  the 
third,  day  or  on  the  morrow,  unless  thou  wast  in 


138         M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 


th§Jiighest_d^  —  for  how  small 

is  the  difference  ?  —  so  think  it  no  great  thing  to 
die  after  as  many  years  as  thou  canst  name  rather 
than  to-morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians  are 
dead  after  often  contracting  their  eyebrows  over 
the  sick  ;  and  how  many  astrologers  after  predict- 
ing with  great  pretensions  the  deaths  of  others ; 
and  how  many  philosophers  after  endless  dis- 
courses on  death  or  immortality  ;  how  many  heroes 
after  killing  thousands  ;  and  how  many  tyrants 
who  have  used  their  power  over  men's  lives  with 
terrible  insolence  as  if  they  were  immortal ;  and 
how  many  cities  are  entirely  dead,  so  to  speak, 
Helice  and  Pompeii  and  Herclanum,  and  others 
innumerable.  Add  to  the  reckoning  all  whom 
thou  hast  known,  one  after  another.  One  man 
after  burying  another  has  been  laid  out  dead,  and 
another  buries  him  ;  and  all  this  in  a  short  time. 
To  conclude,  always  observe  how  ephemeral  anc\ 
worthless  human  things  are,  and  what  was  yester 
day  a  little  mucus,  to-morrow  will  be  a  mummy 
or  ashes.  Pass  then  through  this  little  space  of 
time  conformably  to  nature,  and  end  thy  journey 
in  content,  just  as  an  olive  falls  off  when  it  is  ripe, 
blessing  nature  who  produced  it,  and  thanking  the 
tree  on  which  it  grew. 


M.  A  NTONINUS.    IV.  139 


49.  Be  like  the  promontory  against  which  the 
waves  continually  break,  but  it  stands  firm  and 
tames  the  fury  of  the  water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  J,  because  this  has  happened  to 
me  —  Not  so,  but  HajDjiv^jimJ^  though  J^s_has__ 

happened  to  me,  because_.J-- continue  free  from .  ... 

pain,  neither  crushed  by  the  present  nor  fearing, 
the  future.  For  such  a  thing  as  this  might  have 
happened  to  every  man  ;  but  every  man  would 
not  have  continued  free  from  pain  on  such  an 
occasion.  Why  then  is  that  rather  a  misfortune 
than  this  a  good  fortune  ?  And  dost  thou  in  all 
cases  call  that  a  man's  misfortune,  which  is  not  a 
deviation  from  man's  nature  ?  And  does  a  thing 
seem  to  thee  to  be  a  deviation  from  man's  nature, 
when  it  is  not  contrary  to  the  will  of  man's 
nature  ?  Well,  thou  knowest  the  will  of  nature. 
Will  then  this  which  has  happened  prevent  thee 
from  being  just,  magnanimous,  temperate,  prudent, 
secure  against  inconsiderate  opinions  and  false- 
hood ;  will  it  prevent  thee  from  having  modesty, 
freedom,  and  everything  else,  by  the  presence  of 
which  man's  nature  obtains  all  that  is  its  own? 
Remember  too  on  every  occasion  which  leads  thee 
to  vexation  to  apply  this  principle :  that  this  is  not 
a  misfortune,  but  that  to  bear  it  nobly  is  good 
fortune. 


140         M.  ANTONINUS.  IV. 

50.  It  is  a  vulgar,  but  still  a  useful  help  towards 
contempt  of  death,  to  pass  in  review  those  who 
have  tenaciously  stuck  to  life.  What  more  then 
have  they  gained  than  those  who  have  died  early  ? 
Certainly  they  lie  in  their  tombs  somewhere  at 
last,  Cadicianus,  Fabius,  Julianus,  Lepidus,  or 
any  one  else  like  them,  who  have  carried  out  many 
to  be  buried  and  then  were  carried  out  them- 
selves. Altogether  the  interval  is  small  [between 
birth  and  death]  ;  and  consider  with  how  much 
trouble,  and  in  company  with  what  sort  of  people 
and  in  what  a  feeble  body  this  interval  is  labo- 
riously passed.  Do  not  then  consider  life  a  thing 
of  any  value.f  Forjook  to  the  immensity  of 
time-behind  thee,  and  to  the  time  which  is  before 
thee,  another  boundless  space.  In  this  infinity 
then  what  is  the  difference  between  him  who 
lives  three  days  and  him  who  lives  three  genera- 
tions ?  2 

51.  Always  run  to  the  short  way  ;  and  the  short 

2  An  allusion  to  Homer's  Nestor  who  was  living  at  the 
war  of  Troy  among  the  third  generation,  like  old  Parr 
with  his  hundred  and  fifty  two  years,  and  some  others  in 
modern  times  who  have  beaten  Parr  by  twenty  or  thirty 
years  ;  and  yet  they  died  at  last.  The  word  is  TpiyepTjvtov 
in  Antoninus.  Nestor  is  named  rptyepov  by  some  writers ; 
but  here  perhaps  there  is  an  allusion  to  Homer's  Tepqviot 
ImroTa  Neorup. 


M.   ANTONINUS.    IV.  141 


way  is  the  natural :  accordingly  say  and  do  every- 
thing in  conformity  with  the  soundest  reason. 
For  such  a  purpose  frees  a  man  from  trouble,! 
and  warfare,  and  all  artifice  and  ostentatious 
display. 


V. 


N  the  morning  when  thou  risest  un- 
willingly, let  this  thought  be  pres- 
ent  —  I  am  rising  to  the  work  of  a 
human  being.    Why  then  am  I  dis- 


satisfied  if  I  am  going  to  do  the  things  for  which 
I  exist  and  for  which  I  was  brought  into  the 
world?/  Or  have  I  been  made  for  this,  to  lie  in 
the  bedclothes  and  keep  myself  warm  ? J—  But 
this  is  more  pleasant  —  Dost  thou  exist  then  to 
take  thy  pleasure,  and  not  at  all  for  action  or 
exertion  ?  Dost  thou  not  see  the  little  plants,  the 
little  birds,  the  ants,  the  spiders,  the  bees  working 
together  to  put  in  order  their  several  parts  of 
the  universe  ?  And  art  thou  unwilling  to  do  the 
work  of  a  human  being,  and  dost  thou  not  make 
haste  to  do  that  which  is  according  to  thy  nature  ? 
—  But  it  is  necessary  to  take  rest  also  —  It  is 
necessary :  however  nature  has  fixed  bounds  to 
this  too  :  she  has  fixed  bounds  both  to  eating  and 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


143 


drinking,  and  yet  thou  goest  beyond  these  bounds, 
beyond  what  is  sufficient ;  yet  in  thy  acts  it  is  not 
so,  but  thou  stoppest  short  of  what  thou  canst  do. 
So  thou  lovest  not  thyself,  for  if  thou  didst,  thou 
wouldst  love  thy  nature  and  her  will.  But  those 
who  love  their  several  arts  exhaust  themselves  in 
working  at  them,  unwashed  and  without  food  ;  but 
thou  valuest  thy  own  nature  less  than  the  turner 
values  the  turning  art,  or  the  dancer  the  dancing 
art,  or  the  lover  of  money  values  his  money,  or 
the  vainglorious  man  his  little  glory.  And  such 
men,  when  they  have  a  violent  affection  to  a  thing, 
choose  neither  to  eat  nor  to  sleep  rather  than  to 
perfect  the  things  which  they  care  for.  But  are 
the  acts  which  concern  society  more  vile  in  thy 
eyes  and  less  worthy  of  thy  labor  ? 

2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away 
every  impression  which  is  troublesome  or  unsuit- 
able, and  immediately  to  be  in  all  tranquillity. 

3.  Judge  every  word  and  deed  which  is  accord- 
ing to  nature  to  be  fit  for  thee  ;  and  be  not  diverted 
by  the  blame  which  follows  from  any  people  nor 
by  their  words,  but  if  a  thing  is  good  tobe  done 
or  said,  do  not  consider  it  unworthy  of  thee.  For 
those  persons  have  their  peculiar  leading  principle 
and  follow  their  peculiar  movement ;  which  things 
do  not  thou  regard,  but  go  straight  on,  following 


144 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


thy  own  nature  and  the  common  nature  ;  and  the 
way  of  both  is  one. 

4.  I  go  through  the  things  which  happen  ac- 
cording to  nature  until  I  shall  fall  and  rest, 
breathing  out  my  breath  into  that  element  out  of 
which  I  daily  draw  it  in,  and  falling  upon  that 
earth  out  of  wrhich  my  father  collected  the  seed, 
and  my  mother  the  blood,  and  my  nurse  the  milk ; 
out  of  which  during  so  many  years  I  have  been 
supplied  with  food  and  drink ;  which  bears  me 
when  I  tread  on  it  and  abuse  it  for  so  many  pur- 
poses. 

5.  Thou  say  est,  Men  cannot  admire  the  sharp- 
ness of  thy  wits  —  Be  it  so ;  but  there  are  many 
other  things  of  which  thou  canst  not  say,  I  am  not 
formed  for  them  by  nature.  Show  those  qualities 
then  which  are  altogether  in  thy  power,  sincerity^ 
gravity,  endurance  of  labor?  aversion  to.  pleasure, 
contentment  with  thy  portion  and  with  few  things, 
benevolence,  frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity, 
freedom  from  trifling,  magnanimity.  Dost  thou 
not  see  how  ln^y^aTItres~"t!iou  art  immediately 
able  to  exhibit,  in  which  there  is  no  excuse  of  nat- 
ural incapacity  and  unfitness,  and  yet  thou  still 
remainest  voluntarily  below  the  mark  ?  or  art  thou 
compelled  through  being  defectively  furnished  by 
nature  to  murmur,  and  to  be  stingy,  and  to  flatter, 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


145 


and  to  find  fault  with  tliy  poor  body,  and  to  try 
to  please  men,  and  to  make  great  display,  and  to 
be  so  restless  in  thy  mind  ?  No  by  the  gods  :  but 
thou  mightest  have  been  delivered  from  thes'e 
things  long  ago.  Only  if  in  truth  thou  canst  be 
charged  with  being  rather  slow  and  dull  of  com- 
prehension, thou  must  exert  thyself  about  this 
also,  not  neglecting  it  nor  yet  taking  pleasure  in 
thy  d ulness. 

6.  One  man,  when  he  has  done  a  service  to 
another,  is  ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account  as 
a  favor  conferred.  Another  is  not  ready  to  do 
this,  but  still  in  his  own  mind  he  thinks  of  the 
man  as  his  debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he  has 
done.  A  third  in  a  manner  does  not  even  know 
what  he  has  done,  but  he  is  like  a  vine  which  has 
produced  grapes,  and  seeks  for  nothing  more  after 
it  has  once  produced  its  proper  fruit.  As  a  horse 
when  he  has  run,  a  dog  when  he  has  tracked  the 
game,  a  bee  when  it  has  made  the  honey,  so  a  man 
when  he  has  done  a  good  act,  does  not  call  out  for 
others  to  come  and  see,  but  lie  goes  on  to  another 
act,  as  a  vine  goes  on  to  produce  again  the  grapes 
in  season  —  Must  a  man  then  be  one  of  these, 
who  in  a  manner  act  thus  without  observing  it  ?  — 
Yes  —  But  this  very  thing  is  necessary,  the  ob- 
servation of  what  a  man  is  doing :  for,  it  may  be 
10 


146  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


said,  it  is  characteristic  of  the  social  animal  to 
perceive  that  he  is  working  in  a  social  manner, 
and  indeed  to  wish  that  his.social  partner  also 
should  perceive  it  —  It  is  true  what  thou  sayest, 
but  thou  dost  not  rightly  understand  what  is  now 
said :  and  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  become  one  of 
those  of  whom  I  spoke  before,  for  even  they  are 
misled  by  a  certain  show  of  reason.  But  if  thou 
wilt  choose  to  understand  the  meaning  of  what  is 
said,  do  not  fear  that  for  this  reason  thou  wilt 
omit  any  social  act. 

7.  A  prayer  of  the  Athenians :  Rain,  rain,  0 
dear  Zeus,  down  on  the  ploughed  fields  of  the 
Athenians  and  on  the  plains.  —  In  truth  we  ought 
not  to  pray  at  all,  or  we  ought  to  pray  in  this  sim- 
ple and  noble  fashion. 

8.  Just  as  we  must  understand  when  it  is  said, 
That  Aesculapius  prescribed  to  this  man  horse- 
exercise,  or  bathing  in  cold  water  or  going  with- 
out shoes ;  so  we  must  understand  it  when  it  is 
said,  That  the  nature  of  the  universe  prescribed 
to  this  man  disease  or  mutilation  or  loss  or  any- 
thing else  of  the  kind.  For  in  the  first  case  Pre- 
scribed means  something  like  this :  he  prescribed 
this  for  this  man  as  a  thing  adapted  to  procure 
health ;  and  in  the  second  case  it  means,  That 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


147 


which  happens 1  to  [or,  suits]  every  man  is  fixed 
in  a  manner  for  him  suitably  to  his  destiny.  For 
this  is  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  things  are 
suitable  to  us,  as  the  workmen  say  of  squared 
stones  in  walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are 
suitable,  when  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in 
some  kind  of  connection.  For  there  is  altogether 
one  fitness  [or,  harmony].  And  as  the  universe 
is  made  up  out  of  all  bodies  to  be  such  a  body  as 
it  is,  so  out  of  all  existing  causes  necessity  [des- 
tiny] is  made  up  to  be  such  a  cause  as  it  is.  And 
even  those  who  are  completely  ignorant  under- 
stand what  I  mean,  for  they  say,  It  [necessity, 
destiny]  brought  this  to  such  a  person.  —  This 
then  was  brought  and  this  was  prescribed  to 
him.  Let  us  then  receive  these  things,  as  well  as 
those  which  Aesculapius  prescribes.  Many  as  a 
matter  of  course  even  among  his  prescriptions  are 
disagreeable,  but  we  accept  them  in  the  hope  of 
health.  Let  the  perfecting  and  accomplishment 
of  the  things  which  the  common  nature  judges  tc 
be  good,  be  judged  by  thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind 
as  thy  health.  And  so  accept  everything  which 
happens,  even  if  it  seem  disagreeable,  because  it 
'eads  to  this,  to  the  health  of  the  universe  and  to 

1  In  this  section  there  is  a  play  on  the  meaning  of 
wuBaiveiv. 


148  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


the  prosperity  and  felicity  of  Zeus  [the  universe]. 
For  he  would  not  have  brought  on  any  man  what 
lie  has  brought,  if  it  were  not  useful  for  the 
whole.  Neither  does  the  nature  of  anything, 
whatever  it  may  be,  cause  anything  which  is  not 
suitable  to  that  which  is  directed  by  it.    For  two 

^  reasons  then  it  is  right  to  be  content  with  that 
which  happens  to  thee ;  the  one,  because  it  was 
done  for  thee  and  prescribed  for  thee,  and  in  a 
manner  had  reference  to  thee,  originally  from  the 
most  ancient  causes  spun  with  thy  destiny ;  and 
9  the  other,  because  even  that  which  comes  sever- 
ally  to  every  man  is  to  the  power  which  adminis- 
ters the  universe  a  cause  of  felicity  and  perfection, 
aay  even  of  its  very  continuance.  For  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  whole  is  mutilated,  if  thou  cuttest 
off  anything  whatever  from  the  conjunction  and 
the  continuity  either  of  the  parts  or  of  the  causes. 
And  thou  dost  cut  off,  as  far  as  it  is  in  thy  power, 

/  when  thou  art  dissatisfied,  and  in  a  manner  triest 
to  put  anything  out  of  the  way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,  nor  discouraged,  nor  dis- 
satisfied, if  thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing  every- 
thing according  to  right  principles  ;  but  when  thou 
hast  failed,  return  back  again,  and  be  content  if 
the  greater  part  of  what  thou  doest  is  consistent 
with  man's  nature,  and  love  this  to  which  thou  re- 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


149 


tunics t ;  and  do  not  return  to  philosophy  as  if  she 
were  a  master,  but  act  like  those  who  have  sore 
eyes  and  apply  a  bit  of  sponge  and  egg,  or  as 
another  applies  a  plaister,  or  drenching  with  water. 
For  thus  thou  wilt  not  fail  to  f  obey  reason,  and 
thou  wilt  repose  in  it.  And  remember  that  phi- 
losophy requires  only  the  things  which  thy  nature 
requires  ;  but  thou  wouldst  have  something  else 
which  is  not  according  to  nature  —  It  may  be  ob- 
jected, Why  what  is  more  agreeable  than  this 
[which  I  am  doing]  ?  —  But  is  not  this  the  very 
reason  why  pleasure  deceives  us  ?  And  consider! 
if  magnanimity,  freedom,  simplicity,  aequanimity, 
piety,  are  not  more  agreeable.  For  what  is  more* 
agreeable  than  wisdom  itself,  when  thou  thinkest 
of  the  security  and  the  happy.course  of  all  things 
which  depend  on  the  faculty  of  understanding 
and  knowledge  ? 

10.  Things  are  in  such  a  kind  of  envelopement 
that  they  have  seemed  to  philosophers,  not  a  few 
nor  those  common  philosophers,  altogether  unin- 
telligible ;  nay  even  to  the  Stoics  themselves  they 
seem  difficult  to  understand.  And  all  our  assent 
is  changeable ;  for  where  is  the  man  who  never 
changes  ?  '  Carry  thy  thoughts  then  to  the  objects 
themselves,  and  consider  how  short-lived  they  are 
and  worthless,  and  that  they  may  be  in  the  pos- 


150 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


\ 


session  of  a  filthy  wretch  or  a  whore  or  a  robber 
Then  turn  to  the  morals  of  those  who  live  with 
thee,  and  it  is  hardly  possible  to  endure  even  the 
most  agreeable  of  them,  to  say  nothing  of  a  man 
being  hardly  able  to  endure  himself.  In  such 
darkness  then  and  dirt  and  in  so  constant  a  flux 
both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and  of  motion  and 
of  things  moved,  what  there  is  worth  being  highly 
prized  or  even  an  object  of  serious  pursuit,  I  can- 
not imagine.  But  on  the  contrary  it  is  a  man's 
duty  to  comfort  himself,  and  to  wait  for  the 
natural  dissolution  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  the 
delay,  but  to  rest  in  these  principles  only :  the  one, 
that  nothing  will  happen  to  me  which  is  not  con- 
formable to  the  nature  of  the  universe ;  and  the 
other,  that  it  is  in  my  power  never  to  act  contrary 
to  my  god  and  daemon  :  for  there  is  no  man  who 
will  compel  me  to  this. 

11.  About  what  am  I  now  employing  my  own 
soul  ?  On  every  occasion  I  must  ask  myself  this 
question,  and  inquire,  what  have  I  now  in  this 
part  of  me  which  they  call  the  ruling  principle  ? 
and- whose  soul  have  I  now?  that  of  a  child,  or  of 
a  young  man,  or  of  a  feeble  woman,  or  of  a  tyrant, 
or  of  a  domestic  animal,  or  of  a  wild  beast  ? 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  ,  ap- 
pear good  to  the  many,  we  may  learn  from  this. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    V.  15l 


For  if  any  man  should  conceive  certain  things  as 
being  really  good,  such  as  prudence,  temperance, 
justice,  fortitude,  he  would  not  after  having  first 
conceived  these  endure  to  listen  to  anything  f 
which  should  not  be  in  harmony  with  what  is 
really  good.f  But  if  a  man  has  first  conceived 
as  good  the  things  which  appear  to  the  many  to 
be  good,  he  will  listen  and  readily  receive  as  very 
applicable  that  which  was  said  by  the  comic 
writer,  f  Thus  even  the  many  perceive  the  dif- 
ference.f  For  were  it  not  so,  this  saying  would 
not  offend  and  would  not  be  rejected  [in  the  first 
case],  while  we  receive  it  when  it  is  said  of 
wealth,  and  of  the  means  which  further  luxury 
and  fame,  as  said  fitly  and  wittily.  Go  on  then 
and  ask  if  we  should  value  and  think  those  things 
to  be  good,  to  which  after  their  first  conception  in 
the  mind  the  words  of  the  comic  writer  might  be 
aptly  applied  —  that  he  who  has  them,  through 
pure  abundance  has  not  a  place  to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I  am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the  ma- 
terial ;  and  neither  of  them  will  perish  into  non- 
existence, as  neither  of  them  came  into  existence 
out  of  non-existence.  Every  part  of  me  then 
will  be  reduced  by  change  into  some  part  of  the 
universe,  and  that  again  will  change  into  another 
part  of  the  universe  and  so  on  for  ever.    And  by 


152  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


consequence  of  jsuch  a  change  I  too  exist,  and 
those  who  begot  me,  and_so  on  for  ever  in  the 
other  direction.  For  nothing  hinders  us  from 
saying  so,  even  if  the  universe  is  administered 
according  to  definite  periods  [of  revolution]. 

14.  Reason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philosophy] 
are  powers  which  are  sufficient  for  themselves  and 
for  their  own  works.  They  move  then  from  a 
first  principle  which  is  their  own,  and  they  make 
their  way  to  the  end  which  is  proposed  to  them ; 
and  this  is  the  reason  why  such  acts  are  named 
Catorthoseis  or  right  acts,  which  word  signifies 
that  they  proceed  by  the  right  road. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called  a 
man's,  which  do  not  belong  to  a  man,  as  man. 
They  are  not  required  of  a  man,  nor  does  man's 
nature  promise  them,  nor  are  they  the  means  of 
man's  nature  attaining  its  end.  Neither  then 
does  the  end  of  man  lie  in  these  things,  nor  yet 
that  which  aids  to  the  accomplishment  of  this  end, 
and  that  which  aids  towards  this  end  is  that 
which  is  good.  Besides,  if  any  of  these  things 
did  belong  to  man,  it  would  not  be  right  for  a 
man  to  despise  them  and  to  set  himself  against 
them ;  nor  would  a  man  be  worthy  of  praise  who 
showed  that  he  did  not  want  these  things,  nor 
would  he  who  stinted  himself  in  any  of  them  be 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


155 


good,  if  indeed  these  things  were  good.  But  now 
the  more  of  these  things  a  man  deprives  himself 
of,  or  of  other  things  like  them,  or  even  when  he 
is  deprived  of  any  of  them,  the  more  patiently 
he  endures  the  loss,  just  in  the  same  degree  he  is 
a  better  man. 

16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such 
also  will  be  the  character  of  thy  mind ;  for  the 
soul  is  dyed  by  the  thoughts.  Dye  it  then  with  a 
continuous  series  of  such  thoughts  as  these  :  for 
instance,  that  where  a  man  can  live,  there  he  can 
also  live  well.  But  he  must  live  in  a  palace ; 
—  well  then,  he  can  also  live  well  in  a  palace. 
And  again,  consider  that  for  whatever  purpose 
each  thing  has  been  constituted,  for  this  it  has 
been  constituted,  and  towards  this  it  is  carried  ; 
and  its  end  is  in  that  towards  which  it  is  carried ; 
and  where  the  end  is,  there  also  is  the  advantage 
and  the;  good  of  each  thing.  Now  the^good  for 
the  reasonable  animal  is  society;  for  that  we  are 
made  for  society  has  been  shown  above.  Is  it  not 
plain  that  the  inferior  exist  fo^the  sakejaf  the 
superior  ?  but  the  things  which  have  life  are 
superior  to  those  which  have  not  life,  and  of  those 
which  have  life  the  superior  are  those  which  have 
reason. 

~T7.  To  seek  what  is  impossible  is  madness: 


154  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


and  it  is  impossible  that  the  bad  should  not  do 
something  of  this  kind. 


18.  (Noth  ing  happens  to  any  man  which  he  is 
not  formed  by  nature  to  bear,  j  The  same  things 
happen  to  another,  and  either  because  he  does  not 
see  that  they  have  happened  or  because  he  would 
show  a  great  spirit  he  is  firm  and  remains  un- 
harmed. It  is  a  shame  then  that  ignorance  and 
conceit  should  be  stronger  than  wisdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul,  not 
in  the  least  degree  ;  nor  have  they  admission  to 

*the  soul,  nor  can  they  turn  or  move  the  soul :  but 
the  soul  turns  and  moves  itself  alone,  and  what- 
ever judgments  it  may  think  proper  to  make,  such 
it  makes  for  itself  the  things  which  present  them- 
selves to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing  to 
me,  so  far  as  I  must  do  good  to  men  and  endure 
them.  But  so  far  as  some  men  make  themselves 
obstacles  to  my  proper  acts,  man  becomes  to  me 
one  of  the  things  which  are  indifferent,  no  less 
than  the  sun  or  wind  or  a  wild  beast.  Now  it  is 
true  that  these  may  impede  my  action,  but  they 
are  no  impediments  to  my  affects  and  disposition, 
which  have  the  power  of  acting  conditionally  and 
changing :  for  the  mind  converts  and  changes 
every  hindrance  to  its  activity  into  an  aid ;  and  sc 


M.  ANTONINUS.    V.  155 


that  which  is  a  hindrance  is  made  a  furtherance 
to  an  act ;  and  that  which  is  an  obstacle  on  the 
road  helps  us  on  this  road. 

21.  Reverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  uni- 
verse ;  and  this  is  that  which  makes  use  of  all 
things  and  directs  all  things.  And  in  like  manner 
also  reverence  that  which  is  best  in  thyself;  and 
this  is  of  the  same  kind  as  that.  For  in  thyself 
also,  that  which  makes  use  of  everything  else,  is 
this,  and  thy  life  is  directed  by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state,  does 
no  harm  to  the  citizen.  In  the  case  of  every  ap- 
pearance of  harm  apply  this  rule:  if  the  state  is 
not  harmed  by  this,  neither  am  I  harmed.  But 
if  the  state  is  harmed,  thou  must  not  be  angry 
with  him  who  does  harm  to  the  state.  Show  him 
where  his  error  is.f 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which 
things  pass  by  and  disappear,  both  the  things 
which  are  and  the  things  which  are  produced. 
For  substance  is  like  a  river  in  a  continual  flow, 
and  the  activities  of  things  are  in  constant  change, 
and  the  causes  work  in  infinite  varieties ;  and 
there  is  hardly  anything  which  stands  still.  And 
consider  this  which  is  near  to  thee,  this  boundless 
abyss  of  the  past  and  of  the  future  in  which  all 
things  disappear.    How  then  is  he  not  a  fool  who 


156  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


is  puffed  up  with  such  things  or  plagued  about 
them  and  makes  himself  miserable  ?  for  they  vex 
him  only  for  a  time,  and  a  short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of  which 
thou  hast  a  very  small  portion  ;  and  of  universal 
time,  of  which  a  short  and  indivisible  interval  has 
been  assigned  to  thee  ;  and  of  that  which  is  fixed 
by  destiny,  and  how  small  a  part  of  it  thou  art. 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong  ?  Let  him  look 
to  it.  He  has  his  own  disposition,  his  own  ac- 
tivity. I  now  have  what  the  universal  nature 
wills  me  to  have  ;  and  I  do  what  my  nature  now 
wills  me  to  do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of  thy  soul  which  leads  and 
governs  be  undisturbed  by  the  movements  in  the 
flesh  whether  of  pleasure  or  of  pain  ;  and  let  it 
not  unite  with  them,  but  let  it  circumscribe  itself 
and  limit  those  affects  to  their  parts.  But  when 
these  affects  rise  up  to  the  mind  by  virtue  of  that 
other  sympathy  that  naturally  exists  in  a  body 
which  is  all  one,  then  thou  must  not  strive  to  re- 
sist the  sensation,  for  it  is  natural ;  but  let  not  the 
ruling  part  of  itself  add  to  the  sensation  the 
opinion  that  it  is  either  good  or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with 
the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his 
own  soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


V. 


157 


him,  and  that  it  does  all  that  the  daemon  wishes, 
which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his 
guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And 
this  is  every  man's  understanding  and  reason. 

28.  Art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  arm-pits 
stink  ?  art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth 
smells  foul  ?  What  good  will  this  anger  do  thee  ? 
He  has  such  a  mouth,  he  has  such  arm-pits  :  it_is 

npr>pggnTy  jfofit  cnMi  nn  PTriRp^fjmTrnnst  come  from 

such  things  —  But  the  man  has  reason,  it  will  be 
said,  and  he  is  able,  if  he  takes  pains,  to  discover 
trhmujj  hr  rfffrndr.  T  wish  thee  well  of  thy  dis- 
covery. Well  then,  and  thou  hast  reason  :  byjthy 
ration al  .facult  y  siir  up  his  rational  faculty ;  show 
him  his  error,  admonish  him.  For  if  he  listens, 
thou  wilt  cure  him,  and  there  is  no  need  of  anger, 
[f  Neither  tragic  actor  nor  whore.f  ]  2 

29.  As  thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  art 
gone  out,  .  .  so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live  here. 
But  if  men  do  not  permit  thee,  then  get  away  out 

2  This  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both.  There  is 
also  something:  wrong  Or  incomplete  in  the  beginning  of 
S.  29,  where  he  says  tog  e^e/id-dv  §jv  diavoy,  which 
Gataker  translates  "  as  if  thou  wast  about  to  quit  life ; " 
but  we  cannot  translate  etjeMdv  in  that  way.  Other 
translations  are  not  much  more  satisfactory.  I  have 
translated  it  literally  and  left  it  imperfect. 


.158  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 


of  life,  yet  so  as  if  thou  wert  suffering  no  harm. 
The  house  is  smoky,  and  I  quit  it.  Why  dost 
thou  think  that  this  is  any  trouble  ?  But  so  long 
as  nothing  of  the  kind  drives  me  out,  I  remain, 
am  free,  and  no  man  shall  hinder  me  from  doing 
what  I  choose ;  and  I  choose  to  do  what  is  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  the  rational  and  social 
animal. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social. 
Accordingly  it  has  made  the  inferior  things  for 
the  sake  of  the  superior,  and  it  has  fitted  the  su- 
perior to  one  another.  Thou  seest  how  it  has 
subordinated,  co-ordinated  and  assigned  to  every- 
thing its  proper  portion,  and  has  brought  together 
into  concord  with  one  another  the  things  which 
are  the  best. 

31.  How  hast  thou  behaved  hitherto  to  the 
gods,  thy  parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers,  to 
those  who  looked  after  thy  infancy,  to  thy  friends, 
kinsfolk,  to  thy  slaves?  Consider  if  thou  hast 
hitherto  behaved  to  all  in  such  a  way  that  this 
may  be  said  of  thee  :  — 

Never  has  wronged  a  man  in  deed  or  word. 

And  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things 
thou  hast  passed  through,  and  how  many  things 
thou  hast  been  able  to  endure  :  and  that  the  his- 


M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 

tor j  of  thy  life  is  now  complete  and  thy  service 'Is  " 
ended:  and  how  many  beautiful  things  thou  hast 
seen :  and  how  many  pleasures  and  pains  thou 


hast  despise^;  and  how  many  things  called 
honorable  thou  hast  spurned ;  and  to  how  many 
ill-minded  folks  thou  hast  shown  a  kind  disposi- 
tion. 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignoranJLgouls  dis- 
turb him  who  has  skill  and  knowledge  ?  What 
soul  then  has  skill  and  knowledge  ?  That  which 
knows  beginning  and  end,  and  knows  the  reason 
which  pervades  all  substance  and  through  all  time 
by  fixed  periods  [revolutions]  administers  the 
universe. 

33.  Soon,  very  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes,  or  a 
skeleton,  and  either  a  name  or  not  even  a  name  ; 
but  name  is  sound  and  echo.  And  the  things 
which  are  much  valued  in  life  are  empty  and  rot- 
ten and  trifling,  and  [like]  little  dogs  biting  one 
another,  and  little  children  quarrelling,  laughing, 
and  then  straightway  weeping.  But  fidelity  and 
modesty  and  justice  and  truth  are  fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee  here  ? 
if  the  objects  of  sense  are  easily  changed  and 
never  stand  still,  and  the  organs  of  perception  are 


/ 


160  M.  ANTONINUS.  V. 

dull  and  easily  receive  false  impressions  ;  and  the 
poor  soul  itself  is  an  exhalation  from  blood.  But 
to  have  good  repute  amidst  such  a  world  as  this 
is  an  empty  thing.  Why  then  dost  thou  not  wait 
in  tranquillity  for  thy  end^  whether  it  is  extinction 
or  removal  to  another  state  ?  And  until  that  time 
comes,  what  is  sufficient?  Why,  what  else  than 
to  venerate  the  gods  and  bless  them,  and  to  do 
good  to  men,  and  to  practise  tolerance  and  seL^ 
restraint ;  3  but  as  to  everything  which  is  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath,  to  remem- 
ber that  this  is  neither  thine  nor  in  thy  power. 

34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable  flow 
of  happiness,  if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right  way, 
and  think  and  act  in  the  right  way.  These  two 
things  are  common  both  to  the  soul  of  god  and  to 
the  soul  of  man,  and  to  the  soul  of  every  rational 
being,  not  to  be  hindered  by  another ;  and  to  hold 
good  to  consist  in  the  disposition  to  justice  and  the 
practice  of  it,  and  in  this  to  let  thy  desire  find  its 
termination. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor  an 
effect  of  my  own  badness,  and  the  common  weal  is 

3  This  is  the  Stoic  precept  avz%ov  not  anexov,  TJie 
first  part  teaches  us  to  be  content  with  men  and  things 
as  they  are.  The  second  part  teaches  us  the  virtue  of 
self-restraint,  or  the  government  of  our  passions. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    V.  163 

not  injured,  why  am  I  troubled  about  it  ?  and 
what  is  the  harm  to  the  common  weal  ? 

36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately  by 
the  appearance  of  things,  but  give  help  [to  all] 
according  to  thy  ability  and  their  fitness  ;  and  if 
they  should  have  sustained  loss  in  matters  which 
are  indifferent,  do  not  imagine  this  to  be  a  damage. 
For  it  is  a  bad  habit.  But  as  the  old  man  when 
he  went  away  asked  back  his  foster-child's  top, 
remembering  that  it  was  a  top,  so  do  thou  in  this 
case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  Rostra,  hast 
thou  forgotten,  man,  what  these  things  are?  — 
Yes  ;  but  they  are  objects  of  great  concern  to 
these  people  —  Wilt  thou  too  then  be  made  a  fool 
for  these  things  ?  —  I  was  once  a  fortunate  man, 
but  I  lost  it,  I  know  not  how.  —  But  fortunate 
means  that  a  man  has  assigned  to  himself  a  good 
fortune  :  —  and  a  good  fortune  is  good  disposition 
of  the  soul,  good  emotions,  good  actions.4 

4  This  section  is  unintelligible.  Many  of  the  words 
may  be  corrupt,  and  the  general  purport  of  the  section 
cannot  be  discovered.  Perhaps  several  things  have  been 
improperly  joined  in  one  section.  I  have  translated  it 
nearly  literally.  Different  translators  give  the  section 
a  different  turn,  and  the  critics  have  tried  to  mend  what 
they  cannot  understand. 

11 


VI. 


HE  substance  of  the  universe  is  obe- 
dient and  compliant ;  and  the  reason 
which  governs  it  has  in  itself  no  cause 
for  doing  evil,  for  it  has  no  malice,  nor 


does  it  do  evil  to  anything,  nor  is  anything  harmed 
by  it.  But  all  things  are  made  and  perfected 
according  to  this  reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whether 
thou  art  cold  or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy  duty  ; 
and  whether  thou  art  drowsy  or  satisfied  with 
sleep  ;  and  whether  ill-spoken  of  or  praised ;  and 
whether  dying  or  doing  something  else.  For  it  is 
one  of  the  acts  of  life,  this  act  by  which  we  die  : 
it  is  sufficient  then  in  this  act  also  to  do  well  what 
we  have  in  hand. 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar 
quality  of  anything  nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and  they 
will  either  be  reduced  to  vapor,  if  indeed  all  sub- 
stance is  one,  or  they  will  be  dispersed. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VI.  163 


5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what  its 
own  disposition  is,  and  what  it  does,  and  on  what 
material  it  works. 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not  to 
become  like  the  wrong  doer. 

7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it,  in 
passing,  from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act. 
thinking;  of  god. 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses 
and  turns  itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such  as 
it  is  and  such  as  it  wills  to  be,  it  also  makes  every- 
thing which  happens  appear  to  itself  to  be  such  as 
it  wills. 

9.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  universe 
every  single  thing  is  accomplished,  for  certainly  it 
is  not  in  conformity  to  any  other  nature  that  each 
thing  is  accomplished,  either  a  nature  which  ex- 
ternally comprehends  this,  or  a  nature  which  is 
comprehended  within  this  nature,  or  a  nature 
external  and  independent  of  this.  (xt.  1,  vi.  40, 
vin.  50.) 

10.  The  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  and  a 
mutual  involution  of  things,  and  a  dispersion  ;  or 
it  is  unity  and  order  and  providence.  If  then  it 
is  the  former,  why  do  I  desire  to  tarry  in  a  for- 
tuitous combination  of  things  and  such  a  disorder  ? 
and  why  do  I  care  about  anything  else  than  how  I 


164  M.  ANTONINUS.  VI. 

shall  at  last  become  earth  ?  and  why  am  I  dis- 
turbed, for  the  dispersion  of  my  elements  will 
happen  whatever  I  do.  But  if  the  other  supposi- 
tion is  true,  I  venerate,  and  I  am  firm,  and  I  trust 
in  him  who  governs,  (iv.  27.) 
-  11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  by  cir- 
cumstances to  be  disturbed  in  a  manner,  quickly 
return  to  thyself  and  do  not  continue  out  of  tune 
longer  than  the  compulsion  lasts  ;  for  thou  wilt 
have  more  mastery  over  the  harmony  by  continu- 
ally recurring  to  it. 

12.  If  thou  hadst  a  step-mother  and  a  mother 
at  the  same  time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to  thy 
step-mother,  but  still  thou  wouldst  constantly  re- 
turn to  thy  mother.  Let  the  court  and  philosophy 
now  be  to  thee  step-mother  and  mother :  return 
to  philosophy  frequently  and  repose  in  her,  through 
whom  what  thou  meetest  with  in  the  court  appears 
to  thee  tolerable,  and  thou  appearest  tolerable  in 
the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such 
eatables,  we  receive  the  impression,  that  this  is 
the  dead  body  of  a  fish,  and  this  is  the  dead  body 
of  a  bird  or  of  a  pig  ;  and  again,  that  this  Faler- 
nian  is  only  a  little  grape  juice,  and  this  purple 
robe  some  sheeps'  wool  dyed  with  the  blood  of  a 
shell-fish :  such  then  are  these  impressions,  and 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VI.  165 


they  reach  the  things  themselves  and  penetrate 
them,  and  so  we  see  what  kind  of  things  they  are. 
Just  in  the  same  way  ought  we  to  act  all  through 
life,  and  where  there  are  things  which  appear 
most  worthy  of  our  approbation,  we  ought  to  lay 
them  bare  and  look  at  their  worthlessness  and 
strip  them  of  all  the  words  by  which  they  are 
exalted.  For  outward  show  is  a  wonderful  per- 
verter  of  the  reason,  and  when  thou  art  most  sure 
that  thou  art  employed  about  things  worth  thy 
pains,  it  is  then  that  it  cheats  thee  most.  Con- 
sider then  what  Crates  says  of  Xenocrates  himself. 

14.  Most  of  the  things  which  the  multitude 
admire  are  referred  to  objects  of  the  most  general 
kind,  those  which  are  held  together  by  cohesion 
or  natural  organization,  such  as  stones,  wood,  fig- 
trees,  vines,  olives.  But  those  which  are  admired 
by  men,  who  are  a  little  more  reasonable,  are  re- 
ferred to  the  things  which  are  held  together  by  a 
\Uving  principle,  as  flocks,  herds.  Those  which 
are  admired  by  men  who  are  still  more  instructed 
are  the  things  which  are  held  together  by  a  ra- 
tional soul,  not  however  a  universal  soul,  but  ra- 
tional so  far  as  it  is  a  soul  skilled  in  some  art,  or 
expert  in  some  other  way,  or  simply  rational  so 
far  as  the  possessing  of  a  number  of  slaves.  But 
he  who  values  a  rational  soul,  a  soul  universal  and 


166  M.  ANTONINUS.  VI. 


fitted  for  political  life,  regards  nothing  else  except 
this ;  and  above  all  things  he  keeps  his  soul  in  a 
condition  and  in  an  activity  conformable  to  reason 
and  social  life,  and  he  co-operates  to  this  end  with 
those  who  are  of  the  same  kind  as  himself. 

15.  Some  things  are  hurrying  into  existence, 
and  others  are  hurrying  out  of  it ;  and  of  that 
which  is  coming  into  existence  part  is  already  ex- 
tinguished. Motions  and  changes  are  continually 
renewing  the  world,  just  as  the  uninterrupted 
course  of  time  is  always  renewing  the  infinite  du- 
ration of  ages.  In  this  flowing  stream  then,  on 
which  there  is  no  abiding,  what  is  there  of  the 
things  which  hurry  by  on  which  a  man  would  set 
a  high  price  ?  It  would  be  just  as  if  a  man  should 
fall  in  love  with  one  of  the  sparrows  which  fly  by, 
but  it  has  already  past  out  of  sight.  Something 
of  this  kind  is  the  very  life  of  every  man,  like  the 
exhalation  of  the  blood  and  the  respiration  of  the 
air.  For  such  as  it  is  to  have  once  drawn  in  the 
air  and  to  have  given  it  back,  which  we  do  every 
moment,  just  the  same  is  it  with  the  whole  respi- 
ratory power,  which  thou  didst  receive  at  thy  birth 
yesterday  and  the  day  before,  to  give  it  back  to 
the  element  from  which  thou  didst  first  draw  it. 

16.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a 
thing  to  be  valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in  domesti- 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VI.  167 


cated  animals  and  wild  beasts,  nor  the  receiving 
of  impressions  by  the  appearances  of  things,  nor 
being  moved  by  desires  as  puppets  by  strings,  nor 
assembling  in  herds,  nor  being  nourished  by  food  ; 
for  this  is  just  like  the  act  of  separating  and  part- 
ing with  the  useless  part  of  our  food.  What  then 
is  worth  being  valued  ?  To  be  received  with 
clapping  of  hands  ?  No.  Neither  must  we  value 
the  clapping  of  tongues,  for  the  praise  which 
comes  from  the  many  is  a  clapping  of  tongues. 
Suppose  then  that  thou  hast  given  up  this  worth- 
less thing  called  fame,  what  remains  that  is  worth 
valuing  ?  This  in  my  opinion,  to  move  thyself 
and  to  restrain  thyself  in  conformity  to  thy  proper 
constitution,  to  which  end  all  employments  lead 
and  all  arts.  For  every  art  aims  at  this,  that  the 
thing  which  has  been  made  should  be  adapted  to 
the  work  for  which  it  has  been  made ;  and  both 
the  vine-planter  who  looks  after  the  vine,  and  the 
horse-breaker,  and  he  who  trains  the  dog,  seek 
this  end.  But  the  education  and  the  teaching  of 
youth  aim  at  something.  In  this  then  is  the 
value  of  the  education  and  the  teaching.  And  if 
this  is  well,  thou  wilt  not  seek  anything  else. 
Wilt  thou  not  cease  to  value  many  other  things 
too  ?  Then  thou  wilt  be  neither  free,  nor  suffi- 
cient for  thy  own  happiness,  nor  without  passion. 


168  M.ANTONINUS.  VI. 


For  of  necessity  thou  must  be  envious,  jealous, 
and  suspicious  of  those  who  can  take  away  those 
things,  and  plot  against  those  who  have  that 
which  is  valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a  man 
must  be  altogether  in  a  state  of  perturbation  wdio 
wants  any  of  these  things :  and  besides,  he  must 
often  find  fault  with  the  gods.  But  to  reverence 
and  honor  thy  own  mind  will  make  thee  content 
with  thyself,  and  in  harmony  with  society,  and  in 
agreement  with  the  gods,  that  is,  praising  all  that 
they  give  and  have  ordered. 

17.  Above,  below,  all  around  are  the  movements 
of  the  elements.  But  the  motion  of  virtue  is  in 
none  of  these :  it  is  something  more  divine,  and 
advancing  by  a  way  hardly  observed  it  goes  hap- 
pily on  its  road. 

18.  How  strangely  men  act.  They  will  not 
praise  those  who  are  living  at  the  same  time  and 
living  with  themselves ;  but  to  be  themselves 
praised  by  posterity,  by  those  whom  they  have 
never  seen  nor  ever  will  see,  this  they  set  much 
value  on.  But  this  is  very  much  the  same  as  if 
thou  shouldst  be  grieved  because  those  who  have 
lived  before  thee  did  not  praise  thee. 

19.  If  a  thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished  by 
thyself,  do  not  think  that  it  is  impossible  for  a 
man :  but  if  anything  is  possible  for  a  man  and 


M.  ANTONINUS.     VI.  169 


conformable  to  Ills  nature,  think  that  this  can  be 
attained  by  thyself  too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that  a 
man  has  torn  thee  with  his  nails,  and  by  dashing 
against  thy  head  has  inflicted  a  wound.  Well,  we 
neither  show  any  signs  of  vexation,  nor  are  we 
offended,  nor  do  we  suspect  him  afterwards  as  a 
treacherous  fellow ;  and  yet  we  are  on  our  guard 
against  him,  not  however  as  an  enemy,  nor  yet 
with  suspicion,  but  we  quietly  get  out  of  his  way. 
Something  like  this  let  thy  behavior  be  in  all  the 
other  parts  of  life ;  let  us  overlook  many  things  in 
those  who  are  like  antagonists  in  the  gymnasium. 
For  it  is  in  our  power,  as  I  said,  to  get  out  of  the 
way,  and  to  have  no  suspicion  nor  hatred, 

21.  If  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and 
show  me  that  I  do  not  think  or  act  right,  I  will 
gladly  change ;  for  I  seek  the  truth  by  which  no 
man  was  ever  injured.  But  he  is  injured  who 
abides  in  his  error  and  ignorance. 

22.  I  do  my  duty :  other  things  trouble  me 
not ;  for  they  are  either  things  without  life,  or 
things  without  reason,  or  things  that  have  rambled 
and  know  not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animals  which  have  no  reason 
and  generally  all  things  and  objects  do  thou,  since 
thou  hast  reason  and  they  have  none,  make  use 


170        M.   ANTONINUS.  VI. 


of  them  with  a  generous  and  liberal  spirit.  But 
towards  human  beings,  as  they  have  reason,  be- 
have in  a  social  spirit.  And  on  all  occasions  call 
on  the  gods,  and  do  not  perplex  thyself  about  the 
length  of  time  in  which  thou  shalt  do  this ;  for 
even  three  hours  so  spent  are  sufficient. 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom 
by  death  were  brought  to  the  same  state ;  for 
either  they  were  received  among  the  same  semi- 
nal principles  of  the  universe,  or  they  were  alike 
dispersed  among  the  atoms. 

25.  Consider  how  many  things  in  the  same  in- 
divisible time  take  place  in  each  of  us,  things 
which  concern  the  body  and  things  which  concern 
the  soul :  and  so  thou  wilt  not  wonder  if  many 
more  things,  or  rather  all  things  which  come  into 
existence  in  that  which  is  the  one  and  all,  which 
we  call  Cosmos,  exist  in  it  at  the  same  time. 

26.  If  any  man  should  propose  to  thee  the 
question,  how  the  name  Antoninus  is  written, 
wouldst  thou  with  a  straining  of  the  voice  utter 
each  letter  ?  What  then  if  they  grow  angry,  wilt 
thou  be  angry  too?  Wilt  thou  not  go  on  with 
composure  and  number  every  letter?  Just  so 
then  in  this  life  also  remember  that  every  duty  is 
made  up  of  certain  parts.  These  it  is  thy  duty 
to  observe,  and  without  being  disturbed  or  show- 


M.  ANTONINUS.     VI.  171 


ing  anger  towards  those  who  are  angry  with  thee 
to  go  on  thy  way  and  finish  that  which  is  set  be- 
fore thee. 

27.  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive 
after  the  things  which  appear  to  them  to  be  suit- 
able to  their  nature  and  profitable  !  And  yet  in 
a  manner  thou  dost  not  allow  them  to  do  this, 
when  thou  art  vexed  because  they  do  wrong. 
For  they  are  certainly  moved  towards  things 
because  they  suppose  them  to  be  suitable  to 
their  nature  and  profitable  to  them  —  But  it  is 
not  so  —  Teach  them  then,  and  show  them  with- 
out being  angry. 

28.  Death  is  a  cessation  of  the  impressions  n 
through  the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the 
strings  which  move  the  appetites,  and  of  the 
discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts,  and  of 
the  service  to  the  flesh. 

29.  It  is  a  shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to 
give  way  in  this  life,  when  thy  body  does  not 
give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a 
Caesar,  that  thou  art  not  dyed  with  this  dye  ;  for 
such  things  happen.  Keep  thyself  then  simple, 
good,  pure,  serious,  free  from  affectation,  a  friend 
of  justice,  a  worshipper  of  the  gods,  kind,  affec- 
tionate, strenuous  in  all  proper  acts.    Strive  to 


172  M.   ANTONINUS.  VI. 


continue  to  be  such  as  philosophy  wished  to  make 
thee.  (Reverence  the  gods,  and  help  men.  Short 
is  life.)  There  is  only  one  fruit  of  this  terrene 
life,  a  pious  disposition  and  social  acts.  Do 
everything  as  a  disciple  of  Antoninus.  Remem- 
ber his  constancy  in  every  act  which  was  con- 
formable to  reason,  and  his  evenness  in  all  things, 
and  his  piety,  and  the  serenity  of  his  countenance, 
and  his  sweetness,  and  his  disregard  of  empty 
fame,  and  his  efforts  to  understand  things  ;  and 
how  he  would  never  let  anything  pass  without 
having  first  most  carefully  examined  it  and  clearly 
understood  it ;  and  how  he  bore  with  those  who 
blamed  him  unjustly  without  blaming  them  in  re- 
turn ;  how  he  did  nothing  in  a  hurry  ;  and  how  he 
listened  not  to  calumnies,  and  how  exact  an  exam- 
iner of  manners  and  actions  he  was ;  and  not  given 
to  reproach  people,  nor  timid,  nor  suspicious,  nor 
a  sophist  ;  and  with  how  little  he  was  satisfied, 
such  as  lodging,  bed,  dress,  food,  servants  ;  and 
how  laborious  and  patient ;  and  how  he  was  able 
on  account  of  his  sparing  diet  to  hold  out  to  the 
evening,  not  even  requiring  to  relieve  himself  by 
any  evacuations  except  at  the  usual  hour ;  and 
his  firmness  and  uniformity  in  his  friendships ; 
and  how  he  tolerated  freedom  of  speech  hi  those 
who  opposed  his  opinions  ;  and  the  pleasure  that 


M.  ANTONINUS.      VI.  173 


he  had  when  any  man  showed  him  anything  bet- 
ter ;  and  how  pious  he  was  without  superstition. 
Imitate  all  this  that  thou  mayest  have  as  good  a 
conscience,  when  thy  last  hour  comes,  as  he  had. 
(i.  16.) 

31.  Return  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thyself 
back  ;  and  when  thou  hast  roused  thyself  from 
sleep  and  hast  perceived  that  they  were  only 
dreams  which  troubled  thee,  now  in  thy  waking 
hours  look  at  these  [the  things  about  thee]  as 
thou  didst  look  at  those  [the  dreams]. 

32.  I  consist  of  a  little  body  and  a  soul.  Now 
to  this  little  body  all  things  are  indifferent,  for  it 
is  not  able  to  perceive  differences.  But  to  the 
understanding  those  things  only  are  indifferent, 
which  are  not  the  works  of  its  own  activity.  But 
whatever  things  are  the  works  of  its  own  activity, 
all  these  are  in  its  power.  And  of  these  how- 
ever only  those  which  are  done  with  reference  to 
the  present ;  for  as  to  the  future  and  the  past 
activities  of  the  mind,  even  these  are  for  the 
present  indifferent. 

33.  Neither  the  labor  which  the  hand  does  nor 
that  of  the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as 
the  foot  does  the  foot's  work  and  the  hand  the 
hand's.  So  then  neither  to  a  man  as  a  man  is  his 
labor  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  it  does  the 


174  M .  ANTONINUS.  VI. 


things  of  a  man.  But  if  the  labor  is  not  contrary^, 
to  his  nature,  neither  is  it  an  evil  to  him. 

34.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  enjoyed 
by  robbers,  patricides,  tyrants. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  sec  how  the  handicraftsmen 
accommodate  themselves  up  to  a  certain  point  to 
those  who  are  not  skilled  in  their  craft,  —  never- 
theless they  cling  to  the  reason  [the  principles] 
of  their  art  and  do  not  endure  to  depart  from  it  ? 
Is  it  not  strange  if  the  architect  and  the  physician 
shall  have  more  respect  to  the  reason  [the  prin- 
ciples] of  their  own  arts  than  man  to  his  own 
reason,  which  is  common  to  him  and  the  gods. 

36.  Asia,  Europe  are  corners  of  the  universe : 
all  the  sea  a  drop  in  the  universe  ;  Athos  a  little 
clod  of  the  universe :  all  the  present  time  is  a 
point  in  eternity.  All  things  are  little,  change- 
able, perishable.  All  things  come  from  thence, 
from  that  universal  ruling  power  either  directly 
proceeding  or  by  way  of  consequence.  And  ac- 
cordingly the  lion's  gaping  jaws,  and  that  which 
is  poisonous,  and  every  harmful  thing,  as  a  thorn, 
as  mud,  are  after-products  of  the  grand  and  beau- 
tiful. Do  not  then  imagine  that  they  are  of  an- 
other kind  from  that  which  thou  dost  venerate, 
but  form  a  just  opinion  of  the  source  of  all. 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has  seen 


M.  ANTONINUS:  VI. 


175 


all,  both  everything  which  has  taken  place  fron? 
all  eternity  and  everything  which  will  be  for  time 
without  end ;  for  all  are  of  one  kin  and  of  one 
form. 

38.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all 
things  in  the  universe  and  their  relation  to  one 
another.  For  in  a  manner  all  things  are  impli- 
cated with  one  another,  and  all  in  this  way  are 
friendly  to  one  another  ;  for  one  thing  comes  in 
order  after  another,  and  this  is  by  virtue  of  thef 
active  movement  and  mutual  conspiration  and  the 
unity  of  the  substance. 

39.  Adapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which  thy 
lot  has  been  cast :  and  the  men  among  whom 
thou  hast  received  thy  portion,  love  them,  but  do 
it  truly  [sincerely]. 

40.  Every  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it  does 
that  for  which  it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and  yet 
he  who  made  it  is  not  there.  But  in  the  things 
which  are  held  together  by  nature  there  is  within 
and  there  abides  in  them  the  power  which  made 
them ;  wherefore  the  more  it  is  fit  to  reverence 
this  power,  and  to  think,  that,  if  thou  dost  live 
and  act  according  to  its  will,  everything  in  thee 
is  in  conformity  to  intelligence.  And  thus  also  in 
the  universe,  the  things  which  belong  to  it  are  in 
conformity  to  intelligence. 


176  M.  ANTONINUS.  VI. 


41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not 
within  thy  power  thou  shalt  suppose  to  be  good 
for  thee  or  evil,  it  must  of  necessity  be  that,  if 
such  a  bad  thing  befall  thee  or  the  loss  of  such  a 
good  thing,  thou  wilt  blame  the  gods,  and  hate 
men  too,  those  who  are  the  cause  of  the  misfor- 
tune or  the  loss,  or  those  who  are  suspected  of 
being  likely  to  be  the  cause  ;  and  indeed  we  do 
much  injustice,  because  we  make  a  difference  be- 
tween these  things  [because  we  do  not  regard 
these  things  as  indifferent].  But  if  we  judge 
only  those  things  which  are  in  our  power  to  be 
good  or  bad,  there  remains  no  reason  either  for 
finding  fault  with  god  or  standing  in  a  hostile 
attitude  to  man. 

42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end, 
some  with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others 
without  knowing  what  they  do ;  as  men  also 
when  they  are  asleep,  of  whom  it  is  Heraclitus, 
I  think,  who  says  that  they  are  laborers  and  co- 
operators  in  the  things  which  take  place  in  the 
universe.  But  men  co-operate  after  different 
fashions  :  and  even  those  co-operate  abundantly, 
who  find  fault  with  what  happens  and  those  who 
try  to  oppose  it  and  to  hinder  it ;  for  the  universe 
had  need  even  of  such  men  as  these.  It  remains 
then  for  thee  to  understand  among  what  kind  of 


M.   ANTONINUS.  VI. 


177 


workmen  thou  placest  thyself;  for  he  who  rules 
all  things  will  certainly  make  a  right  use  of  thee, 
and  he  will  receive  thee  among  some  part  of  the 
co-operators  and  of  those  whose  labors  conduce  to 
one  end.  But  be  not  thou  such  a  part  as  the 
mean  and  ridiculous  verse  in  the  play,  which 
Chrysippus  speaks  of. 

43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  work  of 
the  rain,  or  Aesculapius  the  work  of  the  Fruit- 
bearer  [the  earth]  ?  And  how  is  it  with  respect 
to  each  of  the  stars,  are  they  not  different  and  yet 
they  work  together  to  the  same  end? 

44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me  and 
about  the  things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they 
have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to 
imagine  a  deity  without  forethought ;  and  as  to 
doing  me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any  desire 
towards  that  ?  for  what  advantage  would  result  to 
them  from  this  or  to  the  whole,  which  is  the  special 
object  of  their  providence  ?  But  if  they  have  not 
determined  about  me  individually,  they  have  cer- 
tainly determined  about  the  whole  at  least,  and 
the  things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in 
this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept  with 
pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them.  But  if 
they  determine  about  nothing  —  which  it  is  wicked 
to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us  neither 

12 


178 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


VI. 


sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them  nor  do  any- 
thing else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were  present 
and  lived  with  us  —  but  if  however  the  gods  de- 
termine about  none  of  the  things  which  concern 
us,  I  am  able  to  determine  about  myself,  and  I 
can  inquire  about  that  which  is  useful ;  and  that 
is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  conformable  to 
his  own  constitution  and  nature.  But  my  nature 
is  rational  and  social ;  and  my  city  and  country, 
so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so  far 
as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.  The  things  then 
which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful 
to  me. 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is  for 
the  interest  of  the  universal :  this  might  be  suf- 
ficient. But  further  thou  wilt  observe  this  also  as 
a  general  truth,  if  thou  dost  observe,  that  whatever 
is  profitable  to  any  man  is  profitable  also  to  other 
men.  But  let  the  word  profitable  be  taken  here 
in  the  common  sense  as  said  of  things  of  the  mid- 
dle kind  [neither  good  nor  bad]. 

46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre 
and  such  places,  that  the  continual  sight  of  the 
same  things  and  the  uniformity  make  the  spectacle 
wearisome,  so  it  is  in  the  whole  of  life ;  for  all 
things  above,  below,  are  the  same  and  from  the 
same.    How  long  then  ? 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VI. 


179 


47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men  and 
of  all  kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations  are  dead, 
so  that  thy  thoughts  come  down  even  to  Philistion 
and  Phoebus  and  Origanion.  Now  turn  thy 
thoughts  to  the  other  kinds  [of  men].  To  that 
place  then  we  must  remove,  where  there  are  so 
many  great  orators,  and  so  many  noble  philoso- 
phers, Heraclitus,  Pythagoras,  Socrates  ;  so  many 
heroes  of  former  days,  and  so  many  generals  after 
them,  and  tyrants ;  besides  these,  Eudoxus,  Hip- 
parchus,  Archimedes,  and  other  men  of  acute  nat- 
ural talents,  great  minds,  lovers  of  labor,  versatile, 
confident,  mockers  even  of  the  perishable  and 
ephemeral  life  of  man,  as  Menippus  and  such  as 
are  like  him.  As  to  all  these  consider  that  they 
have  long  been  in  the  dust.  What  harm  then  is 
this  to  them ;  and  what  to  those  whose  names  are 
altogether  unknown  ?  ^One  thing  here  is  worth  a 
great  deal,  to  pass  thy  life  in  truth  and  justice, 
with  a  benevolent  disposition  even  to  liars  and 
unjust  men.  j 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thyself,  think 
of  the  virtues  of  those  who  live  with  thee ;  for 
instance,  the  activity  of  one,  and  the  modesty  of 
another,  and  the  liberality  of  a  third,  and  some 
other  good  quality  of  a  fourth.  For  nothing  de- 
lights so  much  as  the  examples  of  the  virtues, 


180  M.  ANTONINUS.  VI. 


when  they  are  exhibited  in  the  morals  of  those 
who  live  with  us  and  present  themselves  in  abun- 
dance, as  far  as  is  possible.  Wherefore  we  must 
keep  them  before  us. 

49.  Art  thou  dissatisfied  because  thou  weighest 
only  so  many  litrae  and  not  three  hundred  ?  Be 
not  dissatisfied  then  that  thou  must  live  only 
so  many  years  and  not  more  ;  for  as  thou  art 
satisfied  with  the  amount  of  substance  which  has 
been  assigned  to  thee,  so  be  content  with  the 
time. 

50.  Let  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men].  But 
act  even  against  their  will,  when  the  principles  of 
justice  lead  that  way.  If  however  any  man  by 
using  force  stands  in  thy  way,  betake  thyself  to 
contentment  and  tranquillity,  and  at  the  same 
time  employ  the  hindrance  towards  the  exercise 
of  some  other  virtue  ;  and  remember  that  thy 
attempt  was  with  a  reservation  [conditionally], 
that  thou  didst  not  desire  to  do  impossibilities. 
What  then  didst  thou  desire  ?  —  Some  such  effort 
as  this  —  But  thou  attainest  thy  object,  if  the 
things  to  which  thou  wast  moved  are  [not]  ac- 
complished.f 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another  man's 
activity  to  be  his  own  good ;  and  he  who  loves 
pleasure,  his  own  sensations ;   but  he  who  has 


M .  ANTONINUS.    VI.  181 


understanding,  considers  his  own  acts  to  be  his 
own  good. 

52.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion'  about 
a  thing,  and  not  to  be  disturbed  in  our  soul ;  for 
things  themselves  have  no  natural  power  to  form 
our  judgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefully  to 
what  is  said  by  another,  and  as  much  as  it  is  pos- 
sible, be  in  the  speaker's  mind. 

54.  That  which  is  not  good  for  the  swarm, 
neither  is  it  good  for  the  bee. 

55.  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman  or  the  sick 
the  doctor,  would  they  listen  to  anybody  else  ;  or 
how  could  the  helmsman  secure  the  safety  of  those 
in  the  ship  or  the  doctor  the  health  of  those  whom 
he  attends  ? 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I  came 
into  the  world  are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter,  and 
to  those  bitten  by  mad  dogs  water  causes  fear ; 
and  to  little  children  the  ball  is  a  fine  thing. 
Why  then  am  I  angry  ?  Dost  thou  think  that  a 
false  opinion  has  less  power  than  the  bile  in  the 
jaundiced  or  the  poison  in  him  who  is  bitten  by  a 
mad  dog  ? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  ac- 
cording to  the  reason  of  thy  own  nature  :  nothing 


182        M.  ANTONINUS.  VI. 


will  happen  to  thee  contrary  to  the  reason  of  the 
universal  nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom  men 
wish  to  please,  and  for  what  objects,  and  by  what 
kind  of  acts  ?  How  soon  will  time  cover  all 
things,  and  how  many  it  has  covered  already. 


VIL 


HAT  is  badness?  It  is  that  which 
thou  hast  often  seen.  And  on  the 
occasion  of  everything  which  hap- 
pens keep  this  in  mind,  that  it  is 
that  which  thou  hast  often  seen.  Everywhere  up 
and  down  thou  wilt  find  the  same  things,  with 
which  the  old  histories  are  filled,  those  of  the 
middle  ages  and  those  of  our  own  day  ;  with  which 
cities  and  houses  ar$  filled  now.  There  is  noth- 
ing new :  all  things  are  both  familiar  and  short- 
lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  unless 
the  impressions  [thoughts]  which  correspond  to 
them  are  extinguished  ?  But  it  is  in  thy  power 
continuously  to  fan  these  thoughts  into  a  flame. 
I  can  have  that  opinion  about  anything,  which  I 
ought  to  have.  If  I  can,  why  am  I  disturbed  ? 
The  things  which  are  external  to  my  mind  have 
no  relation  at  all  to  my  mind.  —  Let  this  be  the 


184         M.   ANTONINUS.  VII. 


state  of  thy  affects,  and  thou  standest  erect.  To 
recover  thy  life  is  in  thy  power.  Look  at  things 
again  as  thou  didst  use  to  look  at  them ;  for  in 
this  consists  the  recovery  of  thy  life. 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the 
stage,  flocks  of  sheep,  herds,  exercises  with  spears, 
a  bone  cast  to  little  dogs,  a  bit  of  bread  into  fish- 
ponds, laborings  of  ants  and  burden-carrying, 
runnings  about  of  frightened  little  mice,  puppets 
pulled  by  strings  —  [all  alike].  It  is  thy  duty 
then  in  the  midst  of  such  things  to  show  good 
humor  and  not  a  proud  air ;  to  understand  how- 
ever that  every  man  is  worth  just  so  much  as  the 
things  are  worth  about  which  he  busies  himself. 

4.  In  discourse  thou  must  attend  to  what  is 
said,  and  in  every  movement  thou  must  observe 
what  is  doing.  And  in  the  one  thou  shouldst  see 
immediately  to  what  end  it  refers,  but  in  the 
other  watch  carefully  what  is  the  thing  signified. 

5.  Is  my  understanding  sufficient  for  this  or 
not  ?  If  it  is  sufficient,  1  use  it  for  the  work  as 
an  instrument  given  by  the  universal  nature.  But 
if  it  is  not  sufficient,  then  either  I  retire  from  the 
work  and  give  way  to  him  who  is  able  to  do  it 
better,  unless  there  be  some  reason  why  I  ought 
not  to  do  so ;  or  I  do  it  as  well  as  I  can,  taking  to 
help  me  the  man  who  with  the  aid  of  my  ruling 


M.   ANTONINUS.  VII. 


185 


principle  can  do  what  is  now  fit  and  useful  for  the 
general  good.  For  whatsoever  either  by  myself 
or  with  another  I  can  do,  ought  to  be  directed  to 
this  only,  to  that  which  is  useful  and  well  suited 
to  society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame 
have  been  given  up  to  oblivion ;  and  how  many 
who  have  celebrated  the  fame  of  others  have  long 
been  dead. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped  ;  for  it  is  thy  ^ 
business  to  do  thy  duty  like  a  soldier  in  the  assault 
on  a  town.    How  then,  if  being  lame  thou  canst 
not  mount  up  on  the  battlements  alone,  but  with 
the  help  of  another  it  is  possible  ? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  thee,  for  thou 
wilt  come  to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary,  having 
with  thee  the  same  reason  which  now  thou  usest 
for  present  things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another,  ^ 
and  the  bond  is  holy ;  and  there  is  hardly  anything 
unconnected  with  any  other  thing.  For  things 
have  been  co-ordinated,  and  they  combine  to  form 
the  same  universe  [order].  For  there  is  one 
universe  made  up  of  all  things,  and  one  god  who 
pervades  all  things,  and  one  substance,  and  one 
law,  [one]  common  reason  in  all  intelligent  ani- 
mals, and  one  truth ;  if  indeed  there  is  also  one 


186        M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


perfection  for  all  animals  which  are  of  the  same 
stock  and  participate  in  the  same  reason. 

10.  Everything  material  soon  disappears  in  the 
substance  of  the  whole ;  and  everything  formal 
[causal]  is  very  soon  taken  back  into  the  universal 
reason  ;  and  the  memory  of  everything  is  very 
soon  overwhelmed  in  time. 

11.  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  ac- 
cording to  nature  and  according  to  reason. 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  made  erect,    (in.  5.) 

13.  Just  as  it  is  with  the  members  in  those 
bodies  which  are  united  in  one,  so  it  is  with  ra- 
tional beings  which  exist  separate,  for  they  have 
been  constituted  for  one  co-ope  atior.  And  the 
perception  of  this  will  be  more  apparent  to  thee, 
if  thou  often  sayest  to  thyself  that  I  am  a  member 
[^e'Aos]  of  the  system  of  rational  beings.  But  if 
[using  the  letter  r]  thou  sayest  that  thou  art  a 
part  [/xepos],  thou  dost  not  yet  love  men  from  thy 
heart ;  beneficence  does  not  yet  delight  thee  for  its 
own  sake ; 1  thou  still  doest  it  barely  as  a  thing  of 
propriety,  and  not  yet  as  doing  good  to  thyself. 

14.  Let  there  fall  externally  what  will  on  the 
parts  which  can  feel  the  effects  of  this  fall.  For 

1  I  have  used  Gataker's  conjecture  Kara/irjicTiKcbc  instead 
of  the  common  reading  KaTa?\,7]KTLKCjg :  compare  iv.  20 ; 
ix.  42. 


M.  ANT  ONINUS.  VII. 


187 


those  parts  which  have  felt  will  complain,  if  they 
choose.  But  I,  unless  I  think  that  what  has  hap- 
pened is  an  evil,  am  not  injured.  And  it  is  in  my 
power  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  must  be 
good,  just  as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald  or  the 
purple  were  always  saying  this,  Whatever  any  one 
does  or  says,  I  must  be  emerald  and  keep  my 
color. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  disturb  itself, 
I  mean,  does  not  frighten  itself  or  cause  itself 
pain.f  But  if  any  one  else  can  frighten  or  pain 
it,  let  him  do  so.  For  the  faculty  itself  will  not 
by  its  own  opinion  turn  itself  into  such  ways. 
Let  the  body  itself  take  care,  if  it  can,  that  it 
suffer  nothing,  and  let  it  speak,  if  it  suffers.  But 
the  soul  itself,  that  which  is  subject  to  fear,  to 
pain,  which  has  completely  the  power  of  forming 
an  opinion  about  these  things,  will  suffer  nothing, 
for  it  will  never  deviate!  into  such  a  judgment. 
The  leading  principle  in  itself  wants  nothing, 
unless  it  makes  a  want  for  itself ;  and  therefore  it 
is  both  free  from  perturbation  and  unimpeded,  if 
it  does  not  disturb  and  impede  itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a  good  daemon, 
or  a  good  thing.  What  then  art  thou  doing  here, 
O  imagination  ?  go  away,  I  intreat  thee  by  the 


188       M.   ANTONINUS.  VII. 


gods,  as  thou  didst  come,  for  I  want  thee  not. 
But  thou  art  come  according  to  thy  old  fashion. 
I  am  not  angry  with  thee  :  only  go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change  ?  Why  what 
can  take  place  without  change  ?  What  then  is 
more  pleasing  or  more  suitable  to  the  universal 
nature  ?  And  canst  thou  take  a  bath  unless  the 
wood  undergoes  a  change?  and  canst  thou  be 
nourished,  unless  the  food  undergoes  a  change  ? 
And  can  anything  else  that  is  useful  be  accom- 
plished without  change  ?  Dost  thou  not  see  then 
that  for  thyself  also  to  change  is  just  the  same, 
and  equally  necessary  for  the  universal  nature  ? 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as  through 
a  furious  torrent  all  bodies  are  carried,  being  by 
their  nature  united  with  and  co-operating  with  the 
whole,  as  the  parts  of  our  body  with  one  another. 
How  many  a  Chrysippus,  how  many  a  Socrates, 
how  many  an  Epictetus  has  time  already  swal- 
lowed up  ?  And  let  the  same  thought  occur  to 
thee  with  reference  to  every  man  and  thing. 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I  should 
do  something  which  the  constitution  of  man  does 
not  allow,  or  in  the  way  which  it  does  not  allow, 
or  what  it  does  not  allow  now. 

21.  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things; 
and  near  the  forgetfulness  of  thee  by  all. 


M.ANTONINUS.    VII.  189 


22.  It  is  peculiar  to  man  to  love  even  those  v 
who  do  wrong.  And  this  happens,  if  when  they 
do  wrong  it  occurs  to  thee  that  they  are  kinsmen, 
and  that  they  do  wrong  through  ignorance  and 
unintentionally,  and  that  soon  both  of  you  will 
die  ;  and  above  all,  that  the  wrong  doer  has  done 
thee  no  harm,  for  he  has  not  made  thy  ruling  fac- 
ulty worse  than  it  was  before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal 
substance,  as  if  it  were  wax,  now  moulds  a  horse, 
and  when  it  has  broken  this  up,  it  uses  the  mate- 
rial for  a  tree,  then  for  a  man,  then  for  something 
else  ;  and  each  of  these  things  subsists  for  a  very 
short  time.  But  it  is  no  hardship  for  the  vessel  to 
be  broken  up,  just  as  there  was  none  in  its  being 
fastened  together. 

24.  A  scowling  look  is  altogether  unnatural ; 
when  it  is  often  assumed,2  the  result  is  that  all 
comeliness  dies  away,  and  at  last  is  so  completely 
extinguished  that  it  cannot  be  again  lighted  up  at 
all.  Try  to  conclude  from  this  very  fact  that  it 
is  contrary  to  reason.  For  if  even  the  perception 
of  doing  wrong  shall  depart,  what  reason  is  there 
for  living  any  longer  ? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  whole  will  soon 
change  all  things  which  thou  seest,  and  out  of  their 

2  This  is  corrupt. 


190       M.ANTONINUS.  VII. 


substance  will  make  other  things,  and  again  other 
things  from  the  substance  of  them,  in  order  that 
the  world  may  be  ever  new. 

26.  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong, 
immediately  consider  with  what  opinion  about 
good  or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For  when  thou 
hast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him,  and  wilt  neither 
wonder  nor  be  angry.  For  either  thou  thyself 
thinkest  the  same  thing  to  be  good  that  he  does  or 
another  thing  of  the  same  kind.  It  is  thy  duty 
then  to  pardon  him.  But  if  thou  dost  not  think 
such  things  to  be  good  or  evil,  thou  wilt  more 
readily  be  well  disposed  to  him  who  is  in  error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast  not 
as  of  what  thou  hast :  but  of  the  things  which 
thou  hast  select  the  best,  and  then  reflect  how 
eagerly  they  would  have  been  sought,  if  thou 
hadst  them  not.  At  the  same  time  however  take 
care  that  thou  dost  not  through  being  so  pleased 
with  them  accustom  thyself  to  overvalue  them,  so 
as  to  be  disturbed  if  ever  thou  shouldst  not  have 
them. 

28.  Retire  into  thyself.  The  rational  principle 
which  rules  has  this  nature,  that  it  is  content  with 
itself  when  it  does  what  is  just,  and  so  secures 
tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.    Stop  the  pull- 


M.ANTONINUS.    VII.  191 

ing  of  the  strings.  Confine  thyself  to  the  pres- 
ent. Understand  well  what  happens  either  to 
thee  or  to  another.  Divide  and  distribute  every 
object  into  the  causal  [formal]  and  the  material. 
Think  of  thy  last  hour.  Let  the  wrong  which  is 
done  by  a  man  stay  there  where  the  wrong  was 
done. 

30.  Direct  thy  attention  to  what  is  said.  Let 
thy  understanding  enter  into  the  things  that  are 
doing  and  the  things  which  do  them.    (vn.  4.) 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and  modesty 
and  with  indifference  towards  the  things  which 
lie  between  virtue  and  vice.  Love  mankind. 
Follow  god.  The  poet  says  that  Law  rules  all  — 
f  And  it  is  enough  to  remember  that  law  rules 
all.t 3  — 

32.  About  death :  whether  it  is  a  dispersion,  or 
a  resolution  into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is  either 
extinction  or  change. 

33.  About  pain :  the  pain  which  is  intolerable 
carries  us  off ;  but  that  which  lasts  a  long  time 
is  tolerable;  and  the  mind  maintains  its  own 
tranquillity  by  retiring  into  itself,  f  and  the  ruling 
faculty  is  not  made  worse.  But  the  parts  which 
are  harmed  by  pain,  let  them,  if  they  can,  give 
their  opinion  about  it. 


8  The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 


192 


M.  ANT  ONINU  S.  VII. 


34.  About  fame :  look  at  the  minds  [of  those 
who  seek  fame],  observe  what  they  are,  and  what 
kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what  kind  of  things 
they  pursue.  And  consider  that  as  the  heaps  of 
sand  piled  on  one  another  hide  the  former  sands, 
so  in  life  the  events  which  go  before  are  soon 
covered  by  those  which  come  after. 

35.  From  Plato : 4  the  man  who  has  an  elevated 
mind  and  takes  a  view  of  all  time  and  of  all  sub- 
stance, dost  thou  suppose  it  pos  ible  for  him  to 
think  that  human  life  is  anything  great  ?  it  is  not 
possible,  he  said.  —  Such  a  man  then  will  think 
that  death  also  is  no  evil  —  Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Antisthenes  :  It  is  royal  to  do  good 
and  to  be  abused. 

37.  It  is  a  base  thing  for  the  countenance  to  be 
obedient  and  to  regulate  and  compose  itself  as  the 
mind  commands,  and  for  the  mind  not  to  be  reg- 
ulated and  composed  by  itself. 

38.  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things, 
For  they  care  nought  about  it.5 

39.  To  the  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

40.  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of 

corn : 

One  man  is  born  ;  another  dies.6 

*  Plato,  Pol.  vi.  486. 

6  From  the  Bellerophon  of  Euripides. 

6  From  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides.    Cicero  (Tuscul. 


M.  ANTONINUS.     VII.  193 


41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  for  my  children, 
There  is  a  reason  for  it. 

42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just.7 

43.  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no 
violent  emotion. 

44.  From  Plato  : 8  But  I  would  make  this  man 
a  sufficient  answer,  which  is  this :  Thou  sayest 
not  well,  if  thou  thinkest  that  a  man,  who  is  good 
for  anything  at  all  ought  to  compute  the  hazard 
of  life  or  death,  and  should  not  rather  look  to  this 
only  in  all  that  he  does,  whether  he  is  doing  what 
is  just  or  unjust,  and  the  works  of  a  good  or  a 
bad  man. 

45.  8  For  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  truth . 
wherever  a  man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it  the 
best  place  for  him,  or  has  been  placed  by  a  com- 
mander, there  in  my  opinion  he  ought  to  stay  and 
to  abide  the  hazard,  taking  nothing  into  the 
reckoning,  either  death  or  anything  else,  before 
the  baseness  [of  deserting  his  post]. 

46.  But,  my  good  friend,  consider  whether  that 

ill.  25.)  has  translated  six  lines  from  Euripides,  and 
among  them  are  these  two  lines  :  — 

Reddenda  terrae  est  terra  :  turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges  :  Sic  jubet  necessitas. 

7  See  Aristophanes,  Acharnenses. 

8  From  the  Apologia. 

13 


194        M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


which  is  noble  and  good  is  not  something  different 
from  saving  and  being  saved ;  for  f  we  must  not 
allow  that  it  consists  in  living  such  or  such  a  time, 
at  least  for  one  who  is  really  a  man ;  f  and  he 
should  not  be  fond  of  life,  but  entrusting  this  to 
god  and  believing  what  the  women  say,  that  no 
man  can  escape  his  destiny,  he  should  next  in- 
quire how  he  may  best  live  the  time  that  he  has 
to  live.9 

47.  Look  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars,  as 
if  thou  wrert  going  along  with  them;  and  con- 
stantly consider  the  changes  of  the  elements  into 
one  another;  for  such  thoughts  purge  away  the 
filth  of  the  terrene  life. 

48.  This  is  a  fine  saying  of  Plato : 10  That  he 
who  is  discoursing  about  men  should  look  also  at 
earthly  things  as  if  he  viewed  them  from  some 
higher  place ;  should  look  at  them  in  their  as- 
semblies, armies,  agricultural  labors,  marriages, 
treaties,  births,  deaths,  noise  of  the  courts  of 
justice,  desert  places,  various  nations  of  barba- 

9  Plato,  Gorgias,  c.  68.  In  this  passage  the  text  of 
Antoninus  has  eareov,  which  is  perhaps  right ;  but  there 
seems  to  be  something  wrong  in  the  text.  It  is  certainly 
difficult  to  see  the  exact  construction  of  parts  of  the 
section.  The  reading  evicreov  for  eareov  does  not  mend 
the  matter. 

10  It  is  not  in  the  extant  writings  of  Plato. 


M.  ANTONINUS.  Vll. 


195 


rians,  feasts,  lamentations,  markets,  a  mixture  of 
all  things  and  an  orderly  combination  of  contraries. 

49.  Consider  the  past ;  such  great  changes  of 
political  supremacies.  Thou  mayest  foresee  also 
the  things  which  will  be.  For  they  will  certainly 
be  of  like  form,  and  it  is  not  possible  that  they 
should  deviate  from  the  order  of  the  things  which 
take  place  now :  accordingly  to  have  contemplated 
human  life  for  forty  years  is  the  same  as  to  have 
contemplated  it  for  ten  thousand  years.  For 
what  more  wilt  thou  see  ? 

50.  That  which  has  grown  from  the  earth  to 

the  earth, 

But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly  seed, 
Back  to  the  heavenly  realms  returns.11 
This  is  either  a  dissolution  of  the  mutual  in- 
volution of  the  atoms,  or  a  similar  dispersion  of  the 
unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  drinks  and  curming  magic 

arts 

Turning  the  channel's  course  to  'scape  from 
death.12 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has  sent 
We  must  endure,  and  toil  without  complaining. 

11  From  the  Chrysippus  of  Euripides. 

12  The  first  two  lines  are  from  the  Supp.  of  Eurip- 
ides, v.  1110. 


196 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


52.  Another  may  be  more  expert  in  casting  hia 
opponent;  but  let  him  not  be  more  social,  nor 
more  modest,  nor  better  disciplined  to  meet  all 
that  happens,  nor  more  considerate  with  respect 
to  the  faults  of  his  neighbors. 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conformably 
to  the  reason  which  is  common  to  gods  and  men, 
there  we  have  nothing  to  fear :  for  where  we  are 
able  to  get  profit  by  means  of  the  activity  which 
is  successful  and  proceeds  according  to  our  consti- 
tution, there  no  harm  is  to  be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy 
power  piously  to  acquiesce  in  thy  present  condi- 
tion, and  to  behave  justly  to  those  who  are  about 
thee,  and  to  exert  thy  skill  upon  thy  present 
thoughts,  that  nothing  shall  steal  into  them  with- 
out being  well  examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover  other 
men's  ruling  principles,  but  look  straight  to  this, 
to  what  nature  leads  thee,  both  the  universal 
nature  through  the  things  which  happen  to  thee, 
and  thy  own  nature  through  the  acts  which  must 
be  done  by  thee.  But  every  being  ought  to  do 
that  which  is  according  to  its  constitution ;  and 
all  other  things  have  been  made  for  the  sake  of 
rational  beings,  just  as  among  irrational  things 
the  inferior  for  the  sake  of  the  superior,  but  the 
rational  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 


M .   ANTONINUS.    VII.  197 


The  prime  principle  then  in  man's  constitution 
is  the  social.  And  the  second  is  not  to  yield  to 
the  persuasions  of  the  body,  for  it  is  the  peculiar 
office  of  the  rational  and  intelligent  motion  to  cir- 
cumscribe itself,  and  never  to  be  overpowered 
either  by  the  motion  of  the  senses  or  of  the  ap- 
petites, for  both  are  animal ;  but  the  intelligent 
motion  claims  superiority  and  does  not  permit 
itself  to  be  overpowered  by  the  others.  And  with 
good  reason,  for  it  is  formed  by  nature  to  use  all 
of  them.  The  third  thing  in  the  rational  consti- 
tution is  freedom  from  error  and  from  deception. 
Let  then  the  ruling  principle  holding  fast  to  these 
things  go  straight  on,  and  it  has  what  is  its  own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have 
completed  thy  life  up  to  the  present  time  ;  and 
live  according  to  nature  the  remainder  which  is 
allowed  thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee,  and 
is  spun  with  the  thread  of  thy  destiny.  For  what 
is  more  suitable  ? 

58.  In  everything  which  happens  keep  before 
thy  eyes  those  to  whom  the  same  things  hap- 
pened, and  how  they  were  vexed,  and  treated 
them  as  strange  things,  and  found  fault  with 
them :  and  now  where  are  they  ?  Nowhere. 
Why  then  dost  thou  choose  to  act  in  the  same 


198        M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


way  ?  and  why  dost  thou  not  leave  these  agita- 
tions which  are  foreign  to  nature,  to  those  who 
cause  them  and  those  who  are  moved  by  them  ? 
and  why  art  thou  not  altogether  intent  upon  the 
right  way  of  making  use  of  the  things  which  hap- 
pen to  thee  ?  for  then  thou  wilt  use  them  well, 
and  they  will  be  a  material  for  thee  [to  work  on]. 
Only  attend  to  thyself,  and  resolve  to  be  a  good 

man  in  every  act  which  thou  doest :  and  remem- 
ber       *         *         #        *  #13 

59.  Look  within.  Within  is  the  fountain  of 
good,  and  it  will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt  ever 
dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to  show 
no  irregularity  either  in  motion  or  attitude.  For 
what  the  mind  shows  in  the  face  by  maintaining 
in  it  the  expression  of  intelligence  and  propriety, 
that  ought  to  be  required  also  in  the  whole  body. 
But  all  these  things  shoul»d  be  observed  without 
affectation. 

y  61.  The  art  of  life  is  more  like  the  wrestler's 
art  than  the  dancer's,  in  respect  of  this  that  it 
should  stand  ready  and  firm  to  meet  onsets  which 
are  sudden  and  unexpected. 

13  This  section  is  obscure,  and  the  conclusion  is  so 
corrupt  that  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  probable  mean- 
ing to  it.  It  is  better  to  leave  it  as  it  is  than  to  patch  it 
up,  as  some  critics  and  translators  have  done. 


M .  ANTON!  N  US  .     VII.  100 


62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose 
approbation  thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what  ruling 
principles  they  possess.  For  then  thou  wilt 
neither  blame  those  who  offend  involuntarily,  not 
wilt  thou  want  their  approbation,  if  thou  lookest 
to  the  sourcea  of  their  opinions  and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  invol- 
untarily deprived  of  truth ;  consequently  in  the 
same  way  it  is  deprived  of  justice  and  temper- 
ance and  benevolence  and  everything  of  the  kind. 
It  is  most  necessary  to  bear  this  constantly  in 
mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be  more  gentle  towards 
all. 

64.  In  every  pain  let  this  thought  be  present, 
that  there  is  no  dishonor  in  it,  nor  does  it  make 
the  governing  intelligence  worse,  for  it  does  not 
damage  the  intelligence  either  so  far  as  the  intel- 
ligence is  rational 14  or  so  far  as  it  is  social.  In- 
deed in  the  case  of  most  pains  let  this  remark  of 
Epicurus  aid  thee,  that  pain  is  neither  intolerable 
nor  everlasting,  if  thou  bearest  in  mind  that  it  has 
its  limits,  and  if  thou  addest  nothing  to  it  in  imag- 
ination :  and  remember  this  too,  that  we  do  not 

14  The  text  has  vXlktj,  which  it  has  been  proposed  to 
alter  to  Aoyi/cr/,  and  this  change  is  necessary.  We  shall 
then  have  in  this  section  "koywrj  and  kolvovlkt]  associated, 
as  we  have  in  s.  68  Iojlkt}  and  •koIltlkt],  and  in  s.  72. 


200 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


perceive  that  many  things  which  are  disagreeable 
to  us  are  the  same  as  pain,  such  as  excessive 
drowsiness,  and  the  being  scorched  by  heat,  and 
the  having  no  appetite.  When  then  thou  art  dis- 
contented about  any  of  these  things,  say  to  thy- 
self, that  thou  art  yielding  to  pain. 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhuman, 
as  they  feel  towards  men.15 

66.  How  do  we  know  if  Telauges  was  not  supe- 
rior in  character  to  Socrates  ?  for  it  is  not  enough 
that  Socrates  died  a  more  noble  death,  and  dis- 
puted more  skilfully  with  the  sophists,  and  passed 
the  night  in  the  cold  with  more  endurance,  and 
that  when  he  was  bid  to  arrest  Leon  of  Salamis, 
he  considered  it  more  noble  to  refuse,  and  that  he 
walked  in  a  swaggering  way  in  the  streets  — 
though  as  to  this  one  may  have  great  doubts  if  it 
was  true.  But  we  ought  to  inquire,  what  kind 
of  a  soul  it  was  that  Socrates  possessed,  and  if  he 
was  able  to  be  content  with  being  just  towards 
men  and  pious  towards  the  gods,  neither  idly 
vexed  on  account  of  men's  villany,  nor  yet  mak- 
ing himself  a  slave  to  any  man's  ignorance,  nor 
receiving  as  strange  anything  that  fell  to  his 

15  I  have  followed  Gataker's  conjecture  ol  uKavdpwro 
instead  of  the  MSS.  reading  ol  avSpomoi. 


I 

ill.  ANTONINUS.    VII.  201 

share  out  of  the  universal  nor  enduring  it  as 
intolerable,  nor  allowing  his  understanding  to 
sympathize  with  the  affects  of  the  miserable  flesh 

67.  Nature  has  not  so  mingled  f  [the  intelli- 
gence] with  the  composition  of  the  body,  as  not 
to  have  allowed  thee  the  power  of  circumscribing 
thyself  and  of  bringing  under  subjection  to  thyself 
all  that  is  thy  own  ;  for  it  is  very  possible  to  be  a 
divine  man  and  to  be  recognized  as  such  by  no 
one.  Always  bear  this  in  mind ;  and  another 
thing  too,  that  very  little  indeed  is  necessary  for 
living  a  happy  life.  And  because  thou  hast  de- 
spaired of  becoming  a  dialectician  and  skilled  in 
the  knowledge  of  nature,  do  not  for  this  reason 
renounce  the  hope  of  being  both  free  and  modest 
and  social  and  obedient  to  god. 

68.  It  is  in  thy  power  to  live  free  from  all  com- 
pulsion in  the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind,  even 
if  all  the  world  cry  out  against  thee  as  much  as 

hey  choose,  and  even  if  wild  beasts  tear  in  pieces 
the  members  of  this  kneaded  matter  which  has 
grown  around  thee.  For  what  hinders  the  mind 
in  the  midst  of  all  this  from  maintaining  itself  in 
tranquillity  and  in  a  just  judgment  of  all  sur- 
rounding things  and  in  a  ready  use  of  the  objects 
which  are  presented  to  it,  so  that  the  judgment 
may  say  to  the  thing  which  falls  under  its  obser- 


202       M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


vation ;  This  thou  art  in  substance  [reality], 
though  in  men's  opinion  thou  mayst  appear  to  be 
of  a  different  kind  ;  and  the  use  shall  say  to  that 
which  falls?  under  the  hand  :  Thou  art  the  thing 
that  I  was  seeking ;  for  to  me  that  which  pre- 
sents itself  is  always  a  material  for  virtue  both 
rational  and  political,  and  in  a  word  for  the  exer- 
cise of  art  which  belongs  to  man  or  god.  For 
everything  which  happens  has  a  relationship 
either  to  god  or  man,  and  is  neither  new  nor 
difficult  to  handle,  but  usual  and  apt  matter  to 
work  on. 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  consists 
in  this,  in  passing  every  day  as  the  last,  and  in 
being  neither  violently  excited  nor  torpid  nor 
playing  the  hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not  vexed 
because  during  so  long  a  time  they  must  tolerate 
continually  men  such  as  they  are  and  so  many  of 
them  bad ;  and  besides  this  they  also  take  care 
of  them  in  all  ways.  But  thou,  who  art  destined 
to  end  so  soon,  art  thou  wearied  of  enduring  the 
bad,  and  this  too  when  thou  art  one  of  them  ? 

71.  It  is  a  ridiculous  thing  for  a  man  not  to  fly 
from  his  own  badness,  which  is  indeed  possible, 
but  to  fly  from  other  men's  badness,  which  is  im- 
possible. 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VII. 


203 


72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  political  [sociall 
faculty  finds  to  be  neither  intelligent  nor  social,  it 
properly  judges  to  be  inferior  to  itself. 

73.  When  thou  hast  done  a  good  act  and  an- 
other has  received  it,  why  dost  thou  still  look  for 
a  third  thing  besides  these,  as  fools  do,  either  to 
have  the  reputation  of  having  done  a  good  act  or 
to  obtain  a  return  ? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is  use- 
ful. But  it  is  useful  to  act  according  to  nature. 
Do  not  then  be  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful 
by  doing  it  to  others. 

75.  The  nature  of  the  All  moved  to  make  the 
universe.  But  now  either  everything  that  takes 
place  comes  by  way  of  consequence  [or  continu- 
ity] ;  or  even  the  chief  things  towards  which  the 
ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs  its  own  move- 
ment are  governed  by  no  rational  principle.  If 
this  is  remembered  it  will  make  thee  more  tran- 
quil in  many  things,    (ix.  21,  vi.  44.)  16 

16  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  this  section.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  there  is  some  error  in  rj  aMyiara,  &c. 
Some  of  the  translators  have  made  nothing  of  the  pas- 
sage, and  they  have  somewhat  perverted  the  words. 
The  first  proposition  is,  that  the  universe  was  made  by 
some  sufficient  power.  A  beginning  of  the  universe  is 
assumed,  and  a  power  which  framed  an  order.  The 


204 


M.  ANT  ON1NUS.  VII, 


next  question  is,  How  are  things  produced  now ;  or  in 
other  words,  by  what  power  do  forms  appear  in  continu- 
ous succession  %  The  answer,  according  to  Antoninus, 
may  be  this  :  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  original  constitution 
of  things  that  all  change  and  succession  have  been 
effected  and  are  effected.  And  this  is  intelligible  in  a 
sense,  if  we  admit  that  the  universe  is  always  one  and 
the  same,  a  continuity  of  identity  ;  as  much  one  and 
the  same  as  man  is  one  and  the  same,  which  he  believes 
himself  to  be,  though  he  also  believes  and  cannot  help 
believing  that  both  in  his  body  and  in  his  thoughts  there 
is  :hange  and  succession.  There  is  no  real  discontinu- 
ity then  in  the  universe  ;  and  if  we  say  that  there  was 
an  order  framed  in  the  beginning  and  that  the  things 
which  are  now  produced  are  a  consequence  of  a  pre- 
vious arrangement,  we  speak  of  things  as  we  are  com- 
pelled to  view  them,  as  forming  a  series  or  succession  ; 
just  as  we  speak  of  the  changes  in  our  own  bodies  and 
the  sequence  of  our  own  thoughts.  But  as  there  are 
no  intervals,  not  even  intervals  infinitely  small,  between 
any  two  supposed  states  of  any  one  thing,  so  there  are 
no  intervals,  not  even  infinitely  small,  between  what  we 
call  one  thing  and  any  other  thing  which  we  speak  of 
as  immediately  preceding  or  following  it.  What  we  call 
time  is  an  idea  derived  from  our  notion  of  a  succession 
of  things  or  events,  an  idea  which  is  a  part  of  our  con- 
stitution, but  not  an  idea  which  we  can  suppose  to  be- 
long to  an  infinite  intelligence  and  power.  The  conclu- 
sion then  is  certain  that  the  present  and  the  past,  the 
production  of  present  things  and  the  supposed  original 
order,  out  of  which  we  say  that  present  things  now 
come,  are  one  :  and  the  present  productive  power  and 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VII.  205 


the  so-called  past  arrangement  are  only  different  names 
for  one  thing.  I  suppose  then  that  Antoninus  wrote 
here  as  people  sometimes  talk  now,  and  that  his  real 
meaning  is  not  exactly  expressed  hy  his  words.  There 
are  certainly  other  passages  from  which,  I  think,  that 
we  may  collect  that  he  had  notions  of  production  some- 
thing like  what  I  have  expressed. 

We  now  come  to  the  alternative:  "or  even  the  chief 

things  principle."    I  do  not  exactly  know  what 

he  means  by  ra  Kvpiurara,  "  the  chief,"  or,  "  the  most 
excellent,"  or  whatever  it  is.  But  as  he  speaks  else- 
where of  inferior  and  superior  things,  and  of  the  infe- 
rior being  for  the  use  of  the  superior,  and  of  rational 
beings  being  the  highest,  he  may  here  mean  rational 
beings.  He  also  in  this  alternative  assumes  a  governing 
power  of  the  universe,  and  that  it  acts  by  directing  its 
power  towards  these  chief  objects,  or  making  its  special, 
proper,  motion  towards  them.  And  here  he  uses  the 
noun  {opfirj)  "  movement,"  which  contains  the  same 
notion  as  the  verb  (upfi^ae)  "moved,"  which  he  used  at 
the  beginning  of  the  paragraph  when  he  was  speaking 
of  the  making  of  the  universe.  If  we  do  not  accept  the 
first  hypothesis,  he  says,  we  must  take  the  conclusion 
of  the  second,  that  the  "  chief  things  towards  which  the 
ruling  power  of  the  universe  makes  a  movement  are 
directed  by  no  rational  principle."  The  meaning  then 
is,  if  there  is  a  meaning  in  it,  that  though  there  is  a 
governing  power,  which  strives  to  give  effect  to  its 
efforts,  we  must  conclude  that  there  is  no  rational  direc- 
tion of  anything,  if  the  power  which  first  made  the  uni- 
verse does  not  in  some  way  govern  it  still.  Besides,  if 
we  assume  that  anything  is  now  produced  or  now  exists 


206 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


VII. 


without  the  action  of  the  supreme  intelligence,  and  yet 
that  this  intelligence  makes  an  effort  to  act,  we  obtain  a 
conclusion  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  nature 
of  a  supreme  power,  whose  existence  Antoninus  always 
assumes.  The  tranquillity  that  a  man  may  gain  from 
these  reflections  must  result  from  his  rejecting  the  sec- 
ond hypothesis,  and  accepting  the  first ;  whatever  may 
be  the  exact  sense  in  which  the  emperor  understood  the 
first.  Or,  as  he  says  elsewhere,  if  there  is  no  provi- 
dence which  governs  the  world,  man  has  at  least  the 
power  of  governing  himself  according  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  his  nature ;  and  so  he  may  be  tranquil,  if  he 
does  the  best  that  he  can. 

If  there  is  no  error  in  the  passage,  it  is  worth  the 
labor  to  discover  the  writer's  exact  meaning ;  for  I  think 
that  he  had  a  meaning,  though  people  may  not  agree 
what  it  was.  (Compare  ix.  28.)  If  I  have  rightly  ex- 
plained the  emperor's  meaning  in  this  and  other  pas 
sages,  he  has  touched  the  solution  of  a  great  question. 


VIII. 


HIS  reflection  also  tends  to  the  re- 
moval of  the  desire  of  empty  fame,  > 
that  it  is  no  longer  in  thy  power  to 
have  lived  the  whole  of  thy  life,  or 
at  least  thy  life  from  thy  yonth  upwards,  like  a 
philosopher  ;  but  both  to  many  others  and  to  thy- 
self it  is  plain  that  thou  art  far  from  philosophy. 
Thou  hast  fallen  into  disorder  then,  so  that  it  is 
no  longer  easy  for  thee  to  get  the  reputation  of  a 
philosopher ;  and  thy  plan  of  life  also  opposes  it. 
If  then  thou  hast  truly  seen  where  the  matter 
lies,  throw  away  the  thought,  How  thou  shalt 
seem  [to  others],  and  be  content  if  thou  shalt  live 
the  rest  of  thy  life  in  such  wise  as  thy  nature 
wills.  Observe  then  what  it  wills,  and  let  nothing 
else  distract  thee ;  for  thou  hast  had  experience 
of  many  wanderings  without  having  found  happi- 
ness anywhere,  not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in  wealth, 
nor  in  reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment,  nor  anywhere. 
Where  is  it  then  ?    In  doing  what  man's  nature 


208        M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


requires.  How  then  shall  a  man  do  this  ?  If  he 
has  principles  from  which  come  his  affects  and  his 
acts.  What  principles  ?  Those  which  relate  to 
good  and  bad  :  the  belief  that  there  is  nothing 
good  for  man,  which  does  not  make  him  just, 
temperate,  manly,  free  ;  and  that  there  is  nothing 
bad,  which  does  not  do  the  contrary  to  what  has 
been  mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  thyself, 
How  is  this  with  respect  to  me  ?  Shall  I  repent 
of  it  ?  A  little  time  and  I  am  dead,  and  all  is 
gone.  What  more  do  I  seek,  if  what  I  am  now 
doing  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  living  being, 
and  a  social  being,  and  one  who  is  under  the  same 
law  with  god  ? 

3.  Alexander  and  Caius  and  Pompeius,  what 
are  they  in  comparison  with  Diogenes  and  Hera- 
clitus  and  Socrates  ?  For  they  were  acquainted 
with  things,  and  their  causes  [forms],  and  their 
matter,  and  the  ruling  principles  of  these  men 
were  the  same  [or  conformable  to  their  pursuits]. 
But  as  to  the  others,  how  many  things  had  they 
to  care  for,  and  to  how  many  things  were  they 
slaves. 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same  things 
nevertheless,  even  though  thou  shouldst  burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing :  Be  not  perturbed, 


M.  ANTONINUS.     VIII.  209 


for  all  things  are  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
universal ;  and  in  a  little  time  thou  wilt  be  nobody 
and  nowhere,  like  Hadrianus  and  Augustus.  It 
the  next  place  having  fixed  thy  eyes  steadily  on 
thy  business  look  at  it,  and  at  the  same  time 
remembering  that  it  is  thy  duty  to  be  a  good 
man,  and  what  man's  nature  demands,  do  it  with- 
out turning  aside  ;  and  speak  as  it  seems  to  thee 
most  just,  only  let  it  be  with  good  temper  and 
with  modesty  and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work 
to  do,  to  remove  to  that  place  the  things  which 
are  in  this,  to  change  them,  to  take  them  away 
here  and  to  carry  them  there.  All  things  are 
change,  yet  we  need  not  fear  anything  new.  All 
things  are  familiar  [to  us]  ;  but  the  distribution 
of  them  also  remains  the  same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself  when 
it  goes  on  its  way  well ;  and  a  rational  nature 
goes  on  its  way  well,  when  in  its  thoughts  it 
assents  to  nothing  false  or  uncertain,  and  when  it 
directs  its  movements  to  social  acts  only,  and 
when  it  confines  its  desires  and  aversions  to  the 
things  which  are  in  its  power,  and  when  it  is  sat- 
isfied with  everything  that  is  assigned  to  it  by  the 
common  nature.  For  of  this  common  nature 
every  particular  nature  is  a  part,  as  the  nature 

14 


210      M .  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


of  the  leaf  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  plant ; 
except  that  in  the  plant  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is 
part  of  a  nature  which  has  not  perception  or 
reason,  and  is  subject  to  be  impeded ;  but  the 
nature  of  man  is  part  of  a  nature  which  is  not 
subject  to  impediments,  and  is  intelligent  and 
just,  since  it  gives  to  everything  in  equal  portions 
and  according  to  its  worth  times,  substance,  cause 
[form],  activity,  and  incident.  But  examine,  not 
to  discover  that  any  one  thing  compared  with  any 
other  single  thing  is  equal  in  all  respects,  but  by 
taking  all  the  parts  together  of  one  thing  and 
comparing  them  with  all  the  parts  together  of 
another. 

8.  Thou  hast  not  leisure  [or  ability]  to  read. 
But  thou  hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  arro- 
gance :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  pleasure 
and  pain  :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  love 
of  fame,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  stupid  and  un- 
grateful people,  nay  even  to  care  for  them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding 
fault  with  the  court  life  or  with  thy  own.  (v.  16.) 

10.  Repentance  is  a  kind  of  self-reproof  for 
having  neglected  something  useful ;  but  that 
which  is  good  must  be  something  useful,  and  the 
perfect  good  man  should  look  after  it.  But  no 
such  man  would  ever  repent  of  having  refused 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VIII.  211 


any  sensual  pleasure.  Pleasure  then  is  neither 
good  nor  useful. 

11.  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own 
constitution  ?  What  is  its  substance  and  mate- 
rial ?  And  what  its  causal  nature  [or  form]  ? 
And  what  is  it  doing  in  the  world  ?  And  how 
long  does  it  subsist  ? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluc- 
tance, remember  that  it  is  according  to  thy  con- 
stitution and  according  to  human  nature  to  per- 
form social  acts,  but  sleeping  is  common  also  to 
irrational  animals.  But  that  which  is  according 
to  each  individual's  nature,  is  also  more  peculiarly 
its  own,  and  more  suitable  to  its  nature,  and 
indeed  also  more  agreeable. 

13.  Constantly,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the 
occasion  of  every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply  to 
it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Moral  and  of  Dia- 
lectic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  imme- 
diately say  to  thyself :  What  opinions  has  this 
man  about  good  and  bad  ?  For  if  with  respect 
to  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  causes  of  each,  and 
with  respect  to  fame  and  ignominy,  death  and 
life  he  has  such  and  such  opinions,  it  will  seem 
nothing  wonderful  or  strange  to  me.  if  he  does 
such  and  such  things;  and  I  shall  bear  in  mind 
that  he  is  compelled  to  do  so. 


212       M.  ANTONINUS,  VIII. 


15.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a  shame  to  be  sur- 
mised if  the  fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to  be 
surprised  if  the  world  produces  such  and  such 
things  of  which  it  is  productive  ;  and  for  the 
physician  and  the  helmsman  it  is  a  shame  to  be 
surprised,  if  a  man  has  a  fever,  or  if  the  wind  is 
unfavorable. 

16.  Remember  that  to  change  thy  opinion  and 
to  follow  him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as  consist- 
ent with  freedom  as  it  is  to  persist  in  thy  error. 
For  it  is  thy  own,  the  activity  which  is  exerted 
according  to  thy  own  movement  and  judgment, 
and  indeed  according  to  thy  own  understanding 
too. 

17.  If  a  thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost 
thou  do  it  ?  but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another, 
whom  dost  thou  blame  ?  the  atoms  [chance]  or 
the  gods  ?  Both  are  foolish.  Thou  must  blame 
nobody.  For  if  thou  canst,  correct  [that  which  is 
the  cause]  ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  this,  correct 
at  least  the  thing  itself ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do 
even  this,  of  what  use  is  it  to  thee  to  find  fault  ? 
for  nothing  should  be  done  without  a  purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  died  falls  not  out  of  the 
universe.  If  it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here, 
and  is  dissolved  into  its  proper  parts,  which  are 
elements  of  the  universe  and  of  thyself.  And 
these  too  change,  and  they  murmur  not. 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


VIII. 


213 


19.  Everything  exists  for  some  end,  a  horse,  a 
vine.  Why  dost  thou  wonder  ?  Even  the  sun 
will  say,  I  am  for  some  purpose,  and  the  rest  of 
the  gods  will  say  the  same.  For  what  purpose 
then  art  thou  ?  to  enjoy  pleasure  ?  See  if  com 
mon  sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  everything  no 
less  to  the  end  than  to  the  beginning  and  the  con- 
tinuance, just  like  the  man  who  throws  up  a  ball. 
What  good  is  it  then  for  the  ball  to  be  thrown 
up,  or  harm  for  it  to  come  down,  or  even  to  have 
fallen  ?  and  what  good  is  it  to  the  bubble  while  it 
holds  together,  or  what  harm  when  it  is  burst? 
The  same  may  be  said  of  a  light  also. 

21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see 
what  kind  of  thing  it  is  ;  and  when  it  has  grown 
old,  what  kind  of  thing  it  becomes,  and  when  it  is 
diseased. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the 
praised,  and  the  rememberer  and  the  remem- 
bered :  and  all  this  in  a  nook  of  this  part  of  the 
world ;  and  not  even  here  do  all  agree,  no  not 
any  one  with  himself :  and  the  whole  earth  too  is 
a  point. 

22.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  thee, 
whether  it  is  an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly :  for  thou  choosest 


214 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


rather  to  become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be  good 
to-day. 

23.  Am  I  doing  anything  ?  I  do  it  with  refer- 
ence to  the  good  of  mankind.  Does  anything 
happen  to  me  ?  I  receive  it  and  refer  it  to  the 
gods,  and  the  source  of  all  things,  from  which  all 
that  happens  is  derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathing  appears  to  thee  —  oil, 
sweat,  dirt,  filthy  water,  all  things  disgusting,  — 
so  is  every  part  of  life  and  everything. 

25.  Lucilla  saw  Verus  die,  and  then  Lucilla 
died.  Secunda  saw  Maximus  die,  and  then  Se- 
cunda  died.  Epitynchanus  saw  Diotimus  die, 
and  then  Epitynchanus  died.  Antoninus  saw 
Faustina  die,  and  then  Antoninus  died.  Such  is 
everything.  Celer  saw  Hadrianus  die,  and  then 
Celer  died.  And  those  sharp-witted  men,  either 
seers  or  men  inflated  with  pride,  where  are  they  ? 
for  instance  the  sharp-witted  men,  Charax  and 
Demetrius  the  Platonist  and  Eudaemon,  and  any 
one  else  like  them.  All  ephemeral,  dead  long 
ago.  Some  indeed  have  not  been  remembered 
even  for  a  short  time,  and  others  have  become  the 
heroes  of  fables,  and  again  others  have  disappeared 
even  from  fables.  Remember  this  then,  that  this 
little  compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved, 
or  thy  poor  breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be 
removed  and  placed  elsewhere. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VIII.  215 


26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a  man  to  do  the  proper 
works  of  a  man.  Now  it  is  a  proper  work  of  a 
man  to  be  benevolent  to  his  own  kind,  to  despise 
the  movements  of  the  senses,  to  form  a  just  judg- 
ment of  plausible  appearances,  and  to  take  a 
survey  of  the  nature  of  the  universe  and  of  the 
things  which  happen  in  it. 

27.  There  are  three  relations  [between  thee 
and  other  things] :  the  one  to  the  body 1  which 
surrounds  thee ;  the  second  to  the  divine  cause 
from  which  all  things  come  to  all ;  and  the  third 
to  those  who  live  with  thee. 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  body  —  then 
let  the  body  say  what  it  thinks  of  it  —  or  to  the 
soul ;  but  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  soul  to  main- 
tain its  own  serenity  and  tranquillity,  and  not  to 
think  that  pain  is  an  evil.  For  every  judgment 
and  movement  and  desire  and  aversion  is  within, 
and  no  evil  ascends  so  high. 

29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often  saying 
to  thyself :  now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let  no  bad- 
ness be  in  this  soul,  nor  desire  nor  any  perturba- 
tion at  all ;  but  looking  at  all  things  I  see  what  is 

1  The  text  has  alnov  which  in  Antoninus  means  "form," 
"  formal."  Accordingly  Schulze  recommends  either 
Valkenaer's  emendation  uyyelov,  "  body,"  or  Corae's 
ifufiunov.    Compare  xu.  13,  x.  38. 


216 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


VIII. 


their  nature,  and  I  use  each  according  to  its  value. 
—  Remember  this  power  which  thou  hast  from 
nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  senate  and  to  every 
man,  whoever  he  may  be,  appropriately,  not  with 
any  affectation  :  use  plain  discourse. 

31.  Augustus'  court,  wife,  daughter,  descend- 
ants, ancestors,  sister,  Agrippa,  kinsmen,  inti- 
mates, friends,  Arius,  Maecenas,  physicians  and 
sacrificing  priests  —  the  whole  court  is  dead. 
Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not  considering  the  death 
of  a  single  man,  [but  of  a  whole  race,]  as  of  the 
Pompeii ;  and  that  which  is  inscribed  on  the  tombs, 
The  last  of  his  race.  Consider  what  trouble  those 
before  them  have  had  that  they  might  leave  a 
successor ;  and  then,  that  of  necessity  some  one 
must  be  the  last.  Again  here  consider  the  death 
of  a  whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in  every 
single  act ;  and  if  every  act  does  its  duty,  as  far 
as  is  possible,  be  content ;  and  no  one  is  able  to 
hinder  thee  so  that  each  act  shall  not  do  its  duty  — 
But  something  external  will  stand  in  the  way  — 
Nothing  will  stand  in  the  way  of  thy  acting  justly 
and  soberly  and  considerately  —  But  perhaps  some 
other  active  power  will  be  hindered  — Well,  but  by 
acquiescing  in  the  hindrance  and  by  being  content 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


217 


to  transfer  thy  efforts  to  that  which  is  allowed, 
another  opportunity  of  action  is  immediately  put 
before  thee  in  place  of  that  which  was  hindered, 
and  one  which  will  adapt  itself  to  this  order  of 
which  we  are  speaking. 

33.  Receive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without 
arrogance ;  and  be  ready  to  let  it  go. 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a  hand  cut  off,  or  a 
foot,  or  a  head,  lying  anywhere  apart  from  the 
rest  of  the  body,  such  does  a  man  make  himself, 
as  far  as  he  can,  who  is  not  content  with  what 
happens,  and  separates  himself  from  others,  or 
does  anything  unsocial.  Suppose  that  thou  hast 
detached  thyself  from  the  natural  unity  —  for 
thou  wast  made  by  nature  a  part,  but  now  thou 
hast  cut  thyself  off  —  yet  here  there  is  this 
beautiful  provision,  that  it  is  in  thy  power  again  to 
unite  thyself.  God  has  allowed  this  to  no  other 
part,  after  it  has  been  separated  and  cut  asunder, 
to  come  together  again.  But  consider  the  benev- 
olence with  which  he  has  distinguished  man,  for 
he  has  put  it  in  his  power  not  to  be  separated  at 
all  from  the  universal ;  and  when  he  has  been 
separated,  he  has  allowed  him  to  return  and  to  be 
united  and  to  resume  his  place  as  a  part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given 
to  every  rational  being  all  the  other  powers  that 


218 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


it  has,f  so  we  have  received  from  it  this  power 
also.  For  as  the  universal  nature  converts  and 
fixes  in  its  predestined  place  everything  which 
stands  in  its  way  and  opposes  it,  and  makes  such 
things  a  part  of  itself,  so  also  the  rational  animal 
is  able  to  make  every  hindrance  its  own  material, 
and  to  use  it  for  such  purpose  as  it  may  have 
designed.2 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of  the 
whole  of  thy  life.  Let  not  thy  thoughts  at  once 
embrace  all  the  various  troubles  which  thou  mayst 
expect  to  befall  thee :  but  on  every  occasion  ask 
thyself,  What  is  there  in  this  which  is  intolerable 
and  past  bearing?  for  thou  wilt  be  ashamed  to 
confess.  In  the  next  place  remember  that  neither 
the  future  nor  the  past  pains  thee,  but  only  the 
present.  But  this  is  reduced  to  a  very  little,  if 
thou  only  circumscribest  it,  and  chidest  thy  mind, 
if  it  is  unable  to  hold  out  against  even  this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by  the 
tomb  of  Verus  ? 3  Does  Chaurias  or  Diotimus  sit 

2  The  text  is  corrupt  at  the  beginning  of  the  para- 
graph, but  the  meaning  will  appear  if  the  second  Iojlkuv 
is  changed  into  6Awv :  though  this  change  alone  will  not 
establish  the  grammatical  completeness  of  the  text. 

3  "  Verus  "  is  a  conjecture  of  Saumaise,  and  perhaps 
the  true  reading. 


M.   ANTONINUS.    VIII.  219 


by  the  tomb  of  Hadrianus  ?  That  would  be  ridic- 
ulous. Well,  suppose  they  did  sit  there,  would 
the  dead  be  conscious  of  it?  and  if  the  dead  were 
conscious,  would  they  be  pleased?  and  if  they 
were  pleased,  would  that  make  them  immortal  ? 
Was  it  not  in  the  order  of  destiny  that  these  per- 
sons too  should  become  old  women  and  old  men 
and  then  die  ?  What  then  would  those  do  after 
these  were  dead  ?  All  this  is  foul  smell  and 
blood  in  a  bag. 

38.  If  thou  canst  see  sharp,  look  and  judge 
wisely,f  savs  the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal  I 
see  no  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice  ;  but  I 
see  a  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  love  of  pleasure, 
and  that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about  that 
which  appears  to  give  thee  pain,  thou  thyself 
standest  in  perfect  security  —  Who  is  this  ?  self — 
The  reason  —  But  I  am  not  reason  —  Be  it  so. 
Let  then  the  reason  itself  not  trouble  itself.  But 
if  any  other  part  of  thee  suffers,  let  it  have  its 
own  opinion  about  itself,    (vn.  16.) 

41.  Hindrance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is 
an  evil  to  the  animal  nature  Hindrance  to  the 
movements  [desires]  is  equally  an  evil  to  the 
animal  nature.  And  something  else  also  is  equally 


220 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


VIII. 


an  impediment  and  an  evil  to  the  constitution  of 
plants.  So  then  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  the 
intelligence  is  an  evil  to  the  intelligent  nature. 
Apply  all  these  things  then  to  thyself.  Does  pain 
or  fensuous  pleasure  affect  thee  ?  The  senses  will 
look  to  that. —  Has  any  obstacle  opposed  thee  in 
thy  efforts  towards  an  object  ?  if  indeed  thou  wast 
making  this  effort  absolutely  [unconditionally,  or, 
without  any  reservation],  certainly  this  obstacle  is 
an  evil  to  thee  considered  as  a  rational  animal. 
But  if  thou  takest  [into  consideration]  the  usual 
course  of  things,  thou  hast  not  yet  been  injured 
nor  even  impeded.  The  things  however  which 
are  proper  to  the  understanding  no  one  is  used  to 
impede,  for  neither  fire  nor  iron  nor  tyrant  nor 
abuse  touches  it  in  any  way.  When  it  has  been 
made  a  sphere,  it  continues  a  sphere,    (xi.  12.) 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I  should  give  myself  pain, 
for  I  have  never  intentionally  given  pain  even  to 
another. 

43.  Different  things  delight  different  people. 
But  it  is  my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling  faculty 
sound  without  turning  away  either  from  any 
man  or  from  any  of  the  things  which  happen 
to  men,  but  looking  at  and  receiving  all  with 
welcome  eyes  and  using  everything  according  to 
its  value. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VIII.  221 


44.  See  that  thou  secure  this  present  time  to 
thyself :  for  those  who  rather  pursue  posthumous 
fame  do  not  consider  that  the  men  of  after  time 
will  be  exactly  such  as  these  whom  they  cannot 
bear  now ;  and  both  are  mortal.  And  what  is  it 
in  any  way  to  thee  if  these  men  of  after  time  utter 
this  or  that  sound  or  have  this  or  that  opinion 
about  thee  ? 

45.  Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt ;  for 
there  I  shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil,  that  is, 
content,  if  it  can  feel  and  act  conformably  to  its 
proper  constitution.  Is  this  [change  of  place] 
sufficient  reason  why  my  soul  should  be  unhappy 
and  worse  than  it  was,  depressed,  expanded, 
shrinking,  affrighted?  and  what  wilt  thou  find 
which  is  sufficient  reason  for  this  ?  4 

46.  Nothing  can  happen  to  any  man  which  is 
not  a  human  accident,  nor  to  an  ox  which  is  not 
according  to  the  nature  of  an  ox,  nor  to  a  vine 
which  is  not  according  to  the  nature  of  a  vine,  nor 
to  a  stone  which  is  not  proper  to  a  stone.  If  then 
there  happens  to  each  thing  both  what  is  usual 
and  natural,  why  shouldst  thou  complain  ?  For 

4  6pryo(j.iv7i  in  this  passage  seems  to  have  a  passive 
sense.  It  is  difficult  to  find  an  apt  expression  for  it  and 
some  of  the  other  words.  A  comparison  with  xi.  12. 
will  help  to  explain  the  meaning. 


222       M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


the  common  nature  brings  nothing  which  may  not 
be  borne  by  thee. 

47.  Jf  thou  art  pained  by  any  external  thing, 
it  is  not  this  thing  that  disturbs  thee,  but  thy  own 
judgment  about  it.  And  it  is  in  thy  power  to  wipe 
out  this  judgment  now.  But  if  anything  in  thy 
own  disposition  gives  thee  pain,  who  hinders  thee 
from  correcting  thy  opinion  ?  And  even  if  thou 
art  pained  because  thou  art  not  doing  some  partic- 
ular thing  which  seems  to  thee  to  be  right,  why 
dost  thou  not  rather  act  than  complain  ?  —  But 
some  insuperable  obstacle  is  in  the  way  ?  —  Do 
not  be  grieved  then,  for  the  cause  of  its  not  being 
done  depends  not  on  thee  —  But  it  is  not  worth 
while  to  live,  if  this  cannot  be  done — Take  thy 
departure  then  from  life  contentedly,  just  as  he 
dies  who  is  in  full  activity,  and  well-pleased  too 
with  the  things  which  are  obstacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  invin- 
cible, when  self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with  itself, 
if  it  does  nothing  which  it  does  not  choose  to  do, 
even  if  it  resist  from  mere  obstinacy.  What  then 
will  it  be  when  it  forms  a  judgment  about  anything 
aided  by  reason  and  deliberately?  therefore  the 
mind  which  is  free  from  passions  is  a  citadel,  for 
man  has  nothing  more  secure  to  which  he  can  fly 
for  refuge  and  for  the  future  be  inexpugnable. 


M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


223 


He  then  who  has  not  seen  this  is  an  ignorant  man  ; 
but  he  who  has  seen  it  and  does  not  fly  to  this 
refuge  is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thyself  than  what  the 
first  appearances  report.  Suppose  that  it  has  been 
reported  to  thee  that  a  certain  person  speaks  ill  of 
thee.  This  has  been  reported ;  but  that  thou  hast 
been  injured,  that  has  not  been  reported.  I  see 
that  my  child  is  sick.  I  do  see  ;  but  that  he  is  in 
danger,  I  do  not  see.  Thus  then  always  abide  by 
the  first  appearances,  and  add  nothing  thyself  from 
within,  and  then  nothing  happens  to  thee.  Or 
rather  add  something,  like  a  man  who  knows 
everything  that  happens  in  the  world. 

50.  A  cucumber  is  bitter  —  Throw  it  away.  — 
There  are  briers  in  the  road  —  Turn  aside  from 
them.  —  This  is  enough.  Do  not  add,  And  why 
were  such  things  made  in  the  world  ?  For  thou 
wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a  man  who  is  acquainted  with 
nature,  as  thou  wouldst  be  ridiculed  by  a  carpenter 
and  shoemaker  if  thou  didst  find  fault  because 
thou  seest  in  their  workshop  shavings  and  cuttings 
from  the  things  which  they  make.  And  yet  they 
have  places  into  which  they  can  throw  these 
shavings  and  cuttings;  but  the  universal  nature 
has  no  external  space  ;  now  the  wondrous  part  of 
her  art  is  that  though  she  has  circumscribed  her- 


224       M.   ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


self,  everything  within  her  which  appears  to  decay 
and  to  grow  old  and  to  be  useless  she  changes  into 
herself,  and  again  makes  other  new  things  from 
these  very  same,  so  that  she  requires  neither  sub- 
stance from  without  nor  wants  a  place  into  which 
she  may  cast  that  which  decays.  She  is  content 
then  with  her  own  space,  and  her  own  matter  and 
her  own  art. 

51.  Neither  in  thy  actions  be  sluggish  nor  in 
thy  conversation  without  method,  nor  wandering 
in  thy  thoughts,  nor  let  there  be  in  thy  soul  in- 
ward contention  nor  external  effusion,  nor  in  life 
be  so  busy  as  to  have  no  leisure. 

]/  Suppose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in  pieces, 
curse  thee.  What  then  can  these  things  do  to 
prevent  thy  mind  from  remaining  pure,  wise,  sober, 
just  ?  For  instance,  if  a  man  should  stand  by  a 
limpid  pure  spring,  and  curse  it,  the  spring  never 
ceases  sending  up  potable  water  ;  and  if  he  should 
cast  clay  into  it  or  filth,  it  will  speedily  disperse 
them  and  wash  them  out,  and  will  not  be  at  all 
polluted.  How  then  shalt  thou  possess  a  per- 
petual fountain  [and  not  a  mere  well]  ?  By 
forming  thyself  hourly  to  freedom  conjoined  with 
benevolence,  simplicity,  and  modesty. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world  is, 
does  not  know  where  he  is.    And  he  who  does 


M.  ANTONINUS.    VIII.  225 


not  know  for  what  purpose  the  world  exists,  does 
not  know  who  he  is,  nor  what  the  world  is.  But 
he  who  has  failed  in  any  one  of  these  things  could 
not  even  say  for  what  purpose  he  exists  himself. 
What  then  dost  thou  think  of  him  who  [avoids  or] 
seeks  the  praise  of  those  who  applaud,  of  men  who 
know  not  either  where  they  are  or  who  they  are. 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a  man  who 
curses  himself  thrice  every  hour  ?  wouldst  thou 
wish  to  please  a  man  who  does  not  please  himself? 
Does  a  man  please  himself  who  repents  of  nearly 
everything  that  he  does  ? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in 
concert  with  the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but  let 
thy  intelligence  also  now  be  in  harmony  with  the 
intelligence  which  embraces  all  things.  For  the 
intelligent  power  is  no  less  diffused  in  all  parts  and 
pervades  all  things  for  him  who  is  willing  to  draw 
it  to  him  than  the  aerial  power  for  him  who  is  able 
to  respire  it. 

55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all 
to  the  universe  ;  and  particularly,  the  wickedness 
[of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to  another.  It  is  only 
harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his  power  to  be  re- 
Leased  from  it,  as  soon  as  he  shall  choose. 

56.  To  my  own  free  will  the  free  will  of  my 
neighbor  is  just  as  indifferent  as  his  breath  and 

15 


226        M.  ANTONINUS.  VIII. 


his  flesh.  For  though  we  are  made  especially  for 
the  sake  of  one  another,  still  the  ruling  power  of 
each  of  us  has  its  own  office,  for  otherwise  my 
neighbor's  wickedness  would  be  my  harm,  which 
god  lias  not  willed  in  order  that  my  unhappiness 
may  not  depend  on  another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and  in 
all  directions  indeed  it  is  diffused,  yet  it  is  not  ef- 
fused.   For  this  diffusion  is  extension  :  Accord- 
ingly its  rays  are  called  Extensions  [axru/esj  be- 
cause they  are  extended  [0.77-6  ttov  iKruvecrOai].5 
But  one  may  judge  what  kind  of  a  thing  a  ray  is, 
if  he  looks  at  the  sun's  light  passing  through  a 
narrow  opening  into  a  darkened  room,  for  it  is  ex- 
tended in  a  right  line,  and  as  it  were  is  divided 
when  it  meets  with  a  solid  body  which  stands  in 
the  way  and  intercepts  the  air  beyond ;  but  there 
the  light  remains  fixed  and  does  not  glide  or  fall 
off.    Such  then  ought  to  be  the  outpouring  and 
diffusion  of  the  understanding,  and  it  should  in  no 
way  be  an  effusion,  but  an  extension,  and  it  should 
make  no  violent  or  impetuous  collision  with  the 
obstacles  which  are  in  its  way  ;  nor  yet  fall  down, 
but  be  fixed  and  enlighten  that  which  receives  it. 
For  a  body  will  deprive  itself  of  the  illumination, 
if  it  does  not  admit  it. 

6  A  piece  of  bad  etymology. 


M .  ANTONINUS.    VIII.  227 


58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss  of 
sensation  or  a  different  kind  of  sensation.  But  if 
thou  shalt  have  no  sensation,  neither  wilt  thou  feel 
any  harm  ;  and  if  thou  shalt  acquire  another  kind 
of  sensation,  thou  wilt  be  a  different  kind  of  living 
being  and  thou  wilt  not  cease  to  live. 

59.  Men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 
Teach  them  then  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  In  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another  way 
the  mind.  The  mind  indeed,  both  when  it  exer- 
cises caution  and  when  it  is  employed  about  in- 
quiry, moves  straight  onward  not  the  less,  and  to 
its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every  man's  ruling  faculty;  and 
also  let  every  other  man  enter  into  thine. 


IX. 

E  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously. 
For  since  the  universal  nature  has 
made  rational  animals  for  the  sake 
of  one  another  to  help  one  another 
according  to  their  deserts,  but  in  no  way  to  injure 
one  another,  he  who  transgresses  her  will,  is  clearly 
guilty  of  impiety  towards  the  highest  divinity. 
And  he  too  who  lies  is  guilty  of  impiety  to  the  same 
divinity ;  for  the  universal  nature  is  the  nature  of 
all  things  that  are  ;  and  all  things  that  are  have  a 
relation  to  all  things  that  come  into  existence. 
And  further,  this  universal  nature  is  named  truth 
and  is  the  prime  cause  of  all  things  that  are  true. 
He  then  who  lies  intentionally  is  guilty  of  impiety 
inasmuch  as  he  acts  unjustly  by  deceiving ;  and  he 
also  who  lies  unintentionally,  inasmuch  as  he  is  at 
variance  with  the  universal  nature,  and  inasmuch 
as  he  disturbs  the  order  by  fighting  against  the 
nature  of  the  world  ;  for  he  fights  against  it,  who  is 
moved  of  himself  to  that  which  is  contrary  to  truth, 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


IX. 


229 


for  he  had  received  powers  from  nature  through  the 
neglect  of  which  he  is  not  able  now  to  distinguish 
falsehood  from  truth.  And  indeed  he  who  pursues 
pleasure  as  good,  and  avoids  pain  as  evil  is  guilty 
of  impiety.  For  of  necessity  such  a  man  must 
often  find  fault  with  the  universal  nature,  alleging 
that  it  assigns  things  to  the  bad  and  the  good  con- 
trary to  their  deserts,  because  frequently  the  bad 
are  in  the  enjoyment  of  pleasure  and  possess  the 
things  which  procure  pleasure,  but  the  good  have 
pain  for  their  share  and  the  things  which  cause 
pain.  And  further,  he  who  is  afraid  of  pain  will 
sometimes  also  be  afraid  of  some  of  the  things 
which  will  happen  in  the  world,  and  even  this  is 
impiety.  And  he  who  pursu§£_4>leasure  will  not 
abstain  from  injustice,  and  this  is  plainly  impiety. 
Now  with  respect  to  the  things  towards  which  the 
universal  nature  is  equally  affected,  —  for  it  would 
not  have  made  both,  unless  it  was  equally  affected 
towards  both,  —  towards  these  they  who  wish  to 
follow  nature  should  be  of  the  same  mind  with  it, 
and  equally  affected.  With  respect  to  pain  then 
and  pleasure  or  death  and  life  or  honor  and  dis- 
honor, which  the  universal  nature  employs  equally, 
whoever  is  not  equally  affected  is  manifestly  acting 
impiously.  And  I  say  that  the  universal  nature 
employs  them  equally,  instead  of  saying  that  they 


230         M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


happen  alike  to  those  who  are  produced  in  con 
tinuous  series  and  to  those  who  come  after  them 
by  virtue  of  a  certain  original  movement  of  provi- 
dence, according  to  which  it  moved  from  a  certain 
beginning  to  this  ordering  of  things,  having  con- 
ceived certain  reasons  of  the  things  which  were  to 
be,  and  having  determined  generative  powers  of 
substances  and  changes  and  such  like  succes- 
sions. 

2.  It  would  be  a  man's  happiest  lot  to  depart 
from  mankind  without  having  had  any  taste  of 
lying  and  hypocrisy  and  luxury  and  pride.  How- 
ever to  breathe  out  one's  life  when  a  man  has  had 
enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best  voyage,  as 
the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  determined  to  abide 
with  vice,  and  has  not  experience  yet  induced 
thee  to  fly  from  this  pestilence  ?  For  the  de- 
struction of  the  understanding  is  a  pestilence, 
much  more  indeed  than  any  such  corruption  and 
change  of  this  atmosphere  which  surrounds  us. 
For  this  corruption  is  a  pestilence  of  animals  in 
so  far  as  they  are  animals  ;  but  the  other  is  a 
pestilence  of  men  in  so  far  as  they  are  men. 

3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content 
with  it,  since  this  too  is  one  of  those  things  which 
nature  wills.  For  such  as  it  is  to  be  young  and 
to  grow  old,  and  to  increase  and  to  reach  maturity, 


M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


231 


and  to  have  teeth  and  beard  and  gray  hairs,  and 
to  beget  and  to  be  pregnant  and  to  bring  forth, 
and  all  the  other  natural  operations  which  the 
seasons  of  thy  life  bring,  such  also  is  dissolution. 
This  then  is  consistent  with  the  character  of  a 
reflecting  man  to  be  neither  careless  nor  impa- 
tient nor  contemptuous  with  respect  to  death,  but 
to  wait  for  it  as  one  of  the  operations  of  nature. 
As  thou  now  waitest  for  the  time  when  the  child 
shall  come  out  of  thy  wife's  womb,  so  be  ready 
for  the  time  when  thy  soul  shall  fall  out  of  this 
envelope.  But  if  thou  requirest  also  a  vulgar 
kind  of  comfort  which  shall  reach  thy  heart,  thou 
wilt  be  made  best  reconciled  to  death  by  observ- 
ing the  objects  from  which  thou  art  going  to  be 
removed  and  the  morals  of  those  with  whom  thy 
soul  will  no  longer  be  mingled.  For  it  is  no  way 
right  to  be  offended  with  men,  but  it  is  thy  duty 
to  care  for  them  and  to  bear  with  them  gently  ; 
and  yet  to  remember  that  thy  departure  will  be 
not  from  men  who  have  the  same  principles  as 
thyself.  For  this  is  the  only  thing,  if  there  be 
any,  which  could  draw  us  the  contrary  way  and 
attach  us  to  life,  to  be  permitted  to  live  with 
those  who  have  the  same  principles  as  ourselves. 
But  now  thou  seest  how  great  is  the  trouble 
arising  from  the  discordance  of  those  who  live 


232  M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


together,  so  that  thou  mayst  say,  Come  quick,  0 
death,  lest  perchance  I  too  should  forget  myself. 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against 
himself.  He  who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly  to 
himself,  because  he  makes  himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a 
certain  thing ;  not  only  he  who  does  a  certain 
thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  understand- 
ing, and  thy  present  conduct  directed  to  social 
good,  and  thy  present  disposition  of  contentment 
with  everything  which  happens  f  —  that  is  enough. 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination :  check  desire :  ex- 
tinguish appetite  :  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its 
own  power.  "  "  -  - 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason 
one  life  is  distributed  ;  but  among  reasonable  ani- 
mals one  intelligent  soul  is  distributed  :  just  as 
there  is  one  earth  of  all  things  which  are  of  an 
earthy  nature,  and  we  see  by  one  light,  and 
breathe  one  air,  all  of  us  that  have  the  faculty  of 
vision  and  all  that  have  life. 

9.  All  things  which  participate  in  anything 
which  is  common  to  them  all  move  towards  that 
which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  themselves.  Ev- 
erything which  is  earthy  turns  towards  the  earth, 
everything  which  is  liquid  flows  together,  and 


M.  ANTONINUS.    IX.  233 


everything  which  is  of  an  aerial  kind  does  the 
same,  so  that  they  require  something  to  keep 
them  asunder  and  the  application  of  force.  Fire 
indeed  moves  upwards  on  account  of  the  elemental 
fire,  but  it  is  so  ready  to  be  kindled  together  with 
all  the  fire  which  is  here,  that  even  every  sub- 
stance which  is  somewhat  dry,  is  easily  ignited, 
because  there  is  less  mingled  with  it  of  that  which 
is  a  hindrance  to  ignition.  Accordingly  then 
everything  also  which  participates  in  the  common 
intelligent  nature  moves  in  like  manner  towards 
that  which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  itself,  or 
moves  even  more.  For  so  much  as  it  is  superior 
in  comparison  with  all  other  things,  in  the  same 
degree  also  is  it  more  ready  to  mingle  with  and 
to  be  fused  with  that  which  is  akin  to  it.  Accord- 
ingly among  animals  devoid  of  reason  we  find 
swarms  of  bees,  and  herds  of  cattle,  and  the 
nurture  of  young  birds,  and  in  a  manner,  loves  ; 
for  even  in  animals  there  are  souls,  and  that 
power  which  brings  them  together  is  seen  to 
exert  itself  in  the  superior  degree,  and  in  such  a 
way  as  never  has  been  observed  in  plants  nor  in 
stones  nor  in  trees.  But  in  rational  animals  there 
are  political  communities  and  friendships,  and 
families  and  meetings  of  people ;  and  in  wars 
treaties  and  armistices.    But  in  the  things  which 


234         M.   ANTONINUS.  IX. 


are  still  superior,  even  though  they  are  separated 
from  one  another,  unity  in  a  manner  exists,  as  in 
the  stars.  Thus  the  ascent  to  the  higher  degree 
is  able  to  produce  a  sympathy  even  in  things 
which  are  separated.  See  then  what  now  takes 
place.  For  only  intelligent  animals  have  now 
forgotten  this  mutual  desire  and  inclination, 
and  in  them  alone  the  property  of  flowing  to- 
gether is  not  seen.  But  still  though  men  strive 
to  avoid  [this  union],  they  are  caught  and  held 
by  it,  for  their  nature  is  too  strong  for  them  ;  and 
thou  wilt  see  what  I  say,  if  thou  only  observest. 
Sooner  then  will  one  find  anything  earthy  which 
comes  in  contact  with  no  earthy  thing  than  a 
man  altogether  separated  from  other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  god  and  the  universe  pro- 
duce fruit ;  at  the  proper  seasons  each  produces 
it.  But  if  usage  has  especially  fixed  these  terms 
to  the  vine  and  like  things,  this  is  nothing.  Rea- 
son produces  fruit  both  for  all  and  for  itself,  and 
there  are  produced  from  it  other  things  of  the 
same  kind  as  reason  itself. 

11.  If  thou  art  able,  correct  by  teaching  those 
who  do  wrong  ;  but  if  thou  canst  not,  remember 
that  indulgence  is  given  to  thee  for  this  purpose. 
And  the  gods  too  are  indulgent  to  such  persons  ; 
and  for  some  purposes  they  even  help  them  to  get 


M.  ANT  ONINUS.  IX. 


235 


health,  wealth,  reputation ;  so  kind  they  are. 
And  it  is  in  thy  power  also ;  or  say,  who  hinders 
thee  ? 

12.  Labor  not  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor  yet 
as  one  who  would  be  pitied  or  admired :  but 
direct  thy  will  to  one  thing  only,  to  put  thyself 
in  motion  and  to  check  thyself,  as  the  social 
reason  requires. 

13.  To-day  I  have  got  out  of  all  trouble,  or 
rather  I  have  cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not 
outside,  but  within  and  in  my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  ex- 
perience, and  ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless 
in  the  matter.  Everything  now  is  just  as  it  was 
in  the  time  of  those  whom  we  have  buried. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves  by 
themselves,  neither  knowing  aught  of  themselves, 
nor  expressing  any  judgment.  What  is  it  then 
which  does  judge  about  them  ?  The  ruling  fac- 
ulty. 

1 6.  Not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity  lie  the  evil 
and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as 
his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in 
activity. 

17.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up 
it  is  no  evil  to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good 
to  have  been  carried  up.    (vni.  20.) 


236         M.   ANTONINUS.  IX. 


18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men's  leading  prin- 
ciples, and  thou  wilt  see  what  judges  thou  art 
afraid  of,  and  what  kind  of  judges  they  are  of 
themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing:  and  thou  thyself 
art  in  continuous  mutation  and  in  a  manner  in 
continuous  destruction,  and  the  universe  too. 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man's 
wrongful  act  there  where  it  is.    (vn.  29,  ix.  38.) 

21.  Termination  of  activity,  cessation  from 
movement  and  opinion,  and  in  a  sense  their  death, 
is  no  evil.  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to  the  con- 
sideration of  thy  life,  thy  life  as  a  child,  as  a 
youth,  thy  manhood,  thy  old  age,  for  in  these  also 
every  change  was  a  death.  Is  this  anything  to 
fear  ?  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to  thy  life  under 
thy  grandfather,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy  mother, 
then  to  thy  life  under  thy  father ;  and  as  thou 
findest  many  other  differences  and  changes  and 
terminations,  ask  thyself,  Is  this  anything  to 
fear  ?  In  like  manner  then  neither  are  the  ter- 
mination and  cessation  and  change  of  thy  whole 
life  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of? 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling  fac- 
ulty and  that  of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy 
neighbor :  thy  own  that  thou  mayst  make  it 
just :  and  that  of  the  universe,  that  thou  mayst 


71/.   ANTONINUS.  IX. 


237 


remember  of  what  thou  art  a  part ;  and  that  of 
thy  neighbor,  that  thou  mayst  know  whether  he 
has  acted  ignorantly  or  with  knowledge,  and  that 
thou  mayst  also  consider  that  his  ruling  faculty  is 
akin  to  thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a  component  part  of  a 
social  system,  so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a  com- 
ponent part  of  social  life.  Whatever  act  of  thine 
then  has  no  reference  either  immediately  or  re- 
motely to  a  social  end,  this  tears  asunder  thy  life 
and  does  not  allow  it  to  be  one,  and  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  a  mutiny,  just  as  when  in  a  popular 
assembly  a  man  acting  by  himself  stands  apart 
from  the  general  agreement. 

24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their  sports,' 
and  poor  spirits  carrying  about  dead  bodies  [such 
is  everything]  ;  and  so  what  is  exhibited  in  the 
representation  of  the  mansions  of  the  dead  1  strikes 
our  eye#  more  clearly. 

25.  Examine  into  the  quality  of  the  form  of 
an  object,  and  detach  it  altogether  from  its  mate- 
rial part  and  then  contemplate  it ;  then  determine 
the  time,  the  longest  which  a  thing  of  this  peculiar 
form  is  naturally  made  to  endure. 

1  to  ttjq  NeKvtag  may  be,  as  Gataker  conjectures,  a 
dramatic  representation  of  the  state  of  the  dead.  Schulze 
supposes  that  it  may  be  also  a  reference  to  the  Neavia  of 
the  Odyssey  Uib.  xi.) 


238 


M.  ANTONINUS,  IX. 


26.  Thou  hast  endured  infinite  troubles  through 
not  being  contented  with  thy  ruling  faculty,  when 
it  does  t  he  things  which  it  is  constituted  by  nature 
to  do.    But  enough  [of  this]. 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee, 
or  when  men  say  about  thee  anything  injurious, 
approach  their  souls,  penetrate  within,  and  see 
what  kind  of  men  they  are.  Thou  wilt  discover 
that  there  is  no  reason  to  take  any  trouble  that 
these  men  may  have  this  or  that  opinion  about 
thee.  However  thou  must  be  well  disposed  tow- 
ards them,  for  by  nature  they  are  friends.  And 
the  gods  too  aid  them  in  all  ways,  by  dreams,  by 
signs,  towards  the  attainment  of  those  things  on 
which  they  set  a  value. 

28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe 
are  the  same,  up  and  down  from  age  to  age.  And 
either  the  universal  intelligence  puts  itself  in 
motion  for  every  separate  effect,  and  if  tkis  is  so, 
be  thou  content  with  that  which  is  the  result  of 
its  activity ;  or  it  put  itself  in  motion  once,  and 
everything  else  comes  by  way  of  sequence 2 
in  a  manner :  or  indivisible  elements  are  the 
origin  of  all  things. — In  a  word,  if  there  is  a  god, 

2  The  words  which  immediately  follow  /car'  kitanokov- 
drjoiv  are  corrupt.  But  the  meaning  is  hardly  doubtful. 
(Compare  vn.  75.) 


M.ANTONINUS.    IX.  239 


all  is  well ;  and  if  chance  rules,  do  not  thou  also 
be  governed  by  it. 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all :  then  the  earth 
too  will  change,  and  the  things  also  which  result 
from  change  will  continue  to  change  forever,  and 
these  again  forever.  For  if  a  man  reflects  on  the 
changes  and  transformations  which  follow  one 
another  like  wave  after  wave  and  their  rapidity, 
he  will  despise  everything  which  is  perishable. 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a  winter  torrent : 
it  carries  everything  along  with  it.  But  how 
worthless  are  all  these  poor  people  who  are  en- 
gaged in  matters  political,  and,  as  they  suppose, 
are  playing  the  philosopher  !  All  drivellers. 
Well  then,  man :  do  what  nature  now  requires. 
Set  thyself  in  motion,  if  it  is  in  thy  power,  and 
do  not  look  about  thee  to  see  if  any  one  will 
observe  it ;  nor  yet  expect  Plato's  Republic  :  but 
be  content  if  the  smallest  thing  goes  on  well,  and 
consider  such  an  event  to  be  no  small  matter. 
For  who  can  change  mens  principles  ?  and  with- 
out a  change  of  principles  what  else  is  there  than 
the  slavery  of  men  who  groan  while  they  pretend 
to  obey  ?  Come  now  and  tell  me  of  Alexan- 
der and  Philippus  and  Demetrius  of  Phalerum. 
They  themselves  shall  judge  whether  they  dis- 
covered what  the  universal  nature  required  and 


240 


M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


(rained  themselves  accordingly.  But  if  they 
acted  like  tragedy  heroes,  no  one  has  condemned 
me  to  imitate  them.  Simple  and  modest  is  the 
work  of  philosophy.  Draw  me  not  aside  to 
insolence  and  pride. 

30.  Look  down  from  above  on  the  countless 
herds  of  men  and  their  countless  solemnities,  and 
the  infinitely  varied  voyagings  in  storms  and 
calms,  and  the  differences  among  those  who  are 
born,  who  live  together,  and  die.  And  consider 
too  the  life  lived  by  others  in  olden  time,  and  the 
life  of  those  who  will  live  after  thee,  and  the  life 
now  lived  among  barbarous  nations,  and  how 
many  know  not  even  thy  name,  and  how  many 
will  soon  forget  it,  and  how  they  who  perhaps 
now  are  praising  thee  will  very  soon  blame  thee, 
and  that  neither  a  posthumous  name  is  of  any 
value,  nor  reputation,  nor  anything  else. 

31.  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations 
with  respect  to  the  things  which  come  from  the 
external  cause  ;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the 
things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that 
is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  terminating 
in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy 
nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many 
useless  things  among  those  which  disturb  thee, 


M.ANTONINUS.    IX.  241 


for  they  lie  entirely  in  thy  opinion ;  and  thou 
wilt  then  gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by  com- 
prehending the  whole  universe  in  thy  mind  and 
by  contemplating  the  eternity  of  time  and  observ- 
ing the  rapid  change  of  every  several  thing,  how 
short  is  the  time  from  its  birth  to  its  dissolution, 
and  the  illimitable  time  before  its  birth  as  well  as 
the  equally  boundless  time  after  its  dissolution. 

33.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish, 
and  those  who  have  been  spectators  of  its  disso- 
lution will  very  soon  perish  too.  And  he  who 
dies  at  the  extremest  old  age  will  be  brought 
into  the  same  condition  with  him  who  died  pre- 
maturely. v 

34.  What  are  these  men's  leading  principles, 
and  about  what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy,  and 
for  what  kind  of  reasons  do  they  love  and  honor 
Imagine  that  thou  seest  their  poor  souls  laid  bare. 
When  they  think  that  they  do  harm  by  their 
blame  or  good  by  their  praise,  what  an  idea ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.  But  the 
universal  nature  delights  in  change,  and  in 
obedience  to  her  all  things  are  now  done  well,  and 
from  eternity  have  been  done  in  like  form,  and 
will  be  such  to  time  without  end.  What  then  dost 
thou  say  ?  That  all  things  have  been  and  all 
things  always  will  be  bad,  and  that  no  power  has 

16 


242 


M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


ever  been  found  in  so  many  gods  to  rectify  these 
things,  but  the  world  has  been  condemned  to  be 
bound  in  never  ceasing  evil  ? 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is  the 
substance  of  everything !  water,  dust,  bones,  filth  : 
or  again,  marble  rocks,  the  callosities  of  the  earth ; 
and  gold  and  silver,  the  sediments  ;  and  garments, 
only  bits  of  hair ;  and  purple  dye,  blood ;  and 
everything  else  is  of  the  same  kind.  And  that 
which  is  of  the  nature  of  breath  is  also  another 
thing  of  the  same  kind,  changing  from  this  to 
that. 

*  37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  murmur- 
ing and  apish  tricks.  Why  art  thou  disturbed  ? 
What  is  there  new  in  this  ?  What  unsettles  thee  ? 
Is  it  the  form  of  the  thing  ?  Look  at  it.  Or  is  it 
the  matter  ?  Look  at  it.  But  besides  these  there 
is  nothing.  Towards  the  gods  then  now  become  at 
last  more  simple  and  better.  It  is  the  same 
whether  we  look  at  these  things  for  a  hundred 
years  or  three. 

38.  If  any  man  has  done  wrong,  the  harm  is 
his  own.    But  perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 

39.  Either  all  things  proceed  from  one  intelli- 
gent source  and  come  together  as  in  one  body,  and 
the  part  ought  not  to  find  fault  with  what  is  done 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  :  or  there  are  only 


M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


243 


atoms  and  nothing  else  than  mixture  and  disper- 
sion. Why  then  art  thou  disturbed  ?  Say  to  the 
ruling  faculty,  Art  thou  dead,  art  thou  corrupted, 
art  thou  playing  the  hypocrite,  art  thou  become  a 
beast,  dost  thou  herd  and  feed  with  the  rest  ? 3  y 
40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they 
have  power.  If  then  they  have  no  power,  why 
dost  thou  pray  to  them  ?  But  if  they  have 
power,  why  dost  thou  not  pray  for  them  to  give 
thee  the  faculty  of  not  fearing  any  of  the  things 
which  thou  fearest,  or  of  not  desiring  any  of  the 
things  which  thou  desirest,  or  not  being  pained  at 
anything,  rather  than  pray  that  any  of  these 
things  should  not  happen  or  happen  ?  for  certainly 
if  they  can  co-operate  with  men,  they  can  co- 
operate for  these  purposes.  But  perhaps  thou 
wilt  say,  the  gods  have  placed  them  in  thy  power. 
Well  then,  is  it  not  better  to  use  what  is  in  thy 
power  like  a  free  man,  than  to  desire  in  a  slavish 
and  abject  way  what  is  not  in  thy  power?  And 
who  has  told  thee  that  the  gods  do  not  aid  us  even 
in  the  things  which  are  in  our  power  ?  Begin 

3  There  is  some  corruption  at  the  end  of  this  section. 
I  believe  that  the  translation  expresses  the  emperor's 
meaning.  Whether  intelligence  rules  all  things  or 
chance  rules,  a  man  must  not  be  disturbed.  He  must 
use  the  power  that  he  has,  and  be  tranquil. 


244  M.   ANTONINUS.  IX. 


then  to  pray  for  such  things  and  thou  wilt  see. 
One  man  prays  thus :  How  shall  I  be  able  to  lie 
with  that  woman  ?  Do  thou  pray  thus :  How 
shall  I  not  desire  to  lie  with  her  ?  Another  prays 
thus,  How  shall  I  be  released  from  this  ?  Another 
prays  :  How  shall  I  not  desire  to  be  released  ? 
Another  thus,  How  shall  I  not  lose  my  little  son  ? 
Thou  thus,  How  shall  I  not  be  afraid  to  lose  him. 
In  fine,  turn  thy  prayers  this  way,  and  see  what 
comes. 

41.  Epicurus  says,  Tn  my  sickness  my  conver- 
sation was  not  about  my  bodily  sufferings,  nor,  says 
he,  did  T  talk  on  such  subjects  to  those  who  visited 
me ;  but  I  continued  to  discourse  on  the  nature  of 
things  as  before,  keeping  to  this  main  point,  how 
the  mind  while  participating  in  such  movements 
as  go  on  in  the  poor  flesh  shall  be  free  from  per- 
turbations and  maintain  its  proper  good.  Nor  did 
I,  he  says,  give  the  physicians  an  opportunity  of 
putting  on  solemn  looks,  as  if  they  were  doing 
something  great,  but  my  life  went  on  well  and 
happily.  Do  then  the  same  that  he  did  both  in 
sickness,  if  thou  art  sick,  and  in  any  other  circum- 
stances ;  for  never  to  desert  philosophy  in  any 
events  that  may  befall  us,  nor  to  hold  trifling  talk 
either  with  an  ignorant  man  or  with  one  unac- 
quainted with  nature,  is  a  principle  of  all  schools 


M.   ANTONINUS.  IX.  245 


of  philosophy  ;  but  to  be  intent  only  on  that  which 
thou  art  now  doing  and  on  the  instrument  by 
which  thou  doest  it. 

42.  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man's 
shameless  conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself.  Is  it 
possible  then  that  shameless  men  should  not  be  in 
the  world  ?  It  is  not  possible.  Do  not  then  require 
what  is  impossible.  For  this  man  also  is  one  of 
those  shameless  men,  who  must  of  necessity  be  in 
the  world.  Let  the  same  considerations  be  present 
to  thy  mind  in  the  case  of  the  knave,  and  the 
faithless  man,  and  of  every  man  who  does  wrong 
in  any  way.  For  at  the  same  time  that  thou  dost 
remind  thyself  that  it  is  impossible  that  such  kind 
of  men  should  not  exist,  thou  wilt  become  better 
disposed  towards  every  one  individually.  It  is  use- 
ful to  perceive  this  too  immediately  when  the  occa- 
sion arises,  what  virtue  nature  has  given  to  man  to 
oppose  to  every  wrongful  act.  For  she  has  given 
to  man  as  an  antidote,  against  the  stupid  man 
mildness,  and  against  another  kind  of  man  some 
other  power.  And  in  all  cases  it  is  possible  for 
thee  to  correct  by  teaching  the  man  who  is  gone 
astray ;  for  every  man  who  errs  misses  his  object 
and  is  gone  astray.  Besides  wherein  hast  thou 
been  injured?  For  thou  wilt  find  that  no  one 
among  those  against  whom  thou  art  irritated  has 


246  M .  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


done  anything  by  which  thy  mind  could  be  made 
worse  ;  but  that  which  is  evil  to  thee  and  harmful 
has  its  foundation  only  in  the  mind.  And  what 
harm  is  done  or  what  is  there  strange,  if  the  man 
who  has  not  been  instructed  does  the  acts  of  an 
uninstructed  man  ?  Consider  whether  thou  shouldst 
not  rather  blame  thyself,  because  thou  didst  not 
expect  such  a  man  to  err  in  such  a  way.  For  thou 
hadst  means  given  thee  by  thy  reason  to  suppose 
that  it  was  likely  that  he  would  commit  this  error, 
and  yet  thou  hast  forgotten  and  art  amazed  that  he 
has  erred.  But  most  of  all  when  thou  blamest  a 
man  as  faithless  or  ungrateful,  turn  to  thyself.  For 
the  fault  is  manifestly  thy  own,  whether  thou  didst 
trust  that  a  man  who  had  such  a  disposition  would 
keep  his  promise,  or  when  conferring  thy  kindness 
thou  didst  not  confer  it  absolutely,  nor  yet  in  such 
way  as  to  have  received  from  thy  very  act  all  the 
profit.  For  what  more  dost  thou  want  when  thou 
hast  done  a  man  a  service  ?  art  thou  not  content 
that  thou  hast  done  something  conformable  to  thy 
nature,  and  dost  thou  seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ?  just 
as  if  the  eye  demanded  a  'recompense  for  seeing, 
or  the  feet  for  walking.  For  as  these  members 
are  formed  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  by 
working  according  to  their  several  constitutions 
obtain  what  is  their  own ;  so  also  as  man  is  formed 


M.  ANTONINUS.  IX. 


247 


by  nature  to  acts  of  benevolence,  when  he  has 
done  anything  benevolent  or  in  any  other  way 
conducive  to  the  common  interest,  he  has  acted 
conformably  to  his  constitution  and  he  gets  what 
is  his  own. 


X. 


TLT  thou  then,  my  soul,  never  be 
good  and  simple  and  one  and  naked, 
more  manifest  than  the  body  which 
surrounds  thee  ?  Wilt  thou  never 
enjoy  an  affectionate  and  contented  disposition? 
Wilt  thou  never  be  full  and  without  a  want  of  any 
kind,  longing  for  nothing  more,  nor  desiring  any- 
thing either  animate  or  inanimate  for  the  enjoy- 
ment of  pleasures  ?  nor  yet  desiring  time  wherein 
thou  shalt  have  longer  enjoyment,  or  place,  or 
pleasant  climate,  or  society  of  men  with  whom 
thou  mayst  live  in  harmony?  but  wilt  thou  be 
satisfied  with  thy  present  condition,  and  pleased 
with  all  that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt  thou  convince 
thyself  that  thou  hast  everything  and  that  it 
comes  from  the  gods,  that  everything  is  well  for 
thee  and  will  be  well  whatever  shall  please  them, 
and  whatever  they  shall  give  for  the  conservation 
of  the  perfect  living  being,  the  good  and  just  and 
beautiful,  which  generates  and  holds  together  all 


M.  ANTONINUS.    X.  249 


things,  and  contains  and  embraces  all  things  which 
are  dissolved  for  the  production  of  other  like 
things  ?  Wilt  thou  never  be  such  that  thou  shalt 
so  dwell  in  community  with  gods  and  men  as 
neither  to  find  fault  with  them  at  all  nor  to  be 
condemned  by  them? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far  as 
thou  art  governed  by  nature  only :  then  do  it  and 
accept  it,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living 
being  shall  not  be  made  worse  by  it.  And  next 
thou  must  observe  what  thy  nature  requires  so  far 
as  thou  art  a  living  being.  And  all  this  thou 
mayst  allow  thyself,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou 
art  a  rational  animal,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by 
it.  But  the  rational  animal  is  consequently  also 
a  political  [social]  animal.  Use  these  rules  then 
and  trouble  thyself  about  nothing  else. 

3.  Everything  which  happens  either  happens  in 
such  wise  that  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  V 
it,  or  that  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear 

it.  If  then  it  happens  to  thee  in  such  way  that 
thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  do  not  com- 
plain, but  bear  it  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to 
bear  it.  But  if  it  happens  in  such  wise  that  thou 
art  not  able  to  bear  it,  do  not  complain,  for  it  will 
perish  after  it  has  consumed  thee.  Remember 
however  that  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear 


250  M.  .ANTONINUS.  X. 


everything,  with  respect  to  which  it  depends  on 
thy  own  opinion  to  make  it  endurable  and  toler- 
able, by  thinking  that  it  is  either  thy  interest  or 
thy  duty  (o  do  this. 

4.  If  a  man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him  kindly 
and  show  him  his  error.  But  if  thou  art  not  able, 
blame  thyself,  or  blame  not  even  thyself. 

5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  pre- 
pared for  thee  from  all  eternity ;  and  the  impli- 
cation of  causes  was  from  eternity  spinning  the 
thread  of  thy  being  and  of  that  which  is  incident 
to  it.    (in.  11 ;  iv.  26.) 

6.  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of] 
atoms,  or  nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be 
established,  that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which 
is  governed  by  nature ;  next,  I  am  in  a  manner 
intimately  related  to  the  parts  which  are  of  the 
same  kind  with  myself.  For  remembering  this, 
inasmuch  as  I  am  a  part,  I  shall  be  discontented 
with  none  of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to  rae 
out  of  the  whole ;  for  nothing  is  injurious  to  the 
part,  if  it  is  for  the  advantage  of  the  whole.  For 
the  whole  contains  nothing  which  is  not  for  its 
advantage  ;  and  all  natures  indeed  have  this  com- 
mon principle,  but  the  nature  of  the  universe  has 
this  principle  besides,  that  it  cannot  be  compelled 
even  by  any  external  cause"  to  generate  anything 


M .  ANTONINUS.    X.  251 


harmful  to  itself.  By  remembering  then  that  1 
am  a  part  of  such  a  whole,  I  shall  be  content  with 
everything  that  happens.  And  inasmuch  as  I  am 
in  a  manner  intimately  related  to  the  parts  which 
are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself,  I  shall  do 
nothing  unsocial,  but  I  shall  rather  direct  myself 
to  the  things  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with 
myself,  and  I  shall  turn  all  my  efforts  to  the  com- 
mon interest,  and  divert  them  from  the  contrary. 
Now  if  these  things  are  done  so,  life  must  flow  on 
happily,  just  as  thou  mayst  observe  that  the  life  of 
a  citizen  is  happy,  who  continues  a  course  of  action 
which  is  advantageous  to  his  fellow-citizens,  and  is 
content  with  whatever  the  state  may  assign  to  him. 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  everything  I  mean 
which  is  naturally  comprehended  in  the  universe, 
must  of  necessity  perish  ;  but  let  this  be  understood 
in  this  sense,  that  they  must  undergo  change. 
But  if  this  is  naturally  both  an  evil  and  a  necessity 
for  the  parts,  the  whole  would  not  continue  to 
exist  in  a  good  condition,  the  parts  being  subject 
to  change  and  constituted  so  as  to  perish  in  various 
ways.  For  whether  did  nature  herself  design  to 
do  evil  to  the  things  which  are  parts  of  herself, 
and  to  make  them  subject  to  evil  and  of  necessity 
fall  into  evil,  or  have  such  results  happened  with- 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


out  her  knowing  it  ?  Both  these  suppositions  in- 
deed are  incredible.  But  if  a  man  should  even 
drop  the  term  Nature  [as  an  efficient  power]  and 
should  speak  of  these  things  [change]  as  natural, 
even  then  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  affirm  at  the 
same  time  that  the  parts  of  the  whole  are  in  their 
nature  subject  to  change,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
be  surprised  or  vexed  as  if  something  were  hap- 
pening contrary  to  nature,  particularly  as  the  dis- 
solution of  things  is  into  those  things  of  which  each 
thing  is  composed.  For  there  is  either  a  disper- 
sion of  the  elements  out  of  which  everything  has 
been  compounded,  or  a  change  from  the  solid  to 
the  earthy  and  from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so  that 
these  parts  are  taken  back  into  the  universal  rea- 
son, whether  this  at  certain  periods  is  consumed  by 
fire  or  renewed  by  eternal  changes.  And  do  not 
imagine  that  the  solid  and  the  airy  part  belong  to 
thee  from  the  time  of  generation.  For  all  this 
received  its  accretion  only  yesterday  and  the  day 
before,  as  one  may  say,  from  the  food  and  the  air 
which  is  inspired.  This  then,  which  has  received 
[the  accretion],  changes,  not  that  which  thy  moth- 
er brought  forth.  But  suppose  that  this  [which 
thy  mother  brought  forth]  implicates  thee  very 
much  with  that  other  part,  which  has  the  peculiar 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


253 


quality  [of  change],  this  is  nothing  in  fact  in  the 
way  of  objection  to  what  is  said.1 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names,  good, 
modest,  true,  rational,  a  man  of  equanimity,  and 
magnanimous,  lake  care  that  thou  dost  not  change 
these  names ;  and  if  thou  shouldst  lose  them, 
quickly  return  to  them.  And  remember  that  the  > 
term  Rational  was  intended  to  signify  a  discrimi- 
nating attention  to  every  several  thing  and  freedom 
from  negligence  ;  and  that  Equanimity  is  the 
voluntary  acceptance  of  the  things  which  are  as- 
signed to  thee  by  the  common  nature  ;  and  that 
Magnanimity  is  the  elevation  of  the  intelligent  part 
above  the  pleasurable  or. painful  sensations  of  the 
flesh  and  above  that  poor  thing  called  fame,  and 
death,  and  all  such  things.  If  then  thou  main- 
tainest  thyself  in  the  possession  of  these  names, 
without  desiring  to  be  called  by  these  names  by 
others,  thou  wilt  be  another  person  and  wilt  enter 
on  another  life.  For  to  continue  to  be  such  as  thou 
hast  hitherto  been,  and  to  be  torn  in  pieces  and 
defiled  in  such  a  life,  is  the**  character  of  a  very 
stupid  man  and  one  overfond  of  his  life,  and  like 
those- half-devoured  fighters  with  wild  beasts,  who 

1  The  end  of  this  section  is  perhaps  corrupt.  The 
meaning  is  very  obscure.  I  have  given  that  meaning 
which  appears  to  be  consistent  with  the  whole  argument. 


254 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


though  covered  with  wounds  and  gore,  still  intreat 
to  be  kept  to  the  following  day,  though  they  will 
be  exposed  in  the  same  state  to  the  same  claws 
and  bites.  Therefore  fix  thyself  in  the  possession 
of  these  few  names  :  and  if  thou  art  able  to  abide 
in  them,  abide  as  if  thou  wast  removed  to  certain 
islands  of  the  Happy.2  But  if  thou  shalt  perceive 
that  thou  fallest  out  of  them  and  dost  not  maintain 
thy  hold,  go  courageously  into  some  nook  where 

2  The  islands  of  the  Happy  or  the  Portunatae  Insulae 
are  spoken  of  by  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers.  They 
were  the  abode  of  Heroes,  like  Achilles  and  Diomedes, 
as  we  see  in  the  Scolion  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton. 
Sertorius  heard  of  the  islands  at  Cadiz  from  some  sailors 
who  had  been  there,  and  he  had  a  wish  to  go  and  live  in 
them  and  rest  from  his  troubles.  (Plutarch,  Sertorius, 
c.  8.)  In  the  Odyssey,  Proteus  told  Menelaus  that  he 
should  not  die  in  Argos,  but  be  removed  to  a  place  at 
the  boundary  of  the  earth  where  Rhadamanthus  dwelt: 
(Odyssey,  iv.  565.) 

For  there  in  sooth  man's  life  is  easiest . 
Nor  snow  nor  raging  storm  nor  rain  is  there, 
But  ever  gently  breathing  gales  of  Zephyr 
Oceanus  sends  up  to  gladden  man. 

It  is  certain  that  the  writer  of  the  Odyssey  only 
follows  some  old  legend  without  having  any  knowledge 
of  any  place  which  corresponds  to  his  description.  The 
two  islands  which  Sertorius  heard  of  may  be  Madeira 
and  the  adjacent  island. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    X.  255 


thou  shalt  maintain  them,  or  even  depart  at  once 
from  life,  not  in  passion,  but  with  simplicity  and 
freedom  and  modesty,  after  doing  this  one  [laud- 
able] thing  at  least  in  thy  life,  to  have  gone  out 
of  it  thu-.  In  order  however  to  the  remembrance 
of  these  names,  it  will  greatly  help  thee,  if  thou 
rememberest  the  gods  and  that  they  wish  not  to 
be  flattered,  but  wish  all  reasonable  beings  to  be 
made  like  themselves  ;  and  if  thou  rememberest 
that  what  does  the  work  of  a  fig-tree  is  a  fig-tree, 
and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  dog  is  a  dog, 
and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  bee  is  a  bee, 
and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  man  is  a  man. 

9.  Mimi,3  war,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery, 
will  daily  wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of  thine, 
f  How  many  things  without  studying  nature  dost 
thou  imagine  and  how  many  dost  thou  neglect  ? 4 
But  it  is  thy  duty  so  to  look  on  and  so  to  do 
everything,  that  at  the  same  time  the  power  of 
dealing  with  circumstances  is  perfected,  and  the 
contemplative  faculty  is  exercised,  and  the  con- 
fidence which  comes  from  the  knowledge  of  each 
several  thing  is  maintained  without  showing  it, 

3  Corae  conjectured  fitaoq  "  hatred  "  in  place  of  Mimi, 
Roman  plays  in  which  action  and  gesticulation  were  all 
or  nearly  all. 

4  This  is  corrupt. 


256 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


but  yet  not  concealed.  For  when  wilt  thou  enjoy 
simplicity,  when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge 
of  every  several  thing,  both  what  it  is  in  substance, 
and  what  place  it  has  in  the  universe,  and  how 
long  it  is  formed  to  exist  and  of  what  things  it  is 
compounded,  and  to  whom  it  can  belong,  and 
who  are  able  both  to  give  it  and  take  it  away  ? 

10.  A  spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a  fly, 
and  another  when  he  has  caught  a  poor  hare,  and 
another  when  he  has  taken  a  little  fish  in  a  net, 
and  another  when  he  has  taken  wild  boars,  and 
another  when  he  has  taken  bears,  and  another 
when  he  has  taken  Sarmatians.  Are  not  these 
robbers,  if  thou  examinest  their  principles  ?  5 

11.  Acquire  the  contemplative  way  of  seeing 
how  all  things  change  into  one  another,  and  con- 
stantly attend  to  it,  and  exercise  thyself  about 
this  part  [of  philosophy].  For  nothing  is  so  much 
adapted  to  produce  magnanimity.  Such  a  man 
has  put  off  the  body,  and  as  he  sees  that  he  must, 
no  one  knows  how  soon,  go  away  from  among  men 
and  leave  everything  here,  he  gives  himself  up 
entirely  .  to  just  doing  in  all  his  actions,  and  in 
everything  else  that  happens  he  resigns  himself 

5  Marcus  means  to  say  that  conquerors  are  robbers. 
He  himself  warred  against  Sarmatians,  and  was  a  rob» 
ber,  as  he  says,  like  the  rest. 


M.   ANTONINUS.    X.  257 


to  the  universal  nature.  But  as  to  what  any  man 
shall  say  or  think  about  him  or  do  against  him, 
he  never  even  thinks  of  it,  being  himself  con- 
tented with  these  two  things,  with  acting  justly  in 
what  he  now  does,  and  being  satisfied  with  what 
is  now  assigned  to  him  ;  and  he  lays  aside  all  dis- 
tracting and  busy  pursuits  and  desires  nothing 
else  than  to  accomplish  the  straight  course  through 
the  law,6  and  by  accomplishing  the  straight  course 
to  follow  god. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear, 
since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought  to 
be  done  ?  And  if  thou  seest  clear,  go  by  this  way 
content,  without  turning  back  :  but  if  thou  dost 
not  see  clear,  stop  and  take  the  best  advisers. 
But  if  any  other  things  oppose  thee,  go  on  accord- 
ing to  thy  powers  with  due  consideration,  keeping 
to  that  which  appears  to  be  just.  For  it  is  best 
£o  reach  this  object,  and  if  thou  dost  fail,  let  thy 
failure  be  in  attempting  this.  He  who  follows 
reason  in  all  things  is  both  tranquil  and  active  at 
the  same  time,  and  also  cheerful  and  collected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest 
from  sleep,  whether  it  will  make  any  difference  to 

*  By  the  law,  he  means  the  divine  law,  obedience  to 
the  will  of  God. 

17 


258 


M.   ANTONINUS.  X. 


thee,  if  another  does  what  is  just  and  right*  It 
will  make  no  difference. 

Hast  thou  forgotten  that  those  who  assume 
arrogant  airs  in  bestowing  their  praise  or  blame 
on  others,  are  such  as  they  are  at  bed  and  at  board, 
and  hast  thou  forgotten  what  they  do,  and  what 
they  avoid  and  what  they  pursue,  and  how  they 
steal  and  how  they  rob,  not  with  hands  and  feet, 
but  with  their  most  valuable  part,  by  means  of 
which  there  is  produced,  when  a  man  chooses, 
fidelity,  modesty,  truth,  law,  a  good  daemon 
[happiness]  ?    (vn.  17.) 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and  takes  back  all,  to 
nature,  the  man  who  is  instructed  and  modest  says  : 
Give  what  thou  wilt ;  take  back  what  thou  wilt. 
And  he  says  this  not  proudly,  but  obediently  and 
well  pleased  with  her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee  of 
life.  Live  as  on  a  mountain.  For  it  makes  no 
difference  whether  a  man  lives  there  or  here,  if  he 
lives  everywhere  in  the  world  as  in  a  state  [polit- 
ical community].  Let  men  see,  let  them  know  a 
real  man  who  lives  according  to  nature.  If  they 
cannot  endure  him,  let  them  kill  him.  For  that 
is  better  than  to  live  thus  [as  men  do]. 

16.  No  longer  talk  about  the  kind  of  man  that 
a  good  man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


259 


1 7.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of  time 
and  the  whole  of  substance,  and  consider  that  all 
individual  things  as  to  substance  are  a  grain  of  a 
fig,  and  as  to  time,  the  turning  of  a  gimlet. 

18.  Look  at  everything  that  exists  and  observe 
that  it  is  already  in  dissolution  and  in  change  and 
as  it  were  putrefaction  or  dispersion,  or  that  every- 
thing is  so  constituted  by  nature  as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eat- 
ing, sleeping,  generating,  easing  themselves  and 
so  forth.  Then  what  kind  of  men  they  are  when 
they  are  imperious  f  and  arrogant,  or  angry  and 
scolding  from  their  elevated  place.  But  a  short 
time  ago  to  how  many  they  were  slaves  and  for 
what  things  ;  and  after  a  little  time  consider  in 
what  a  condition  they  will  be. 

20.  That  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which 
the  universal  nature  brings  to  each.  And  it  is 
for  its  good  at  the  time  when  nature  brings  it. 

21.  "The  earth  loves  the  shower;"  and  "the 
solemn  aether  loves : "  and  the  universe  loves  to 
make  whatever  is  about  to  be.  I  say  then  to  the 
universe,  that  I  love  as  thou  lovest.  And  is  not 
this  too  said,  that  "  this  or  that  loves  [is  wont]  to 
be  produced  ?  "  7 

7  These  words  are  from  Euripides.  They  are  cited 
by  Aristotle,  Ethic.  Nicom.  viii.  1.    Athenaeus  (xiii. 


260  M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


22.  Either  thou  livest  here  and  hast  already 
accustomed  thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going  away, 
and  this  was  thy  own  will ;  or  thou  art  dying  and 
hast  discharged  thy  duty.  But  besides  these 
things  there  is  nothing.    Be  of  good  cheer  then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that  this 
piece  of  land  is  like  any  other ;  and  that  all  things 
here  are  the  same  with  things  on  the  top  of  a 
mountain,  or  on  the  sea-shore,  or  wherever  thou 
choosest  to  be.  For  thou  wilt  find  just  what 
Plato  says,  Making  the  walls  of  the  city  like  a 
shepherd's  fold  on  a  mountain.  [The  three  last 
words  are  omitted.    They  are  unintelligible.]  8 

24.  What  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me  ?  and 
of  what  nature  am  I  now  making  it  ?  and  for  what 
purpose  am  I  now  using  it?  is  it  void  of  under- 

296.)  and  Stobaeus  quote  seven  complete  lines  beginning 
hpot  fiev  5{j.j3pov  yala.  There  is  a  similar  fragment  of 
Aeschylus. 

It  was  the  fashion  of  the  Stoics  to  work  on  the  mean- 
ings of  words.  So  Antoninus  here  takes  the  verb  <pi2,el, 
"  loves,"  which  has  also  the  sense  of  "is  wont,"  "  uses," 
and  the  like.  He  finds  in  the  common  language  of  man- 
kind a  philosophical  truth,  and  most  great  truths  are 
expressed  in  the  common  language  of  life  ;  some  un- 
derstand them,  but  most  people  express  them  without 
knowing  how  much  they  mean. 

8  Plato,  Theaet.  174  D.  E. 


M.  ANTONINUS.   X.  261 


standing  ?  is  it  loosed  and  rent  asunder  from  social 
life  ?  is  it  melted  into  and  mixed  with  the  poor 
flesh  so  as  to  move  together  with  it  ? 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a  runaway  ; 
but  the  law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks  the  law 
is  a  runaway.  And  he  also  who  is  grieved  or 
angry  or  afraid,f  is  dissatisfied  because  something 
has  been  or  is  or  shall  be  of  the  things  which  are 
appointed  by  him  who  rules  all  things,  and  he  is 
Law,  and  assigns  to  every  man  what  is  fit.  He 
then  who  fears  or  is  grieved  or  is  angry  is  a 
runaway.9  * 

26.  A  man  deposits  seed  in  a  womb  and  goes 
away,  and  then  another  cause  takes  it,  and  labors 
on  it  and  makes  a  child.  What  a  thing  from  such 
a  material !  Again,  the  child  passes  food  down 
through  the  throat,  and  then  another  cause  takes 
it  and  makes  perception  and  motion,  and  in  fine 
life  and  strength  and  other  things  ;  how  many  and 
how  strange  !  Observe  then  the  things  which  are 
produced  in  such  a  hidden  way,  and  see  the  power 
just  as  we  see  the  power  which  carries  things 
downwards  and  upwards,  not  with  the  eyes,  but 
still  no  less  plainly. 

9  Antoninus  is  here  playing  on  the  etymology  of  vSftog, 
law,  assignment,  that  which  assigns  (vifiei)  to  every  man 
his  portion. 


262 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


27.  Constantly  consider  how  all  things  such  as 
they  now  are,  in  time  past  also  were  ;  and  consider 
that  they  will  be  the  same  again.  And  place 
before  thy  eyes  entire  dramas  and  stages  of  the 
same  form,  whatever  thou  hast  learned  from  thy 
experience  or  from  older  history  ;  for  example  the 
whole  court  of  Hadrian  us,  and  the  whole  court  of 
Antoninus,  and  the  whole  court  of  Philippus, 
Alexander,  Croesus  ;  for  all  those  were  such 
dramas  as  we  see  now,  only  with  different  actors. 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at  any- 
thing or  discontented  to  be  like  a  pig  which  is 
sacrificed,  and  kicks  and  screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in 
silence  laments  the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held. 
And  consider  that  only  to  the  rational  animal  is  it 
given  to  follow  voluntarily  what  happens  ;  but 
simply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed  on  all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  everything  that 
thou  doe.>t  pause  and  ask  thyself,  if  death  is  a 
dreadful  thing  because  it  deprives  thee  of  this. 

30.  When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man's  fault, 
forthwith  turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in  what  like 
manner  thou  dost  err  thyself ;  for  example,  in 
thinking  that  money  is  a  good  thing,  or  pleasure, 
or  reputation  and  the  like.  For  by  attending  to 
this  thou  wilt  quickly  forget  thy  anger,  if  this 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


263 


consideration  also  is  added,  that  the  man  is  com- 
pelled :  for  what  else  could  he  do  ?  or,  if  thou  art 
able,  take  away  from  him  the  compulsion. 

3 1 .  When  thou  hast  seen  Satyron  the  Socratic,| 
think  of  either  Eutyches  or  Hymen,  and  when 
thou  hast  seen  Euphrates,  think  of  Eutychion  or 
Silvanus,  and  when  thou  hast  seen  Alciphron 
think  of  Tropaeophorus,  and  when  thou  hast  seen 
Xenophon  think  of  Crito  or  Severus,  and  when 
thou  hast  looked  on  thyself,  think  of  any  other 
Caesar,  and  in  the  case  of  every  one  do  in  like 
manner.  Then  let  this  thought  be  in  thy  mind, 
Where  then  are  those  men  ?  Nowhere,  or  nobody 
knows  where.  For  thus  continuously  thou  wilt 
look  at  human  things  as  smoke  and  nothing  at  all ; 
especially  if  thou  reflectest  at  the  same  time  that 
what  has  once  changed  will  never  exist  again  in 
the  infinite  duration  of  lime.  But  thou,  in  what 
a  brief  space  of  time  is  thy  existence  ?  And  why 
art  thou  not  content  to  pass  through  this  short 
time  in  an  orderly  way  ?  What  matter  and  oppor- 
tunity [for  thy  activity]  art  thou  avoiding  ?  For 
what  else  are  all  these  things,  except  exercises  for 
the  reason,  when  it  has  viewed  carefully  and  by 
examination  into  their  nature  the  things  which 
happen  in  life  ?  Persevere  then  until  thou  shalt 
have  made  these  things  thy  own,  as  the  stomach 


264 


M .  ANTONINUS.  X. 


which  is  strengthened  makes  all  things  its  own,  as 
the  blazing  fire  makes  flame  and  brightness  out 
of  everything  that  is  thrown  into  it. 

32.  Let  it  not  be  in  any  man's  power  to  say 
truly  of  thee  that  thou  art  not  simple  or  that  thou 
art  not  good  ;  but  let  him  be  a  liar  whoever  shall 
think  anything  of  this  kind  about  thee  ;  and  this 
is  altogether  in  thy  power.  For  who  is  he  that 
shall  hinder  thee  from  being  good  and  simple  ? 
Do  thou  only  determine  to  live  no  longer,  unless 
thou  shalt  be  such.  For  neither  does  reason 
allow  [thee  to  live],  if  thou  art  not  such. 

•33.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material  [our 
life]  can  be  done  or  said  in  the  way  most  con- 
formable to  reason  ?  For  whatever  this  may  be, 
it  is  in  thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say  it ;  and  do  not 
make  excuses  that  tliou  art  hindered.  Thou  wilt 
not  cease  to  lament  till  thy  mind  is  in  such  a  con- 
dition, that,  what  luxury  is  to  those  who  enjoy 
pleasure,  such  shall  be  to  thee,  in  the  matter  which 
is  subjected  and  presented  to  thee,  the  doing  of  the 
things  which  are  conformable  to  man's  constitu- 
tion ;  for  a  man  ought  to  consider  as  an  enjoyment 
everything  which  it  is  in  his  power  to  do  accord- 
ing to  his  own  nature.  And  it  is  in  his  power 
everywhere.  Now  it  is  not  given  to  a  cylinder  to 
move  everywhere  by  its  own  motion,  nor  yet  to 


M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


2G5 


water  nor  fire,  nor  to  anything  else  which  is  gov- 
erned by  nature  or  an  irrational  soul,  for  the 
things  which  check  them  and  stand  in  the  way 
are  many.  ^J3ut  intelligence  and  reason  are  able 
to  go  through  everything  that  opposes  them,  and 
in  such  manner  as  they  are  formed  by  nature 
and  as  they  choose.)"  Place  before  thy  eyes  this 
facility  with  which  the  reason  will  be  carried 
through  all  things,  as  fire  upwards,  as  a  stone 
downwards,  as  a  cylinder  down  an  inclined  sur- 
face, and  seek  for  nothing  further.  For  all  other 
obstacles  either  affect  the  body  only  which  is  a 
dead  thing;  or,  except  through  opinion  and  the 
yielding  of  the  reason  itself,  they  do  not  crush 
nor  do  any  harm  of  any  kind ;  for  if  they  did,  he 
who  felt  it  would  immediately  become  bad.  Now 
in  the  case  of  all  things  which  have  a  certain 
constitution,  whatever  harm  may  happen  to  any 
of  them,  that  which  is  so  affected  becomes  con- 
sequently worse ;  but  in  the  like  case,  a  man  be- 
comes both  better,  if  one  may  say  so,  and  more 
worthy  of  praise  by  making  a  right  use  of  these 
accidents.  And  finally  remember  that  nothing 
harms  him  who  is  really  a  citizen,  which  does  not 
harm  the  state  ;  nor  yet  does  anything  harm  the 
state,  which  does  not  harm  law  [order]  ;  and  of 
these  things  which  are  called  misfortunes  not  one 


266  M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


harms  law.  What  then  does  not  harm  law  does 
not  harm  either  state  or  citizen. 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  princi- 
ples even  the  briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and  any 
common  precept,  to  remind  him  that  he  should  be 
free  from  grief  and  fear.    For  example  — 

Leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground  — 
So  is  the  race  of  men.10 

Leaves  also  are  thy  children ;  and  leaves  too  are 
they  who  cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of 
credit  and  bestow  their  praise,  or  on  the  con- 
trary curse,  or  secretly  blame  and  sneer ;  and 
leaves  in  like  manner  are  those  who  shall  receive 
and  transmit  a  man's  fame  to  after  times.  For  all 
such  things  as  these  "  are  produced  in  the  season 
of  spring,"  as  the  poet  says ;  then  the  wind 
casts  them  down ;  then  the  forest  produces  other 
leaves  in  their  places.  But  a  brief  existence  is 
common  to  all  things,  and  yet  thou  avoidest  and 
pursuest  all  things  as  if  they  would  be  eternal. 
A  little  time,  and  thou  shalt  close  thy  eyes  ;  and 
him  who  has  attended  thee  to  thy  grave  another 
soon  will  lament. 

35.  The  healthy  eye  ought  to  see  all  visible 
things  and  not  to  say,  I  wish  for  green  things ; 

10  Homer,  II.  vi.  146. 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


X. 


267 


for  this  is  the  condition  of  a  diseased  eye.  And 
the  healthy  hearing  and  smelling  ought  to  be 
ready  to  perceive  all  that  can  be  heard  and 
smelled.  And  the  healthy  stomach  ought  to  be 
with  respect  to  all  food  just  as  the  mill  with  re- 
spect to  all  things  which  it  is  formed  to  grind. 
And  accordingly  the  healthy  understanding  ought 
to  be  prepared  for  everything  which  happens  ;  but 
that  which  says,  Let  my  dear  children  live,  and 
let  all  men  praise  whatever  I  may  do,  is  an  eye 
which  seeks  for  green  things,  or  teeth  which  seek 
for  soft  things. 

36.  There  is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there 
shall  not  be  by  him  when  he  is  dying  some  who 
are  pleased  with  what  is  going  to  happen.11  Sup- 
pose that  he  was  a  good  and  wise  man,  will  there 
not  be  at  last  some  one  to  say  of  him,  Let  us  at 
last  breathe  freely  being  relieved  from  this  school- 
master. It  is  true  that  he  was  harsh  to  none  of 
us,  but  I  perceived  that  he  tacitly  condemns  us.  — 
This  is  what  is  said  of  a  good  man.  But  in  our 
own  case  how  many  other  things  are  there  for 
which  there  are  many  who  wish  to  get  rid  of  us. 
Thou  wilt  consider  this  then  when  thou  art  dying, 

11  He  says  naicov,  but  as  he  affirms  in  other  places  that 
death  is  no  evil,  he  must  mean  what  others  may  call  an 
evil,  and  he  means  only  "  what  is  going  to  happen.'* 


268       M.  ANTONINUS.  X. 


and  thou  wilt  depart  more  contentedly  by  reflect- 
ing thus :  I  am  going  away  from  such  a  life,  in 
which  even  my  associates  in  behalf  of  whom  I 
have  striven  so  much,  prayed,  and  cared,  them- 
selves wish  me  to  depart,  hoping  perchance  to  get 
some  little  advantage  by  it.  Why  then  should  a 
man  cling  to  a  longer  stay  here  ?  Do  not  how- 
ever for  this  reason  go  away  less  kindly  disposed 
to  them,  but  preserving  thy  own  character,  and 
continuing  friendly  and  benevolent  and  kind,  and 
on  the  other  hand  not  as  if  thou  wast  torn  away  ; 
but  as  when  a  man  dies  a  quiet  death,  the  soul  is 
easily  separated  from  the  body,  such  also  ought 
thy  departure  from  men  to  be,  for  nature  united 
thee  to  them  and  associated  thee.  But  does  she 
now  dissolve  the  union  ?  Well,  I  am  separated  as 
from  kinsmen,  not  however  dragged  resisting,  but 
without  compulsion  ;  for  this  too  is  one  of  the 
things  according  to  nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on 
the  occasion  of  anything  being  done  by  any  per- 
son to  inquire  with  thyself,  For  what  object  is 
this  man  doing  this  ?  but  begin  with  thyself,  and 
examine  thyself  first. 

38.  Remember  that  this  which  pulls  the  strings 
is  the  thing  which  is  hidden  within  :  this  is  the 
power  of  persuasion,  this  is  life,  this,  if  one  may 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


X. 


269 


so  say,  is  man.  In  contemplating  thyself  never 
include  the  vessel  which  surrounds  thee  and 
these  instruments  which  are  attached  about  it. 
For  they  are  like  to  an  axe,  differing  only  in  this 
that  they  grow  to  the  body.  For  indeed  there  is 
no  more  use  in  these  parts  without  the  cause 
which  moves  and  checks  them,  than  in  the 
weaver's  shuttle,  and  the  writer's  pen  and  the 
driver's  whip.12 

i2  See  "  The  Philosophy  of  Antoninus/' 


XT. 


HESE  are  the  properties  of  the  ra- 
tional soul :  it  sees  itself,  analyses 
^fvj\  itself,  and  makes  itself  such  as  it 
chooses ;  the  fruit  which  it  bears  it- 
self enjoys  —  for  the  fruits  of  plants  and  that  in 
animals  which  corresponds  to  fruits  others  enjoy  — 
it  obtains  its  own  end,  wherever  the  limit  of  life 
may  be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a  dance  and  in  a  play 
and  in  such  like  things,  where  the  whole  action  is 
incomplete,  if  anything  cuts  it  short;  but  in  every 
part  and  wherever  it  may  be  stopped,  it  makes 
what  has  been  set  before  it  full  and  complete,  so 
that  it  can  say,  I  have  what  is  my  own.  And 
further  it  traverses  the  whole  universe,  and  the 
surrounding  vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and  it 
extends  itself,  into  the  infinity  of  time  and  em- 
braces and  comprehends  the  periodical  renova- 
tion of  all  things,  and  it  comprehends  that  those 
who  come  after  us  will  see  nothing  new,  nor  have 
those  before  us  seen  anything  more,  but  in  a 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XT.  271 


manner  he  who  is  forty  years  old,  if  he  has  any 
understanding  at  all,  has  seen  by  virtue  of  the 
uniformity  that  prevails  all  things  which  have 
been  and  all  that  will  be.  This  too  is  a  property 
of  the  rafional  soul,  love  of  one's  neighbor,  and  v 
truth  and  modesty,  and  to  value  nothing  more 
than  itself,  which  is  also  the  property  of  Law.1 
Thus  then  right  reason  differs  not  at  all  from  the 
reason  of  justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing  song 
and  dancing  and  the  pancratium,  if  thou  wilt  dis- 
tribute the  melody  of  the  voice  into  its  several 
sounds,  and  ask  thyself  as  to  each,  if  thou  art 
mastered  by  this ;  for  thou  wilt  be  prevented  by 
shame  from  confessing  it :  and  in  the  matter  of 
dancing,  if  at  each  movement  and  attitude  thou 
wilt  do  the  same  ;  and  the  like  also  in  the  matter 
of  the  pancratium.  In  all  things  then,  except 
virtue  and  the  acts  of  virtue,  remember  to  apply 
thyself  to  their  several  parts,  and  by  this  division 
to  come  to  value  them  little  :  and  apply  this  rule 
also  to  thy  whole  life. 

3.  What  a  soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at  any 
moment  it  must  be  separated  from  the  body,  and 
ready  either  to  be  extinguished  or  dispersed  or 
continue  to  exist ;   but  so  that  this  readiness 

1  Law  is  the  order  by  which  all  things  are  governed. 


272         M.   ANTONINUS.  IX. 

comes  from  a  man's  own  judgment,  not  from  mere 
obstinacy,  as  with  the  Christians,  but  considerately 
and  with  dignity  and  in  a  way  to  persuade  an- 
other, without  tragic  show. 

4.  Have  I  done  something  for  the  general  in- 
terest ?  Well  then  I  have  had  my  reward.  Let 
this  always  be  present  to  thy  mind,  and  never 
stop  [doing  good]. 

5.  What  is  thy  art  ?  to  be  good.  And  how  is 
this  accomplished  well  except  by  general  princi- 

|  pies,  some  about  the  nature  of  the  universe,  and 
others  about  the  proper  constitution  of  man  ? 

6.  At  first  tragedies  were  brought  on  the  stage 
as  means  of  reminding  men  of  the  things  which 
happen  to  them,  and  that  it  is  according  to  nature 
for  things  to  happen  so,  and  that,  if  thou  art  de- 
lighted with  what  is  shown  on  the  stage,  thou 
shouldst  not  be  troubled  with  that  which  takes 
place  on  the  larger  stage.  For  thou  seest  that 
these  things  must  be  accomplished  thus,  and  that 
even  they  bear  them  who  cry  out 2  "  O  Cithae- 
ron."  And  indeed  some  things  are  said  well  by 
the  dramatic  writers,  of  which  kind  is  the  follow- 
ing especially :  — 

Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect, 
This  has  its  reason  too.3 


2  Sophocles,  Oedipus  Rex. 
8  See  vii.  41.  38.  40. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XI.  273 


And  again 

We  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  which  happens. 
And 

Life's  harvest  reap  like  the  wheat's  fruitful  ear. 

And  other  things  of  the  same  kind. 

After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  introduced, 
which  had  a  magisterial  freedom  of  speech,  and 
by  its  very  plainness  of  speaking  was  useful  in 
reminding  men  to  beware  of  insolence  ;  and  for 
this  purpose  too  Diogenes  used  to  take  from  these 
writers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy  which  came  next, 
observe  what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what  object 
the  new  comedy  was  introduced,  which  gradually 
sunk  down  into  a  mere  mimic  artifice.  That  some 
good  things  are  said  by  these  writers  too,  every- 
body knows :  but  the  whole  plan  of  such  poetry 
and  dramaturgy,  to  what  end  does  it  look ! 

7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not 
another  condition  of  life  so  well  suited  for  philos- 
ophizing as  this  in  which  thou  now  happenest 
to  be. 

8.  A  branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch 
must  of  necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole  tree 
also.  So  too  a  man  when  he  is  separated  from 
another  man  has  fallen  off  from  the  whole  social 

18 


274         M.  ANTONINUS.  XI. 


community.  Now  as  to  a  branch,  another  cuts  tt 
off,  but  a  man  by  his  own  act  separates  himself 
from  his  neighbor  when  he  hates  him  and  turns 
away  from  him,  and  he  does  not  know  that  he 
has  at  the  same  time  cut  himself  off  from  the 
whole  social  system.  Yet  he  has  this  privilege 
certainly  from  Zeus  who  framed  society,  for  it  is 
in  our  power  to  grow  again  to  that  which  is  near 
to  us  and  again  to  become  a  part  which  helps  to 
make  up  the  whole.  However  if  it  often  happens, 
this  kind  of  separation,  it  makes  it  difficult  for 
that  which  detaches  itself  to  be  brought  to  unity 
and  to  be  restored  to  its  former  condition.  Fi- 
nally, the  branch,  which  from  the  first  grew  to- 
gether with  the  tree  and  has  continued  to  have 
one  life  with  it,  is  not  like  that  which  after,  being 
cut  off  is  then  ingrafted,  but  it  is  something  like 
what  the  gardeners  mean  when  they  say  that  it 
grows  with  the  rest  of  the  tree,  but  f  that  it  has 
not  the  same  mind  with  it. 

9.  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way  when 
thou  art  proceeding  according  to  right  reason, 
will  not  be  able  to  turn  thee  aside  from  thy  proper 
action,  so  neither  let  them  drive  thee  from  thy 
benevolent  feelings-  towards  them,  but  be  on  thy 
guard  equally  in  both  matters,  not  only  in  the 
matter  of  steady  judgment  and  action,  but  also  in 


M.   ANT  ONINUS.  XI. 


275 


the  matter  of  gentleness  towards  those  who  try  to 
hinder  or  otherwise  trouble  thee.  For  this  also  is 
a  weakness,  to  be  vexed  at  them,  as  well  as  to 
be  diverted  from  thy  course  of  action  and  to  give 
way  through  fear ;  for  both  are  equally  deserters 
from  their  post,  the  man  who  does  it  through 
fear,  and  the  man  who  is  alienated  from  him  who 
is  by  nature  a  kinsman  and  a  friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to  art, 
for  the  arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things.  But  if 
this  is  so,  that  nature  which  is  the  most  perfect 
and  the  most  comprehensive  of  all  natures,  cannot 
fall  short  of  the  skill  of  art.  Now  all  arts  do  the 
inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the  superior ;  there- 
fore the  universal  nature  does  so  too.  And  indeed 
hence  is  the  origin  of  justice,  and  in  justice  the 
other  virtues  have  their  foundation  :  for  justice 
will  not  be  observed,  if  we  either  care  for  middle 
things  [things  indifferent],  or  are  easily  deceived 
and  careless  and  changeable,  (v.  16.  30  ;  vtt. 
55.) 

11.  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the  pur- 
suits and  avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee,  still 
in  a  manner  thou  goest  to  them.  Let  then  thy 
judgment  about  them  be  at  rest,  and  they  will 
remain  quiet,  and  thou  wilt  not  be  seen  either 
pursuing  or  avoiding. 


276         M.  ANTONINUS.  XI. 


12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains  its 
figure,  when  it  is  neither  extended  towards  any 
object,  nor  contracted  inwards,  nor  dispersed  nor 
sinks  down,  but  is  illuminated  by  light,  by  which 
it  set  s  the  truth,  the  truth  of  all  things  and  the 
truth  that  is  in  itself,    (viu.  41.  45  ;  xn.  3.) 

13.  Suppose  any  man  shall  despise  me.  Let 
him  look  to  that  himself.  But  I  will  look  to  this, 
that  I  be  not  discovered  doing  or  saying  anything 
deserving  of  contempt.  Shall  any  man  hate  me  ? 
Let  him  look  to  it.  But  I  will  be  mild  and  be- 
nevolent towards  every  man  and  even  to  him, 
ready  to  show  him  his  mistake,  not  reproachfully, 
nor  yet  as  making  a  display  of  my  endurance,  but 
nobly  and  honestly,  like  the  great  Phocion,  unless 
indeed  he  only  assumed  it.  For  the  interior 
[parts]  ought  to  be  such,  and  a  man  ought  to  be 
seen  by  the  gods  neither  dissatisfied  with  anything 
nor  complaining.  For  what  evil  is  it  to  thee,  if 
thou  art  now  doing  what  is  agreeable  to  thy  own 
nature  and  art  satisfied  with  that  which  at  this 
moment  is  suitable  to  the  nature  of  the  universe, 
since  thou  art  a  human  being  placed  at  thy  post 
f  to  endure  whatever  is  for  the  common  advantage  ? 

14.  Men  despise  one  another  and  flatter  one 
another  ;  and  men  wish  to  raise  themselves  above 
one  another  and  crouch  before  one  another. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XI.  271 


15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is  he  who  says, 
I  have  determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a  fair  way. 
—  What  art  thou  doing,  man  ?  There  is  no  oc- 
casion to  give  this  notice.  It  will  soon  show 
itself  by  acts.  The  voice  ought  to  be  plainly 
written  on  the  forehead.  Such  as  a  man's  charac- 
ter is,f  he  immediately  shows  it  in  his  eyes,  just 
as  he  who  is  beloved  forthwith  reads  everything 
in  the  eyes  of  lovers.  The  man  who  is  honest 
and  good  ought  to  be  exactly  like  a_man  who 
smells  strong,  so  that  the  bystander  as  soon 
as  he  comes  near  him  must  smell  whether  he 
choose  or  not.  But  the  affectation  of  simplicity  is 
like  a  crooked  stick.4  Nothing  is  more  disgraceful 
than  a  wolfish  friendship  [false  friendship].  Avoid 
this  most  of  all.  The  good  and  simple  and 
benevolent  show  all  these  things  in  the  eyes,  and 
there  is  no  mistaking. 

16.  As  to  living  in  the  best  way,  this  power  is 
in  the  soul,  if  it  be  indifferent  to  things  which  are 
indifferent.  And  it  will  be  indifferent,  if  it  looks 
on  each  of  these  things  separately  and  all  together, 

4  Instead  of  aKal/nTf  Saumaise  reads  aKa^rj.  There  is 
a  Greek  proverb,  OKa/j,(3bv  ^vkov  ovdeiroT'  dp&ov :  "  You 
cannot  make  a  crooked  stick  straight." 

The  wolfish  friendship  is  an  allusion  to  the  fable  of 
the  sheep  and  the  wolves. 


278  M.  ANTONINUS.  XI. 


and  if  it  remembers  that  not  one  of  them  pro- 
duces in  us  an  opinion  about  itself,  nor  comes  to 
us  ;  but  these  things  remain  immovable,  and  it  is 
we  ourselves  who  produce  the  judgments  about 
them,  and,  as  we  may  say,  write  them  in  ourselves, 
it  being  in  our  power  not  to  write  them,  and  it 
being  in  our  power,  if  perchance  these  judgments 
have  imperceptibly  got  admission  to  our  minds, 
to  wipe  them  out ;  and  if  we  remember  also  that 
such  attention  will  only  be  for  a  short  time,  and 
then  life  will  be  at  an  end.  Besides  what  trouble 
is  there  at  all  in  doing  this  ?  For  if  these  things 
are  according  to  nature,  rejoice  in  them,  and  they 
will  be  easy  to  thee  :  but  if  contrary  to  nature, 
seek  what  is  conformable  to  thy  own  nature,  and 
strive  towards  this,  even  if  it  bring  no  reputation ; 
for  every  man  is  allowed  to  seek  his  own  good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come,  and 
of  what  it  consistSjf  and  into  what  it  changes,  and 
what  kind  of  a  thing  it  will  be  when  it  has 
changed,  and  that  it  will  sustain  no  harm. 

18.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  consider 
first]  :  What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and  that  we 
are  made  for  one  another ;  and  in  another  respect, 
I  was  made  to  be  set  over  them,  as  a  ram  over  the 
flock  or  a  bull  over  the  herd.  But  examine  the 
matter  from  first  principles,  from  this :    If  all 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XI.  279 


things  are  not  mere  atoms,  it  is  nature  which 
orders  all  things  :  if  this  is  so,  the  inferior  things 
exist  for  the  sake  of  the  superior  and  these  for 
the  sake  of  one  another,  (n.  1 ;  ix.  39  ;  v.  16 ; 
in.  4) 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are 
at  table,  in  bed,  and  so  forth :  and  particularly, 
under  what  compulsions  in  respect  of  opinions 
they  are;  and  as  to  their  acts,  consider  with  what 
pride  they  do  what  they  do.    (vin.  14;  ix.  34.) 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do,  we 
ought  not  to  be  displeased;  but  if  they  do  not 
right,  it  is  plain  that  they  do  so  involuntarily  and 
in  ignorance.  For  as  every  soul  is  unwillingly 
deprived  of  the  truth,  so  also  is  it  unwillingly 
deprived  of  the  power  of  behaving  to  each  man 
according  to  his  deserts.  Accordingly  men  are 
pained  when  they  are  called  unjust,  ungrateful, 
and  greedy,  and  in  a  word  wrongdoers  to  their 
neighbors,    (vn.  62,  63  ;  n.  1 ;  vii.  26 ;  vm.  29.) 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  many 
things  wrong,  and  that  thou  art  a  man  like  oth- 
ers ;  and  even  if  thou  dost  abstain  from  certain 
faults,  still  thou  hast  the  disposition  to  commit 
them,  though  either  through  cowardice,  or  con- 
cern about  reputation  or  some  such  mean  motive, 
thou  dost  abstain  from  such  faults,    (i.  17.) 


280 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XI. 


Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even  under- 
stand whether  men  are  doing  wrong  or  not,  for 
many  things  are  done  with  a  certain  reference  to 
circumstances.  And  in  short,  a  man  must  learn 
a  great  deal  to  enable  him  to  pass  a  correct  judg- 
ment on  another  man's  acts.    (ix.  38  ;  iv.  51.) 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed  or 
grieved,  that  man's  life  is  only  a  moment,  and 
after  a  short  time  we  are  all  laid  out  dead, 
(vn.  58  ;  iv.  48.) 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men's  acts  which  dis- 
turb us,  for  those  acts  have  their  foundation  in 
men's  ruling  principles,  but  it  is  our  own  opin- 
ions which  disturb  us.  Take  away  these  opin- 
ions then,  and  resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judgment 
about  an  act  as  if  it  were  something  grievous,  and 
thy  anger  is  gone.  How  then  shalt  thou  take 
away  these  opinions  ?  By  reflecting  that  no 
wrongful  act  of  another  brings  shame  on  thee : 
for  unless  that  which  is  shameful  is  alone  bad, 
thou  also  must  of  necessity  do  many  things 
wrong  and  become  a  robber  and  everything 
else.    (v.  25;  vn.  16.) 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is 
brought  on  us  by  the  anger  and  vexation  caused 
by  such  acts  than  by  the  acts  themselves,  at 
which  we  are  angry  and  vexed,  (iv.  39.  49  ; 
vn.  24.) 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XI.  281 


Ninth,  consider  that  benevolence  is  invinci- 
ble, if  it  be  genuine,  and  not  an  affected  smile 
and  acting  a  part.  For  what  will  the  most  vio- 
lent man  do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest  to  be  of 
a  benevolent  disposition  towards  him,  and  if,  as 
opportunity  offers,  thou  gently  admonishest  him 
and  calmly  correctest  his  errors  at  the  very  time 
when  he  is  trying  to  do  thee  harm,  saying,  Not 
so,  my  child  :  we  are  constituted  by  nature  for 
something  else  :  I  shall  certainly  not  be  injured, 
but  thou  art  injuring  thyself,  my  child.  —  And 
show  him  with  gentle  tact  and  by  general  prin- 
ciples that  this  is  so,  and  that  even  bees  do  not 
do  as  he  does,  nor  any  animals  which  are  formed 
by  nature  to  be  gregarious.  And  thou  must  do 
this  neither  with  any  double  meaning  nor  in  the 
way  of  reproach,  but  affectionately  and  without 
any  rancour  in  thy  soul ;  and  not  as  if  thou  wert 
lecturing  him,  nor  yet  that  any  bystander  may 
admire,  but  either  when  he  is  alone,  and  if  others 
are  present  .  .  .5 

Remember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst 
received  them  as  a  gift  from  the  Muses,  and 
begin  at  last  to  be  a  man,  so  long  as  thou  li vest- 
But  thou  must  equally  avoid  nattering  men  and 
being  vexed  at  them,  for  both  are  unsocial  and 
5  It  appears  that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  text  here. 


282 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XI. 


lead  to  harm.  And  let  this  truth  be  present  to 
thee  in  the  excitement  of  anger,  that  to  be  moved 
by  passion  is  not  manly,  but  that  mildness  and 
gentleness,  as  they  are  more  agreeable  to  human 
nature,  so  also  are  they  more  manly ;  and  he 
who  possesses  these  qualities  possesses  strength, 
nerves,  and  courage,  and  not  the  man  who  is 
subject  to  fits  of  passion  and  discontent.  For 
in  the  same  degree  in  which  a  man's  mind  is 
nearer  to  freedom  from  all  passion,  in  the  same 
degree  also  is  it  nearer  to  strength :  and  as  the 
sense  of  pain  is  a  characteristic  of  weakness,  so 
also  is  anger.  For  he  who  yields  to  pain  and  he 
who  yields  to  anger,  both  are  wounded  and  both 
submit.  But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a  tenth 
present  from  the  leader  of  the  Muses  [Apollo], 
and  it  is  this  —  that  to  expect  bad  men  not  to 
do  wrong  is  madness,  for  he  who  expects  this 
desires  an  impossibility.  But  to  allow  men  to 
behave  so  to  others,  and  to  expect  them  not  to 
do  thee  any  wrong,  is  irrational  and  tyrannical. 

19.  There  are  four  principal  aberrations  of 
the  superior  faculty  against  which  thou  shouldst 
be  constantly  on  thy  guard,  and  when  thou  hast 
detected  them,  thou  shouldst  wipe  them  out  and 
say  on  each  occasion  thus  :  this  thought  is  not 
necessary :  -this  tends  to  destroy  social  union: 


M.  ANTONINUS. 


XI. 


283 


this  which  thou  art  going  to  say  comes  not  from 
the  real  thoughts  ;  for  thou  shouldst  consider  it 
among  the  most  absurd  of  things  for  a  man  not 
to  speak  from  his  real  thoughts.  But  the  fourth 
is  when  thou  shalt  reproachf  thyself  for  any- 
thing, for  this  is  an  evidence  of  the  diviner  part 
within  thee  being  overpowered  and  yielding  to 
the  less  honorable  and  to  the  perishable  part, 
the  body,  and  to  its  gross  pleasures,  (iv.  24  ; 
n.  16.) 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all  the  fiery  parts 
which  are  mingled  in  thee,  though  by  nature  they 
have  an  upward  tendency,  still  in  obedience  to 
the  disposition  of  the  universe  they  are  over- 
powered here  in  the  compound  mass  [the  body]. 
And  also  the  whole  of  the  earthy  part  in  thee 
and  the  watery,  though  their  tendency  is  down- 
ward, still  are  raised  up  and  occupy  a  position 
which  is  not  their  natural  one.  In  this  manner 
then  the  elemental  parts  obey  the  universal,  for 
when  they  have  been  fixed  in  any  place  perforce 
they  remain  there  until  again  the  universal  shall 
sound  the  signal  for  dissolution.  Is  it  not  then 
strange  that  thy  intelligent  part  only  should  be 
disobedient  and  discontented  with  its  own  place  ? 
And  yet  no  force  is  imposed  on  it,  but  only  those 
things  which  are  conformable  to  its  nature  :  still 


284 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XI. 


it  does  not  submit,  but  is  carried  in  the  opposite 
direction.  For  the  movement  towards  injustice 
and  intemperance  and  to  anger  and  grief  and 
fear  is  nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who 
deviates  from  nature.  And  also  when  the  ruling 
faculty  is  discontented  with  anything  that  hap- 
pens, then  too  it  deserts  its  post :  for  it  is  con- 
stituted for  piety  and  reverence  towards  the  gods 
no  less  than  for  justice.  For  these  qualities  also 
are  comprehended  under  the  generic  term  of 
contentment  with  the  constitution  of  things,  and 
indeed  they  are  prior  6  to  acts  of  justice. 

6  The  word  irpsa^vTepa,  which  is  here  translated 
"  prior,"  may  also  mean  "  superior :  "  but  Antoninus 
seems  to  say  that  piety  and  reverence  of  the  gods  pre- 
cede all  virtues,  and  that  other  virtues  are  derived  from 
them,  even  justice,  which  in  another  passage  (xi.  10) 
he  makes  the  foundation  of  all  virtues.  The  ancient 
notion  of  justice  is  that  of  giving  to  every  one  his  due. 
It  is  not  a  legal  definition,  as  some  have  supposed,  but  a 
moral  rule  which  law  cannot  in  all  cases  enforce.  Be- 
sides law  has  its  own  rules,  which  are  sometimes  moral 
and  sometimes  immoral ;  but  it  enforces  them  all  simply 
because  they  are  general  rules,  and  if  it  did  not  or  could 
not  enforce  them,  so  far  Law  would  not  be  Law.  Jus- 
tice, or  the  doing  what  is  just,  implies  a  universal  rule 
and  obedience  to  it ;  and  as  we  all  live  under  universal 
Law,  which  commands  both  our  body  and  our  intelli- 
gence, and  is  the  law  of  our  nature,  that  is  the  law  of 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XI.  285 


21.  He  who  has  not  one  and  always  the  same 
object  in  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all 
through  his  life.  But  what  I  have  said  is  not 
enough,  unless  this  also  is  added,  what  this  object 
ought  to  be.  For  as  there  is  not  the  same  opin- 
ion about  all  the  things  which  in  some  way  or 
other  are  considered  by  the  majority  to  be  good, 
but  only  about  some  certain  things,  that  is,  things 
which  concern  the  common  interest;  so  also 
ought  we  to  propose  to  ourselves  an  object  which 
shall  be  of  a  common  kind  [social]  and  political. 
For  he  who  directs  all  his  own  efforts  to  this 
object,  will  make  all  his  acts  alike,  and  thus  will 
always  be  the  same. 

22.  Think  of  the  country  mouse  and  of  the 
town  mouse,  and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation  of 
the  town  mouse.7 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the 
many  by  the  name  of  Lamiae,  bugbears  te 
frighten  children. 

the  whole  constitution  of  man,  we  must  endeavour  tc 
discover  what  this  supreme  Law  is.  It  is  the  will  of 
the  power  that  rules  all.  By  acting  in  obedience  to  this 
will,  we  do  justice,  and  by  consequence  everything  else 
that  we  ought  to  do. 

7  The  story  is  told  by  Horace  in  his  Satires  (n.  6), 
and  by  others  since,  but  not  better. 


286        M.  ANT  ONIN  U  S.  XI. 


24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  public  spec- 
tacles used  to  set  seats  in  the  shade  for  strangers, 
but  themselves  sat  down  anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccas 8  for 
not  going  to  him,  saying,  It  is  because  I  would  not 
perish  by  the  worst  of  all  ends,  that  is,  I  would 
not  receive  a  favor  and  then  be  unable  to  return  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  jfi  the  [Ephesians] 9  there 
was  this  precept,  constantly  to  think  of  some  one 
of  the  men  of  former  times  who  practised  virtue. 

27.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the  morning 
look  to  the  heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded  of 
those  bodies  which  continually  do  the  same  things 
and  in  the  same  manner  perform  their  work,  and 
also  be  reminded  of  their  purity  and  nudity.  For 
there  is  no  veil  over  a  star. 

28.  Consider  what  a  man  Socrates  was  when 
he  dressed  himself  in  a  skin,  after  Xanthippe  had 
taken  his  cloak  and  gone  out,  and  what  Socrates 
said  to  his  friends  who  were  ashamed  of  him  and 
drew  back  from  him  when  they  saw  him  dressed 
thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt  thou 

8  Perhaps  the  emperor  made  a  mistake  here,  for  other 
writers  say  that  it  was  Archelaus,  the  son  of  Perdiccas, 
who  invited  Socrates  to  Macedonia. 

9  Gataker  suggested  'EmKovpeiuv  for  'E0£<t£(jv. 


M .  ANTONINUS. 


XI. 


287 


be  able  to  lay  down  rules  for  others  before  thou 
shalt  have  first  learned  to  obey  rules  thyself. 
Much  more  is  this  so  in  life. 

30.  A  slave  thou  art:  free  speech  is  not  for 
thee. 

31.   And  my  heart  laughed  within.  (Od. 

rx.  413.) 

32.  And  virtue  they  will  curse  speaking  harsh 
words.    (Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  184.) 

33.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  winter  is  a  madman's 
act :  such  is  he  who  looks  for  his  child  when  it  is 
no  longer  allowed.    (Epictetus,  in.  24.) 

34.  When  a  man  kisses  his  child,  said  Epicte- 
tus, he  should  whisper  to  himself,  "  To-morrow 
perchance  thou  wilt  die  "  —  But  those  are  words 
of  bad  omen  —  "  No  word  is  a  word  of  bad 
omen/'  said  Epictetus,  "  which  expresses  any 
work  of  nature  ;  or  if  it  is  so,  it  is  also  a  word 
of  bad  omen  to  speak  of  the  ears  of  corn  being 
reaped."    (Epictetus,  m.  24.) 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the 
dried  grape,  all  are  changes,  not  into  nothing,  but 
into  something  which  exists  not  yet.  (Epictetus, 
in.  24.) 

36.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will. 
(Epictetus,  in.  22.) 

37.  Epictetus  also  said,  a  man  must  discover 


288        M.ANTONINUS.  XI. 


an  art  [or  rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  as- 
sent; and  in  respect  to  his  movements  he  must 
be  careful  that  they  be  made  with  regard  to  cir- 
cumstances, that  they  be  consistent  with  social 
interests,  that  they  have  regard  to  the  value  of 
the  object;  and  as  to  sensual  desire,  he  should 
altogether  keep  away  from  it ;  and  as  to  avoid- 
ance, [aversion]  he  should  not  show  it  with  re- 
spect to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power. 

38.  The  dispute  then,  he  said,  is  not  about 
any  common  matter,  but  about  being  mad  or  not. 

39.  Socrates  used  to  say,  What  do  you  want  ? 
Souls  of  rational  men  or  irrational  ?  —  Souls  of 
rational  men  —  Of  what  rational  men  ?  Sound  or 
unsound  ?  —  Sound  —  Why  then  do  you  not  seek 
for  them  ?  —  Because  we  have  them  —  Why  then 
do  you  fight  and  quarrel  ? 


XII. 

LL  those  things  at  which  thou  wish- 
est  to  arrive  by  a  circuitous  road, 
thou  canst  have  now,  if  thou  dost 
not  refuse  them  to  thyself.  And 
this  means,  if  thou  wilt  take  no  notice  of  all  the 
past,  and  trust  the  future  to  providence,  and  di- 
rect the  present  only  conformably  to  piety  and  jus- 
tice. Conformably  to  piety,  that  thou  mayst  be  v 
content  with  the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  thee,  for 
nature  designed  it  for  thee  and  thee  for  it.  Con- 
formably to  justice,  that  thou  mayst  always  speak 
the  truth  freely  and  without  disguise,  and  do  the 
things  which  are  agreeable  to  law  and  according 
to  the  worth  of  each.  And  let  neither  another 
man's  wickedness  hinder  thee,  nor  opinion  nor 
voice,  nor  yet  the  sensations  of  the  poor  flesh 
which  has  grown  about  thee ;  for  the  passive  part 
will  look  to  this.  If  then,  whatever  the  time  may 
be  when  thou  shalt  be  near  to  thy  departure,  neg- 
lecting everything  else  thou  shalt  respect  only  thy 
19 


290         M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within  thee,  and 
if  thou  shalt  be  afraid  not  because  thou  must 
some  time  cease  to  live,  but  if  thou  shalt  fear 
never  to  have  begun  to  live  according  to  nature 
—  then  thou  wilt  be  a  man  worthy  of  the  uni- 
verse which  has  produced  thee,  and  thou  wilt 
cease  to  be  a  stranger  in  thy  native  land,  and  to 
wonder  at  things  which  happen  daily  as  if  they 
were  something  unexpected,  and  to  be  dependent 
on  this  or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  (ruling  principles)  of 
all  men  bared  of  the  material  vesture  and  rind 
and  impurities.  With  his  intellectual  part  alone 
he  touches  the  intelligence  only  which  has  flowed 
and  been  derived  from  himself  into  these  bodies. 
And  if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to  do  this,  thou  wilt 
rid  thyself  of  thy  much  trouble.  For  he  who 
regards  not  the  poor  flesh  which  envelopes  him, 
surely  will  not  trouble  himself  by  looking  after 
raiment  and  dwelling  and  fame  and  such  like 
externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art 
composed,  body,  breath  [life],  intelligence.  Of 
these  the  first  two  are  thine,  so  far  as  it  is  thy 
duty  to  take  care  of  them ;  but  the  third  alone  is 
properly  thine.  Therefore  if  thou  shalt  separate 
from  thyself,  that  is,  from  thy  understanding,  what- 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XII.  291 


ever  others  do  or  say,  and  whatever  thou  hast 
done  or  said  thyself,  and  whatever  future  things 
trouble  thee  because  they  may  happen,  and  what- 
ever in  the  body  which  envelopes  thee  or  in  the 
breath,  [life]  which  is  by  nature  associated  with 
the  body,  is  attached  to  thee  independent  of  thy 
will,  and  whatever  the  external  circumfluent  vor- 
tex whirls  round,  so  that  the  intellectual  power 
exempt  from  the  things  of  fate  can  live  pure  and 
free  by  itself,  doing  what  is  just  and  accepting 
what  happens  and  saying  the  truth  :  if  thou  wilt 
separate,  I  say,  from  this  ruling  faculty  the  things 
which  are  attached  to  it  by  the  impressions  of 
sense,  and  the  things  of  time  to  come  and  of  time 
that  is  past,  and  wilt  make  thyself  like  Empe- 
docles'  sphere,  — 

All  round,  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing ; 1 

and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what  is  really 
thy  life,  that  is,  the  present  —  then  thou  wilt  be 
able  to  pass  that  portion  of  life  which  remains  for 
thee  up  to  the  time  of  thy  death,  free  from  per- 
turbations, nobly,  and  obedient  to  thy  own  daemon 
[to  the  god  that  is  within  thee],  (n.  13.  17  ;  nr. 
5,  6;  xi.  12.) 

1  The  verse  of  Empedocles  is  corrupt  in  Antoninus, 
It  has  been  restored  by  Peyron  thus  : 

Z<j>alpog  KVKTiorepTjg  f/ovlrj  TrepLyT}-&el  yatuv. 


292 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


4.  I  have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that  every 
man  loves  himself  more  than  all  the  rest  of  men, 
but  yet  sets  less  value  on  his  own  opinion  of  him- 
self than  on  the  opinion  of  others.  If  then  a  god 
or  a  wise  teacher  should  present  himself  to  a  man 
and  bid  him  to  think  of  nothing  and  to  design 
nothing  which  he  would  not  express  as  soon  as  he 
conceived  it,  he  could  not  endure  it  even  for  a 
single  day.  So  much  more  respect  have  we  to 
what  our  neighbors  shall  think  of  us  than  to  what 
we  shall  think  of  ourselves. 

5.  How  can  it  be  that  the  gods  after  having 
arranged  all  things  well  and  benevolently  for  man- 
kind, have  overlooked  this  alone,  that  some  men 
and  very  good  men,  and  men  who,  as  we  may  say, 
have  had  most  communion  with  the  divinity,  and 
through  pious  acts  and  religious  observances  have 
been  most  intimate  with  the  divinity,  when  they 
have  once  died  should  never  exist  again,  but 
should  be  completely  extinguished  ? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought  to 
have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  done  it. 
For  if  it  were  just,  it  would  also  be  possible  ;  and 
if  it  were  according  to  nature,  nature  would  have 
had  it  so.  But  because  it  is  not  so,  if  in  fact  it  is 
not  so,  be  thou  convinced  that  it  ought  not  to  have 
been  so :  —  for  thou  seest  even  of  thyself  that  in 


M .   ANTONINUS.  XTI. 


293 


this  inquiry  fhou  art  disputing  with  the  deity; 
and  we  should  not  thus  dispute  with  the  gods, 
unless  they  were  most  excellent  and  most  just ;  — 
but  if  this  is  so,  they  would  not  have  allowed  any- 
thing in  the  ordering  of  the  universe  to  be  neg- 
lected unjustly  and  irrationally. 

6.  Practise  thyself  even  in  the  things  which 
thou  despairest  of  accomplishing.  For  even  the 
left  hand,  which  is  ineffectual  for  all  other  things 
for  want  of  practice,  holds  the  bridle  more  vigor- 
ously than  the  right  hand  ;  for  it  has  been  prac- 
tised in  this. 

7.  Consider  in  what  condition  both  in  body  and  \ 
soul  a  man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken  by 
death  ;   and  consider  the  shortness  of  life,  the 
boundless  abyss  of  time  past  and  future,  the 
feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles  [forms] 
of  things  bare  of  their  coverings  ;  the  purposes  of 
actions ;  consider  what  pain  is,  what  pleasure  is, 
and  death,  and  fame  ;  who  is  to  himself  the  cause 
of  his  uneasiness  ;  how  no  man  is  hindered  by  an- 
other ;  that  everything  is  opinion. 

9.  Tn  the  application  of  thy  principles  thou 
must  be  like  the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  gladia- 
tor ;  for  the  gladiator  lets  fall  the  sword  which 
he  uses  and  is  killed ;  but  the  other  always  has 


294 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


his^  hand,  and  needs  to  do  nothing  else  than 
use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves,  dividing 
them  into  matter,  form  and  purpose. 

11.  What  a  power  man  has  to  do  nothing  ex- 
cept what  God  will  approve,  and  to  accept  all  that 
God  may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  con- 
formably to  nature,  we  ought  to  blame  neither 
gods,  for  they  do  nothing  wrong  either  voluntarily 
or  involuntarily,  nor  men,  for  they  do  nothing 
wrong  except  involuntarily.  Consequently  we 
should  blame  nobody.  (n.  11,  12,  13;  vn.  62; 
vni.  17.) 

13.  How  ridiculous  and  what  a  stranger  he  is 
who  is  surprised  at  anything  which  happens  in 
life. 

14.  Either  there  is  a  fatal  necessity  and  invin- 
cible order,  or  a  kind  providence,  or  a  confusion 
without  a  purpose  and  without  a  director.  If 
then  there  is  an  invincible  necessity,  why  dost 
thou  resist?  But  if  there  is  a  providence  which 
allows  itself  to  be  propitiated,  make  thyself 
worthy  of  the  help  of  the  divinity.  But  if 
there  is  a  confusion  without  a  governor,  be  content 
that  in  such  a  tempest  thou  hast  in  thyself  a  cer- 
tain ruling  intelligence.    And  even  if  the  tempest 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


295 


cany  thee  away,  let  it  carry  away  the  poor  flesh, 
the  breath,  everything  else  ;  for  the  intelligence  at 
least  it  will  not  carry  away. 

1 5.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without 
losing  its  splendor  until  it  is  extinguished  ;  and 
shall  the  truth  which  is  in  thee  and  justice  and 
temperance  be  extinguished  [before  thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a  man  has  presented  the  appearance 
of  having  done  wrong,  [say,]  How  then  do  I  know 
if  this  is  a  wrongful  act  ?  And  even  if  he  has 
done  wrong,  how  do  I  know  that  he  has  not  con- 
demned himself?  and  so  this  is  like  tearing  his 
own  face.  Consider  that  he,  who  would  not  have 
the  bad  man  do  wrong,  is  like  the  man  who  would 
not  have  the  fig-tree  to  bear  juice  in  the  figs  and 
infants  to  cry  and  the  horse  to  neigh,  and  what- 
ever else  must  of  necessity  be.  For  what  must  a 
man  do  who  has  such  a  character?  If  then  thou 
art  irritable,f  cure  this  man's  disposition.2 

17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it:  if  it  is  not 
true,  do  not  say  it.    [For  let  thy  efforts  be.  — ]3 

18.  In  everything  always  observe  what  the 
thing  is  which  produces  for  thee  an  appearance, 

2  The  interpreters  translate  yopyog  by  the  words  "  acer, 
validusque,"  and  "skilful."  Bat  in  Epictetus  yopyw; 
means  "  vehement,"  "  prone  to  anger,"  "  irritable." 

3  There  is  something  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


296        M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


and  resolve  it  by  dividing  it  into  the  formal,  the 
material,  the  purpose,  and  the  time  within  which 
it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee 
something  better  and  more  divine  than  the 
things  which  cause  the  various  affects,  and  as  it 
were  pull  thee  by  the  strings.  What  is  there 
now  in  my  mind  ?  is  it  fear,  or  suspicion,  or  de- 
sire, or  anything  of  the  kind  ?  (v.  1 1 .) 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderately,  nor  with- 
out a  purpose.  Second,  make  thy  acts  refer  to 
nothing  else  than  to  a  social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be  no- 
body and  nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the  things  ex- 
ist which  thou  now  seest,  nor  any  of  those  who 
are  now  living.  For  all  things  are  formed  by 
nature  to  change  and  be  turned  and  to  perish  in 
order  that  other  things  in  continuous  succession 
may  exist. 

22.  Consider  that  everything  is  opinion,  and 
opinion  is  in  thy  power.  Take  away  then,  when 
thou  choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a  mariner, 
who  has  doubled  the  promontory,  thou  wilt  find 
calm,  everything  stable,  and  a  waveless  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity  whatever  it  may  be,  when 
it  has  ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  be- 
cause it  has  ceased  ;  nor  he  who  has  done  this  act, 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XII.  207 


does  he  suffer  any  evil  for  this  reason  that  the  act 
has  ceased.  In  like  manner  then  the  whole  which 
consists  of  all  the  acts,  which  is  our  life,  if  it 
cease  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  for  this 
reason  that  it  has  ceased  ;  nor  he  who  has  termi- 
nated this  series  at  the  proper  time,  has  he  been 
ill  dealt  with.  But  the  proper  time  and  the  limit 
nature  fixes,  sometimes  as  in  old  age  the  peculiar 
nature  of  man,  but  always  the  universal  nature, 
by  the  change  of  whose  parts  the  whole  universe 
continues  ever  young  and  perfect.  And  every- 
thing which  is  useful  to  the  universal  is  always 
good  and  in  season.  Therefore  the  termination 
of  life  for  every  man  is  no  evil,  because  neither  is 
it  shameful,  since  it  is  both  independent  of  the 
will  and  not  opposed  to  the  general  interest,  but 
it  is  good,  since  it  is  seasonable  and  profitable  to 
and  congruent  with  the  universal.  For  thus  too  i 
he  is  moved  by  the  deity  who  is  moved  in  the 
same  manner  with  the  deity  and  towards  the 
same  things  in  his  mind. 

24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in 
readiness.  In  the  things  which  thou  doest  do 
nothing  either  inconsiderately  or  otherwise  than 
as  justice  herself  would  act ;  but  with  respect  to 
what  may  happen  to  thee  from  without,  consider 
that  it  happens  either  by  chance  or  according  to 


298 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


providence,  and  thou  must  neither  blame  chance 
nor  accuse  providence.  Second,  consider  what 
every  being  is  from  the  seed  to  the  time  of  its 
receiving  a  soul,  and  from  the  reception  of  a  soul 
to  the  giving  back  of  the  same,  and  of  what  things 
every  being  is  compounded  and  into  what  things 
it  is  resolved.  Third,  if  thou  shouldst  suddenly 
be  raised  up  above  the  earth,  and  shouldst  look 
down  on  human  things,  and  observe  the  variety 
of  them  how  great  it  is,  and  at  the  same  time  also 
shouldst  see  at  a  glance  how  great  is  the  number 
of  beings  who  dwell  all  around  in  the  air  and  the 
aether,  consider  that  as  often  as  thou  shouldst  be 
raised  up,  thou  wouldst  see  the  same  things,  same- 
ness of  form  and  shortness  of  duration.  Are 
these  things  to  be  proud  of? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion :  thou  art  saved.  Who 
then  hinders  thee  from  casting  it  away  ? 

26.  When  thou  art  troubled '  about  anything, 
thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen 
according  to  the  universal  nature  ;  and  forgotten 
this,  that  a  man's  wrongful  act  is  nothing  to  thee  ; 
and  further  thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  every- 
thing which  happens,  always  happened  so  and  will 
happen  so,  and  now  happens  so  everywhere ;  for- 
gotten this  too,  how  close  is  the  kinship  between 
a  man  and  the  whole  human  race,  for  it  is  a  com- 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XI J.  299 


munity,  not  of  a  little  blood  or  seed,  bat  of  intel- 
ligence. And  thou  hast  forgotten  this  too,  that 
every  man's  intelligence  is  a  god,  and  is  an  efflux 
of  the  deity  ;  and  forgotten  this,  that  nothing  is  a 
man's  own,  but  that  his  child  and  his  body  and 
his  very  soul  came  from  the  deity  ;  forgotten  this, 
that  everything  is  opinion  ;  and  lastly  thou  hast 
forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present  time 
only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection  those 
who  have  complained  greatly  about  anything, 
those  who  have  been  most  conspicuous  by  the 
greatest  fame  or  misfortunes  or  enmities  or  for- 
tunes of  any  kind :  then  think  where  are  they  all 
now  ?  Smoke  and  ash  and  a  tale,  or  not  even  a 
tale.  And  let  there  be  present  to  thy  mind  also 
everything  of  this  sort,  how  Fabius  Catullinus 
lived  in  the  country,  and  Lucius  Lupus  in  his 
gardens,  and  Stertinius  at  Baiae,  and  Tiberius  at 
Capreae  and  Velius  Rufus  [or  Rufus  at  Velia]  ; 
and  in  fine  think  of  the  eager  pursuit  of  anything 
conjoined  with  pride ;  and  how  worthless  every- 
thing is  after  which  men  violently  strain  ;  and  how 
much  more  philosophical  it  is  for  a  man  in  the 
opportunities  presented  to  him  to  show  himself 
just,  temperate,  obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to  do 
this  with  all  simplicity :  for  the  pride  which  is 


300 


M.  ANTONINUS.  XII. 


proud  of  its  want  of  pride  is  the  most  intolerable 
of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen 
the  gods  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they 
exist  and  so  worshippest  them,  I  answer,  in  the 
first  place,  they  may  be  seen  even  with  the  eyes  ; 4 

4  "  Seen  even  with  the  eyes."  It  is  supposed  that  this 
may  be  explained  by  the  Stoic  doctrine,  that  the  universe 
is  a  god  (iv.  23),  and  that  the  celestial  bodies  are  gods 
(viii.  19).  But  the  emperor  may  mean  that  we  know 
that  the  gods  exist,  as  he  afterwards  states  it,  because 
we  see  what  they  do  ;  as  we  know  that  man  has  intellect- 
ual powers,  because  we  see  what  he  does,  and  in  no  other 
way  do  we  know  it.  This  passage  then  will  agree  with 
the  passage  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans  (i.  v.  20),  and 
with  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians  (i.  v.  15),  in  which 
Jesus  Christ  is  named  "  the  image  of  the  invisible 
god  ;  "  and  with  the  passage  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John 
(xtv.  v.  9). 

Gataker,  whose  notes  are  a  wonderful  collection  of 
learning,  and  all  of  it  sound  and  good,  quotes  a  passage 
of  Calvin  which  is  founded  on  St.  Paul's  language  (Rom. 
i.  v.  20)  :  "  God  by  creating  the  universe  [or  world, 
mundum],  being  himself  invisible,  has  presented  himself 
to  our  eyes  conspicuously  in  a  certain  visible  form." 
He  also  quotes  Seneca  (De  Benef.  iv.  c.  8.)  :  "  Quo- 
cunque  te  flexeris,  ibi  ilium  videbis  occurrentem  tibi : 
nihil  ab  illo  vacat,  opus  suum  ipse  implet."  Compare 
also  Cicierd",  De  Senectute  (c.  22),  and  Xenophon's 
Cyropaedia.  (viii.  7-)  I  think  that  my  interpretation  of 
Antoninus  is  right. 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XII.  301 

in  the  second  place  neither  have  I  seen  even  my 
own  soul  and  yet  I  honor  it.  Thus  then  with 
respect  to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  expe- 
rience of  their  power,  from  this  I  comprehend 
that  they  exist  and  I  venerate  them. 

29.  The  safety  of  life  is  this,  to  examine  every-  ^ 
thing  all  through,  what  it  is  itself,  what  is  its  ma- 
terial, what  its  formal  part ;  with  all  thy  soul  to 
do  justice  and  to  say  the  truth.  What  remains 
except  to  enjoy  life  by  joining  one  good  thing  to 
another  so  as  not  to  leave  even  the  smallest  inter- 
vals between  ? 

30.  There  is  one  light  of  the  sun,  though  it  is 
distributed  over  walls,  mountains,  and  other  things 
infinite.  There  is  one  common  substance,  though 
it  is  distributed  among  countless  bodies  which 
have  their  several  qualities.  There  is  one  soul, 
though  it  is  distributed  among;  infinite  natures 
and  individual  circumscriptions  [or  individuals]. 
There  is  one  intelligent  soul,  though  it  seems  to 
be  divided.  Now  in  the  things  which  have  been 
mentioned  all  the  other  parts,  such  as  those  which 
are  air  and  substance,  are  without  sensation  and 
have  no  fellowship  :  and  yet  even  these  parts  the 
intelligent  principle  holds  together  and  the  gravi- 
tation towards  the  same.  But  intellect  in  a  pecul- 
iar manner  tends  to  that  which  is  of  the  same  kin, 


302 


M .  ANTONINUS. 


XII. 


and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling  for  com- 
munion is  not  interrupted. 

31.  What  dost  thou  wish?  to  continue  to  exist? 
Well,  dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensation  ?  move- 
ment ?  growth  ?  and  then  again  to  cease  to  grow  ? 
to  use  thy  speech  ?  to  think  ?  What  is  there  of 
all  these  things  which  seems  to  thee  worth  desir- 
ing ?  But  if  it  is  easy  to  set  little  value  on  all 
these  things,  turn  to  that  which  remains,  which  is 
to  follow  reason  and  god.  But  it  is  inconsistent 
with  honoring  reason  and  god  to  be  troubled  be- 
cause by  death  a  man  will  be  deprived  of  the 
other  things. 

32.  How  small  a  part  of  the  boundless  and  un- 
fathomable time  is  assigned  to  every  man  ?  for  it 
is  very  soon  swallowed  up  in  the  eternal.  And 
how  small  a  part  of  the  whole  substance  ?  and 
how  small  a  part  of  the  universal  soul  ?  and  on 
what  a  small  clod  of  the  whole  earth  thou  creep- 
est  ?  Reflecting  on  all  this  consider  nothing  to  be 
great,  except  to  act  as  thy  nature  leads  thee,  and 
to  endure  that  which  the  common  nature  brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use  of 
itself?  for  all  lies  in  this.  But  everything  else, 
whether  it  is  in  the  power  of  thy  will  or  not,  is 
cnly  lifeless  ashes  and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move  us 


M.  ANTONINUS.    XII.  303 


to  contempt  of  death,  that  even  those  who  think 
pleasure  to  be  a  good  and  pain  an  evil  still  have 
despised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good  which 
comes  in  due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is  the  same 
thing  whether  he  has  done  more  or  fewer  acts  con- 
formable to  right  reason,  and  to  whom  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  he  contemplates  the  world 
for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time  —  for  this  man 
neither  is  death  a  terrible  thing,  (in.  7  ;  vi.  23  ; 
x.  20  ;  xii.  23.) 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a  citizen  in  this  great 
state  [the  world] :  what  difference  does  it  make 
to  thee  whether  for  five  years  [or  three]  ?  for  that 
which  is  conformable  to  the  laws  is  just  for  all. 
Where  is  the  hardship  then,  if  no  tyrant  nor  yet 
an  unjust  judge  sends  thee  away  from  the  state, 
but  nature  who  brought  thee  into  it  ?  the  same  as 
if  a  praetor  who  has  employed  an  actor  dismisses 
him  from  the  stage  —  "  But  I  have  not  finished 
the  five  acts,  but  only  three  of  them  " — Thou 
sayest  well,  but  in  life  the  three  acts  are  the  whole 
drama ;  for  what  shall  be  a  complete  drama  is 
determined  by  him  who  was  once  the  cause  of  its 
composition,  and  now  of  its  dissolution  :  but  thou 
art  the  cause  of  neither.  Depart  then  satisfied, 
for  he  also  who  releases  thee  is  satisfied. 


INDEX. 


) 


INDEX. 


adid<popa  (indifferentia,  Cicero) ;  things  indifferent,  nei- 
ther good  nor  bad  ;  the  same  as  fieoa. 

aiaxpog  (turpis,  Cic.),  ugly  ;  morally  ugly. 

airia,  cause. 

atnwdtf,  ahiov,  to,  the  formal  principle,  the  cause. 
ava<popa,  reference,  relation  to  a  purpose. 
anop'p'oia.,  efflux. 

aTzpoa'ipera,  ra,  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  will  or 
power. 

apXV,  a  first  principle. 

urofioi  (corpora  individua,  Cic),  atoms. 

avTapKeia,  est  quae  parvo  contenta  omne  id  respuit  quod 
abundat  (Cicero)  ;  contentment. 

avTapKTjc,  sufficient  in  itself ;  contented. 

yiyvofieva,  tu,  things  which  are  produced,  come  into  ex- 
istence. 

daLfxuv,  god,  god  in  man,  man's  intelligent  principle. 

diadsoig,  disposition,  affection  of  the  mind. 

dia'tpeciQ,  division  of  things  into  their  parts,  dissection, 
resolution,  analysis. 

dL(ikeiiTiK7),  ars  bene  disserendi  et  vera  ac  falsa  dijudicandi 
(Cic.) 

dialvaig,  dissolution,  the  opposite  of  ovyKpioit. 

dcavoia,  understanding ;  sometimes,  the  mind  generally, 
the  whole  intellectual  power. 

66y/uara  (decreta,  Cic),  principles. 

kyKoareia,  temperance,  self-restraint. 


308 


INDEX. 


aldog,  in  divisione  formae  sunt,  quas  Graeci  ildr)  vocant; 
nostri,  si  qui  haec  forte  tractant,  species  appellant  (Cic.) 
But  eldog  is  used  by  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  less  ex- 
actly and  as  a  general  term,  like  genus.  Index  Epict. 
ed.  Sell  weigh.  —  'flf  6e  ye  ai  Tvptirai  ovaiai  npdg  rd  ak"ka 
hxovatv,  ovru  kcu  to  eldog  itpog  to  yevog  ex£L '  vnoKeiTai 
yap  to  eldog  t<j  yivei.    (Aristot.  Cat.  c.  5.) 

eiftapfxevn,  (f'atalis  necessitas,  fatum,  Cic),  destiny,  neces- 
sity. 

EKKliaeig,  aversions,  avoidance,  the  turning  away  from 
things  ;  the  opposite  of  6pe£eig. 

efixlrvxa,  tci,  things  which  have  life. 

evepyeia,  action,  activity. 

evvoia,  ivvoiai,  notio,  notiones  (Cic),  or  "notitiae  rerum;" 
notions  of  things.  (Notionem  appello  quam  Graeci  turn 
evvoiav,  turn  TrpoXrjyjiv,  Cic) 

emoTpotpq,  attention  to  an  object. 

evdvfiia,  animi  tranquillitas,  (Cic.) 

fyyefiovttcov,  to,  the  ruling  faculty;  principatus,  (Cicero.) 

deuprjfiaTa,  percepta  (Cic),  things  perceived,  general 
principles. 

mXog,  beautiful. 

KaTaknipig,  comprehension ;  cognitio,  perceptio,  compre- 
hensio  (Cicero). 

KaTaoKevr),  constitution. 

KdTop$C)oeLg,  mTopdufLOTa ;  recta,  recte  facta  (Cicero); 
right  acts,  those  acts  to  which  we  proceed  by  the  right 
or  straight  road. 

tcocfiog,  order,  world,  universe. 

KOGftog,  6  blog,  the  universe,  that  which  is  the  One  and 
the  All,  (vi.  25.) 

TioyiKa,  to,,  the  things  which  have  reason. 

TuoyiKog,  rational. 

Aoyof,  reason. 

"Kbyog  oTvepfiaTMog,  seminal  principle. 

ueaa,  rd,  things  indifferent,  viewed  with  respect  to  vir- 
tue. 


INDEX. 


809 


voepog,  intellectual. 

vofiog,  law. 

vovg,  intelligence. 

olrjoig,  arrogance,  pride.  It  sometimes  means  in  Anto- 
ninus the  same  as  rv<poc ;  but  it  also  means  "  opinion." 

otKOvofiia  (dispositio,  ordo,  Cic),  has  sometimes  the  pe- 
culiar sense  of  artifice,  or  doing  something  with  an 
apparent  purpose  different  from  the  real  purpose. 

5/loi>,  to,  the  universe,  the  whole. 

bvra,  to,  things  which  exist ;  existence,  being. 

opc^f,  desire  of  a  thing,  which  is  opposed  to  ewclLiaig, 
aversion. 

bppr],  movement  towards  an  object,  appetite  ;  appetitio, 
naturalis  appetitus,  appetitus  animi  (Cicero). 

ovoia,  substance,  (vi.  49.)  Modern  writers  sometimes 
incorrectly  translate  it  "essentia."  It  is  often  used  by 
Epictetus  in  the  same  sense  as  vfa].  Aristotle  (Cat. 
c.  5)  defines  ovaca,  and  it  is  properly  translated  "  sub- 
stantia "  (ed.  Jul.  Pacius).  Porphyrius  (Isag.  c.  2): 
7]  ovoia  avuraro  ovaa  r£>  ftqdev  elvai  npb  avrfjg  yevog  }]v  rd 
yeviKurarov. 

napanovkriOiiiri  dvvafug,  ij,  the  power  which  enables  us  to 
observe  and  understand. 

ireioic,  passivity,  opposed  to  hepyeia. 

Trepiardoeic,  circumstances,  the  things  which  surround 

us ;  troubles,  difficulties. 
•Kszcpmievr],  T],  destiny. 

Tcpoaipeoig,  purpose,  free  will. 

irpoatpera,  ra)  things  which  are  within  our  will  or  power. 

irpoaipertKov,  to,  free  will. 

Trpo&eoic,  a  purpose,  proposition. 

irpovoia  (providentia,  Cic),  providence. 

okottoc,  object,  purpose. 

oToixelov,  element. 

GvyKaTadeatc  (assensio,  approbatio,  Cic),  assent;  ovyita- 
TCfdeoeig  (probationes,  Gellius,  xix.  1). 

avynpLoig,  the  act  of  combining  elements  out  of  which  a 
body  is  produced,  combination. 


310 


INDEX. 


ibto},  matter,  material. 

Hikov,  to,  the  material  principle. 

vTze^atpeaLg,  exception,  reservation ;  fie&'  im^aipeaeug,  con- 
ditionally. 

V7r6decig,  material  to  work  on ;  thing  to  employ  the  rea- 
son on  ;  proposition,  thing  assumed  as  matter  for  argu- 
ment and  to  lead  to  conclusions.  (Quaestionum  duo 
sunt  genera ;  alteram  infinitum,  definitum  alteram. 
Definitum  est,  quod  imo&eoiv  Graeci,  nos  causam  :  infi- 
nitum, quod  Mauv  illi  appellant,  nos  propositum  possu- 
mus  nominare.   Cic.   See  Aristot.  Anal.  Post.  i.  c.  2). 

VTrolrjTpLg,  opinion. 

biroaTaaLQ,  basis,  substance,  being  (x.  5).  Epictetus  has 
tl  to  VTTOOTanicdv  nal  ovottideg. 

ixploTciod-ai,  to  subsist,  to  be. 

tyavTaoiai  (visus,  Cic);  appearances,  thoughts,  impres- 
sions (visa  animi:  Gellius,  xix.  1)  :  QavTaoia,  ion 
TVTTuaic  ev  ipvxy. 

<$>dvTaona,  seems  to  be  used  by  Antoninus  in  the  same 
sense  as  (pavTacta.    Epictetus  uses  only  tyavTaoia. 

tyavTcicTov,  that  which  produces  a  tyavTacia  :  QavTaoTbv  rb 

TTETTOLTjliOQ  TTjV  (jxZVTaGiaV  aiodTJTOV. 

<t>vaig,  nature. 

<j>voLg,  Tj  to)v  oluv,  the  nature  of  the  universe. 

rpvxhy  soul,  life,  living  principle. 

ipvxv  hoyiKT],  voepd,  a  rational  soul,  an  intelligent  soul. 


THE  END. 


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